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Preface
The Gatherings in Biosemiotics is the first and only regular series o f worldwide 
conferences in semiotic biology. Originally these annual meetings alternated 
between Copenhagen and Tartu, but broadened their scope early on to in­
clude other destinations. This year s Gatherings in Biosemiotics again takes 
place in Tartu, and we have prepared a special edition o f the Tartu Semiotics 
Library book series, Gatherings in Biosemiotics, to commemorate this, the 
twelfth and largest o f the Gatherings so far. This commemorative edition in­
cludes new material on the basics of biosemiotics, as well as a complete his­
tory o f the Gatherings as told by their organizers.
The book is divided into three parts.
Hie first part. Approaches to Biosemiotics, includes five short papers on 
the importance o f semiotics for biology. In these papers Kalevi Kull, Terrence 
Deacon, Howard Pattee, Stuart Kauffman, and Myrdene Anderson describe 
their personal perspectives on the history and functionality o f biosemiotics.
The second part, History of the Gatherings, begins with two retrospectives, 
by the president o f the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies, Jesper 
HofFmeyer o f the University o f Copenhagen, and by the long-time vice 
president o f ISBS, Donald Favareau o f the National University of Singapore. 
We also publish here an original communique between Thomas Sebeok and 
Jesper HofFmeyer on the topic o f the very first Gatherings. We hope that these 
as well as a series o f shorter historical documents will lend perspective on the 
Gatherings in Biosem iotics in their entirety.
The third part features nearly the entire set o f submitted abstracts for this 
year s conference. We included them to give the reader an indication o f the 
whole breadth o f ideas and topics that biosemiotics currently covers.
In the simplest sense, “gathering” here means merely to get people together. 
For our purposes though, the additional connotation o f “gathering ones 
strength” for some great task also seems appropriate. Only the knowledge
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gained from the entire history o f the Gatherings would be equal to such a task. 
W hat this task will ultimately turn out to be remains to be seen. It is part o f our 
business here to find out.
Tyler Bennett 
Silver Rattasepp
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I. APPROACHES 
TO BIOSEMIOTICS
Advancements in biosemiotics: 
Where we are now in discovering 
the basic mechanisms 
of meaning-making
KALEVI K U LL 
University o f Tartu, Estonia
Exordium
It is now 20 years since the publication of the first book titled Biosemiotics1 
and from the Glottertal meetings that initiated much for the further decades. 
It is already 50 years since the coinage of the term ‘biosemiotics’. It is now 
40 years since the Waddington symposia, at which the theory for general 
biology has been actively searched for, with some clear, although not fully self- 
aware hints towards a semiotic biology.3 And there have been 11 annual 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics held with hundreds of scholars altogether discussing 
and advancing the approach. What has been achieved with these two decades?
We have two solid anthologies o f biosemiotics (Favareau 2010; Maran et 
al. 2011) as well as descriptions o f its history (Favareau 2007; Kull 2005). 
We have a monograph that can be used as a textbook o f biosem iotics (in two 
versions -  HofFmeyer 1996, 2008). We have at least three special selections 
o f chapters on biosem iotics that can also be used for teaching purposes 
(Barbieri 2007a; 2007b; Emmeche, Kull 2 0 1 1). And we have study programs 
on the masters and doctoral level, with many students having completed and 
defended their theses on biosemiotics -  in Tartu, Copenhagen, and elsewhere. 
However, what has been achieved within these two decades in the science o f 
biosem iotics -  that is, in understanding the phenomena o f life?
1 Sebeok, Umiker-Sebeok 1992.
2 Rothschild 1962.
3 Waddington 1968-1972. In these symposia, Howard Pattee and Brian Goodwin expressed 
straightforwardly biosemiotic ideas. It is notable that Stuart Kauffman was one of the partici­
pants.
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Understanding is deepened in a dialogue, in conversations. In a couple 
o f occasions, we have tried to formulate the main questions4 and the main 
statements o f biosem iotics together -  including the collective manifesto of 
biosem iotics that provides a version of its major principles (Kull et al. 2009).
Let me try to formulate here some conclusions and problems that have 
been collectively reached and formulated in our biosem iotics inquiry.
1. The lower semiotic threshold zone
Sebeok’s thesis that semiosis is coextensive with life5 is one o f the major 
keystones o f biosemiotics. However, it is still waiting for a more persuasive 
demonstration. Therefore it should still be treated as a hypothesis -  and 
apparently a very productive hypothesis. After Kram pens (1981) paper 
on phytosemiosis, and Sebeok’s inclusion o f all life (thus, biology) under 
the field o f semiotics, biosem iotics began to truly grow, as indicated by the 
collective statement on the scope o f semiotics (Anderson et al. 1984). After 
that, and in som e extent in parallel, Hoffmeyer and Emmeche developed their 
concept o f code duality,6 which has been seen simultaneously as the necessary 
requirement for both life and semiosis, and the inclusion o f Umberto Eco’s 
concept o f semiotic threshold7 into this analysis (for example, W. Nöth 
organised a meeting in Kassel on this topic). Remarkable work has been done 
by H. Pattee in describing the epistemic cut,8 and M. Barbieri in explicating 
the concept o f code9 -  both, in this way, adding arguments for Sebeok’s thesis. 
Very important work has been done by Terrence Deacon, who has provided 
modelling o f processes close to the origin o f life, thus enabling us to describe 
the stepwise origin o f sem iosis.10 This led to the formulation o f the concept 
o f semiotic threshold zone.11 Also, instead o f just extending the usage o f the 
concept of intentionality (Hoffmeyer 2008), Deacon (2011) has introduced 
the concept o f ententionality that covers the phenom enon upwards from the 
first processes o f life.
4 Kull et al. 2008.
s See the formulations collected in Kull et al. 2008, also Kull 2011.
6 Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991.
7 Eco 1976.
8 Pattee 2001.
9 Barbieri 2003.
10 Deacon 1997.
11 Worked out in Saka meeting, August 2008 (Kull, Deacon, Emmeche, Hoffmeyer, Stjernfelt 
2009).
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Nevertheless, what needs still to be done is the further modelling o f mini­
mal sem iosis in operational terms, i.e. in the way that would make it possible 
to apply semiotic m odels on the cellular level and to test these empirically. 
A  persuasive enough model o f semiosis for this purpose still seems to be 
absent.
2. (Re)interpretation of Peircean semiotics
Peirce sees semiosis as a process and this processual instead o f structural 
view has made his approach appropriate and productive for biosemiotics. 
However, the concrete application o f Peirce’s concepts has also raised a series 
o f problems and controversies.
Briefly, the statement is this. If  one accepts Sebeok’s thesis (which states 
that the phenomenon that distinguishes life forms from inanimate objects is 
semiosis) then it is reasonable to interpret Peirce’s model o f semiosis as limited 
to living systems. This is supported by Peirces claim that “since the phenomena 
of habit may [...] result from a purely mechanical arrangement [of the m ole­
cular arrangement o f protoplasm], it is unnecessary to suppose that habit- 
taking is a primordial principle o f the universe” (CP 6.262). In this case, the 
concept o f habit corresponds closely to the concept o f code.
We should, o f course, distinguish between and separate the history of 
science (which reconstructs what Peirce exactly said in context, and in 
different periods o f his life) from science itself (which uses some models 
formulated by Peirce and decontextualises them in order to apply them where 
relevant). In biosemiotics, we need to do the latter, and thus we need not agree 
with everything that he has said. Analogically, whenever anybody is effectively 
using the Darwinian model o f natural selection, it is used (ever since the neo- 
Darwinians) by completely abandoning Darwin’s concept o f inheritance 
(called pangenesis, on gemmules that would diffuse in the body and aggregate 
in the reproductive organs).
Peirce, indeed, developed a strong version o f synechism and applied 
fallibilism to physical laws, meaning that physical laws themselves need not be 
exact, but have exceptions. He needed this in order to explain diversification. 
Acceptance o f the primordiality o f habit in its extreme actually means that 
there are no physical laws in the sense that physics deals with them; instead 
they are all habit-like, i.e., as if mental sensu lato.
Due to knowledge that came much after Peirce, it is now possible to com ­
pletely abandon the hypothesis o f the primordiality o f habit. We may call this 
neo-Peirceanism, if we like.
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Contemporary understanding o f the role o f physical laws in explaining the 
phenomena of life (e.g., by H. Pattee, or S. Kauffman) is different from Peirces 
understanding of laws. Howard Pattee argues that physical laws (however 
strict) do not cover everything; they leave something open (such as initial 
conditions, or the construction o f instruments -  which obey strict physical 
laws but are not determined by these). Stuart Kauffman, somewhat similarly, 
states that there is no entailment by physical laws in the living.1“ The model 
o f diversification, as described by Ilya Prigogine, is one that does not require 
the primordiality o f habit either. Its freedom for diversification stems from 
fluctuations that can be thermal. The mathematics necessary for explaining 
self-organization was not yet available for Ch. Peirce.
Thus there are now models that solve the problem of diversification with­
out the assumption that physical laws themselves have to be habit-like. And 
we are still within Peirce s realism.
It seems that m ost cases that support the existence o f prebiotic physio- 
sem iosis (see review in Rodriguez Higuera 2012) are ones in which the 
author has not analysed the cellular processes and the current biological 
understanding about the differences between living and non-living systems. 
Similarly, insufficient analysis and knowledge o f vegetative life processes may 
be the reason for an opposite deviation, where interpretation processes and 
thus semiosis are confined to higher animals only (e.g., Short 2007).
In science (meant as Wissenschaft, i.e. more broadly than the word is 
commonly used in English), including semiotics, a large part o f the work 
involves the comparison of models. This is an analysis o f whether and to what 
extent the models fit. Our understanding o f phenomena is almost entirely 
based on our ability to find a match between unidentical models. (And this 
usually requires that we should not pay attention to the differences in names -  
words, or terms -  that are used by the different models. Ch. M orris and L. 
Bertalanffy already taught us this.) If we find the right and effective match, 
then the particular differences between the models becom e useful, since these 
are then the points at which one model can instruct the other.
The same is true o f Peirce’s model o f semiosis -  its usefulness depends on 
how we put it in correspondence with other models. And here I am: if one 
accepts Sebeok’s thesis, then it is reasonable to limit the Peirces m odel with 
living systems. And Peirce himself might like this.
In this respect, I would suggest one to read Peirce’s “Man’s glassy essence” 
(CP 6.238ff) (although it requires some knowledge o f physics), because this 
is where Peirce speaks about biophysics, and explicitly attempts to find the
12 Longoef al. 2012.
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molecular mechanism o f protoplasm that is responsible for habit. From this 
text, one can see that (a) Peirce tends to believe that a specific molecular 
constitution o f protoplasm is responsible for semiosis, and (b) at the time 
there was so little known about the physical structure o f matter, the energetics 
o f the cell and nonlinear thermodynamics that his further hesitations about 
the lower semiotic threshold are forgivable. For illustration, let me present 
here some not so often quoted passages o f Peirce (I intentionally abbreviated 
these so that in some cases his thought is slightly altered):
“I have to elucidate [...] the relation between the psychical and physical 
aspects of a substance. The first step towards this ought, I think, to be the 
framing of a molecular theory of protoplasm” (CP 6.238-9).
“ [...] physical property of protoplasm is that of taking habits” (CP 6.254).
“The problem is to find a hypothesis of the molecular constitution of this 
compound which will account for these properties, one and all” (CP 6.256).
“The truth is that, though the molecular explanation of habit is pretty vague 
on the mathematical side, there can be no doubt that systems of atoms having 
polar forces would act substantially in that manner, and the explanation is 
even too satisfactory to suit the convenience of an advocate of tychism. For it 
may fairly be urged that since the phenomena of habit may thus result from a 
purely mechanical arrangement, it is unnecessary to suppose that habit-taking 
is a primordial principle of the universe” (CP 6.262).
“ [...] unless we are to accept a weak dualism, the property must be shown to 
arise from some peculiarity of the mechanical system” (CP 6.264).
Peirce is indeed trying to find the mechanical model for the necessary 
conditions o f habit, and he more-or-less succeeds. He then, however, turns 
to the hypothesis o f primordial origin o f habit because he cannot explain 
certain other things... which, as I see it, can be explained with the physics o f 
the second half o f the 20th century.
I mean, first, the dissipative systems as a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for life, and, second, what Howard Pattee, Terry Deacon, Peter Wills 
and some others have understood and described as the emergence o f semiosis. 
Stuart Kauffman calls this radical emergence. Would Peirce have known this, he 
would have come to the Gatherings in Biosemiotics. (And would tell us that 
he now sees that what Kalevi and Marcello call codes would be habits in his 
terminology.)
It is reasonable to use Peirces model o f semiosis as one good model, but 
certainly not as the ultimate one. For instance, triadicity, which is a basic
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feature o f Peirces model, can be generalised into multiplicity -  i.e., a sign may 
have many aspects instead o f just three, and how many are relevant can be 
concluded as a result o f empirical analysis o f concrete cases. O ccam  s razor, 
which works well in the physical sciences, may not have a similar stand in 
semiotics.
Thus, in biosemiotics, it is productive to work with Peircean m odels, and 
to develop these -  but to do this as scientists, not as historians o f science.
3. Modelling of semiosis, of umwelt and knowing, and 
temporalization of basic sign types
W hen modelling semiosis, classifying signs or describing the semiotic pheno­
mena, it is highly insufficient to limit ourselves to theoretical work. It is 
necessary to look at and to carefully describe and classify the sign processes as 
they occur throughout the living realm, by conducting fieldwork and studies 
o f biocommunication proper.
Until now, there exist only a few works that could interrelate a large number 
o f different m odels o f sem iosis (such as Kram pens article), and there are even 
less o f those that have developed semiotic models on the basis o f empirical 
studies. Typology o f sem iosis cannot be done just deductively. It is important 
to see that both binarism and triadicity are the logical assumptions that stem 
from theoretical models, and not from empirical findings, when describing the 
signs, (in  this context it is remarkable to notice how, for instance, in the work 
o f Juri Lotm an from the 1960s to the late 1980s, his view on the structure of 
sign developed from binary, to ternary, to plural.)
An important reformulation o f the Peircean model has been developed by 
Terrence Deacon (1997), who demonstrates how the mechanism o f indexical 
sem iosis always includes the iconic, and the symbolic one the other two, 
relating these to concrete neurobiological processes. This also means that the 
movement from iconic to indexical to symbolic may have an ontogenetic (and 
consequently also a phylogenetic) basis. Such temporalization o f sign types 
(also described by Hoffmeyer, et al.) is an effective heuristic in (bio)sem iotic 
inquiry.
A remarkable analysis o f primary semiotic phenomena has also been 
provided by Umberto Eco in his Kant and the Platypus. He has introduced the 
concepts o f primary iconicity and primary indexicality, demonstrating, that 
the icon is primarily the sign that is itself responsible for creating a similarity 
relation, i.e., the primary icon does not reflect similarity, but instead makes 
things similar, introduces similarity as such.
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This is in a good accordance with the way that Jakob von Uexküll has 
attempted to describe umwelten of different species o f organisms. The 
semiotic mechanisms themselves are those responsible for the diversity and 
diversification o f umwelten. Uexküll also saw the big differences in the general 
approches to the study o f living beings, to doing biology. We can thus say that 
the way in which semiotics (including biosem iotics) differs fundamentally 
from physics (including biophysics) is that whereas physics studies the world 
as reducible to universal laws, semiotics instead studies all kinds o f knowing. 
Biophysics studies the physico-chemical structure o f organisms, biosemiotics 
studies what the organisms may know, what are the types and ways of knowing, 
and what it does with the world.
The typology o f biosemiotic processes may distinguish between vegetative 
and animal (icon-like and index-like) semiosis; however, the further studies 
should not just limit themselves to a Peircean or any other sign typology, but 
instead develop comparative studies o f the mechanisms o f meaning-making 
and introduce typologies that are empirically based. This means that there 
may be a different number than three (vegetative, animal, and cultural) levels 
of sign processes in life itself.
Another evidently efficient heuristic is the linking o f types o f semiosis with 
the types o f mechanisms o f learning (as was done already by G. Bateson). 
Among other things, this would allow us to include the study o f the forms 
and mechanisms o f conditioning into biosemiotic science. An example of an 
interesting problem in this respect would be the analysis o f the mechanisms of 
associative learning and their relationships to the indexical threshold zone.
4. The symbolic threshold zone
The origin o f humans and o f the human capacity for language is certainly a 
semiotic problem. Since Lev Vygotsky, it has been related to the emergence of 
the capacity to use and create symbols. T. Sebeokhas forcefully and repeatedly 
argued for a sharp difference in sign use between humans and non-humans, 
stating strongly that the term ‘language’ should be reserved exclusively for the 
sign systems that human babies start to acquire close to their first birthday, 
and which is almost completely absent in other known species o f organisms. 
Thus we can call language only those sign systems that include (among others) 
some symbols.
T. Deacon has further argued for this view in his The Symbolic Species, 
bringing in the description o f symbolic semiosis on the basis o f neural mecha­
nisms that are required for it.
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The importance of a careful description of this leap from non-linguistic sign 
systems to the linguistic ones on the basis of differences in semiotic mechanisms 
is evident: ( l )  it provides a basis for understanding the relationship between 
language and the objects it describes, via the inextricable role o f lower levels of 
sign-processes in language; (2 ) it makes it possible to overcome the false use 
o f biological m odels in the humanities (called darwinitis, and neuromania by 
Tallis 2011).
5. The relationship between semiosis and codes
This question has been rather difficult to resolve in the discussions during 
the last decade o f biosemiotics. The conclusion, briefly, is this: semiosis has 
prim acy before codes; codes are products o f semiosis. However, the question 
requires a more detailed analysis.
We can define code as a regular correspondence or link between entities that 
would not form such a regular correspondence on the basis o f self-assembly 
(because, in cases where we have a code, there is an immense number of 
possibilities to form alternative links). As different from self-assembly, the 
creating or inheriting o f codes requires work; i.e., a code is a correspondence 
or link that is created or inherited by sem iosis (by life).
A code, always built by semiosis, may nevetheless persist for some 
time without further activity o f sem iosis -  such as in many machines and 
automatons. Thus, code may exist (temporarily) without semiosis.
One can say that a code (and likewise, a grammar) is a frozen pragmatic, a 
frozen habit. This is a general feature of artefacts -  their pieces are put together, 
thereby building a code-relation into their body.
Semiosis is what is capable o f creating new code-relations. Simultaneously, 
sem iosis also carryies on existing codes, rebuilding and inheriting these. 
Semiosis always includes certain codes. Thus sem iosis cannot exist without 
codes. Code is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for semiosis.
Sem iosis always requires a previous sem iosis ( omne semiosis ex semiosis-, 
omne vivum ex vivo -  except at their initial emergence at the origin o f life). The 
capacity o f creating a new code implies that sem iosis is also a unit o f learning 
from experience. This means that semiosis assum es certain ambiguity, certain 
indeterminacy, unpredictability.
A living cell is a semiosic system. The translation process carried by ribo­
som es is a code-process, but it is only a part o f semiosis. The adaptors (called 
code-makers by M. Barbieri, like tRN As in the case o f the genetic code) are
Advancements in biosemiotics 19
necessary for building the code-relation, but nevertheless are insufficient for 
semiosis.
It seems reasonable to say that meaning-making is a feature o f semiosis and 
not o f code.
Meaning-making (and semiosis) appears when more than one code is 
involved, and the codes are mutually incompatible (i.e., code-plurality, or at 
least code-duality, is necessary). Semiosis is the search that appears due to the 
unpredictability (or, a piece o f freedom) that results from an incompatibility 
situation. This implies the primary intentionality. Therefore, life as ongoing 
semiosis as challenging incompatibility, can be described as permanent 
problem-solving.
In computers, or at least in simple calculators, there are built-in codes, but 
no new codes are created, there is no semiosis by itself. (However, a calculator 
in a process o f being used by a human is a part o f sem iosis.) In the case o f 
more advanced computers, I can imagine that a process equivalent to simple 
code-making (in Barbieri s sense) can be simulated. Yet this is not semiosis. 
However, in even a more advanced case, e.g., o f independently moving and 
sensing robot-computers that would try to communicate with each other on 
the basis o f non-identical codes, semiosis may temporarily appear.
There certainly exists a gray zone between semiosis and non-semiosis, at 
the lower semiotic threshold zone. For example, auto-cells (Terry Deacon’s 
concept) would belong to that zone.
Improving these central concepts is most certainly our work.
6. The evolution of semiosis
The semiotic approach has radically changed our understanding o f biological 
evolution. The statement o f F. Saussure that in the case o f signs, the primary 
processes that are responsible for their formation are synchronic and not 
diachronic, also holds more generally for biosemiotics. For biology, this 
means that the explanations o f phenomena, in first place, have to pay attention 
to the synchronic (or somewhat more generally, to ontogenetic) mechanisms, 
and the diachronic (evolutionary, phylogenetic) processes can be seen as their 
resultants. Here, for the biological theory o f evolution, the most interesting 
discussions will start.
The alternative theories of evolution can be put very briefly as, either ( l )  
genetic change precedes the epigenetic one, or (2) the epigenetic change is 
prior to the genetic, in an evolutionary adaptive change.
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The neo-Darwinian model of evolution clearly speaks in favour of the first 
option -  the first thing to happen is a new random mutation, which creates a new 
phenotype, which can or cannot be preserved due to natural selection, defined 
as the differential reproduction of genotypes. The semiotic model of evolution 
states the opposite -  the first thing to happen is the change in phenotype (which 
includes changes in the usage of the genome, in its expression pattern), which 
can or cannot be affixed by random changes in the genome.
For a long time, the neo-Darwinian model has been seen as having no real 
alternatives for explaining adaptive evolution. However, just in the recent decade, 
a remarkable shift in this has taken place due to advances in developmental 
biology (Müller, Newman 2003; West-Eberhard 2003; Kull 2000).
A  somewhat misleading concept is that o f meme, because it tends to hide 
an important difference that exists between semiotic and physical approaches. 
According to the initial content o f this concept, a meme reproduces and 
evolves on the basis o f a natural selection mechanism -  it may have a random 
mutation, and the differences in reproduction o f memes determine their 
evolution. The reproduction o f memes occurs via imitation, and here is the 
crux o f the matter. According to R. Dawkins and his followers, imitation 
can be m odelled as copying. In this case, indeed, the neo-Darwinian model 
applies. However, if one considers that imitation is by itself a sign process, 
one that requires agency and thus is dependent on the choices made by the 
organism that imitates, then it is clear that here the mechanism of evolution is 
semiotic and not neo-Darwinian. Accordingly, it is organic selection and not 
natural selection that drives the process. The concept o f meme as a vulgarized 
concept o f sign is thus not only unnecessary, but also misleading. Instead, we 
should use a typology o f signs in which certain types o f iconic signs may look 
as if Dawkins' meme.
It is thus important that the evolvement o f semiosis includes both 
the diminishing o f semiotic freedom, when new codes are introduced in 
habituation, and an increase o f semiotic freedom, when new options appear 
due to the replacement or abandoning o f codes.
7. Tools for modelling
Since meaning-making is by its very nature unpredictable in the first place, 
deductive formal models cannot work for modelling the results o f this 
process.
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Sem iosis occurs at the interaction o f two or more codes (or languages) that 
are mutually and partially incompatible.
Semiosis assumes polysemy. Formal languages, including mathematics, as 
different from natural languages, aim to be monosemic. Polysemy (homonymy) 
is the very source of meaning-making (as well as freedom). From a mathematical 
point of view, semiosis includes incompatibility. Among the models of semiosis, 
Lotman’s model explicitly describes the fundamental role of incompatibility, or 
non-translatability. The inclusion of incompatibility makes semiotic modelling 
different from physical modelling as well (for the latter, mathematics fits 
perfectly), because the modelling of semiosis assumes that the object under 
description is logically incompatible. Natural language can therefore be a better 
tool than a formal language for modelling semiosis, or life itself.
Peroration
The major limitation in today’s biosem iotics (and also in semiotics in general) 
is the insufficient development o f models o f semiosis. M ost o f the existing 
models are so simple and primitive that they do not allow to us operationally 
distinguish between sign types, they do not include enough o f the necessary 
distinctions in order to analyse the concrete semiosic phenomena o f life. In 
order to develop biosem iotics as a theoretical and an empirical field o f study, 
further work in elaborating semiotic m odels is crucial.
This means that the models used in anthroposemiotics have to be updated, 
so that the necessary coexistence o f lower levels o f semiosis will be explicated. 
Only then can it be properly demonstrated to what extent it is true that the 
major watershed does not lay between culture and nature, but between living 
(together with all that life produces) and non-life.
Biology can then becom e a science that not only knows the chemicals o f 
life, but also the world in which the organisms live, the issues they distinguish 
in their umwelten, the meanings that they make.
This is also important in order to replace the false biologization of the hu­
manities by the appropriate description o f the semiotic, tying together again 
the fragile diversity o f the fascinating living world. Until there is life to enjoy.
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On the importance of semiotics for biology
T E R R E N C E  W. D E A C O N  
University o f California, Berkeley, USA
Biology stands in a central position astride a great intellectual chasm that has 
defined the Western science since the Enlightenment. On one side there is the 
shiny clean edifice o f the physical sciences, that has as its foundation the three 
pillars o f mathematics, physics, and chemistry. On the other side there is a 
tangled jungle o f ideas constituting the social sciences and humanities, whose 
every trunk and shoot is rooted in a muddy humus of feelings, representations, 
purposes, and values.
Contem porary biology, however, is in the curious position o f claiming to 
be firmly resting on the physical side o f this divide and yet is permeated with 
concepts and assumptions with deep affinities to the other. Life defiantly resists 
full analysis without the use o f such concepts as selves, functions, adaptations, 
and information. And no matter how hard we protest that these are merely 
temporary stand-ins for fully reduced chemical and mechanistic relationships, 
each time a living function is analysed to expose its component materials and 
dynamics we find that we must yet again embed our descriptions of these 
new findings in a language replete with intentional and normative terms. It 
is because o f this that biologists have more and more often found themselves 
having to fend off the insistence o f vitalists and religious fundamentalists 
who argue that only some immaterial essence or intentional “force” could 
explain life.
A crucial crossroads was encountered with the discovery o f the structure 
and function o f D N A, and its identification with information. Coincidentally, 
with the nearly simultaneous coining of a new technical concept of information, 
which reduced it to mere statistical and physical difference, and the parallel 
development o f the computer sciences it was possible for decades to avoid 
confronting the paradoxical stance o f treating this most basic function of life 
as both merely chemical and at the same time semiotic.
That time has passed. Simple mechanistic conceptions o f life and com ­
putational theories o f mind have had half a century to prove themselves
26 TERRENCE W. DEACON
adequate, and while it is true that both paradigms have yielded enormous 
technical advances, neither has moved science any closer to resolving these 
dilemmas. This is because this critical “epistemic cut” is located at the root 
o f life and so merely importing terminology from human phenomenal and 
communicational experience and applying it by analogy to basic living 
functions is ultimately a circular enterprise. M inds were not in some way 
grafted onto biological systems; mentality emerged from and grew out of 
organisms during their evolution.
So not only do we currently have an un-grounded theory o f semiotic 
processes at the molecular, cellular, and organism level, but lacking this 
foundation we are very likely making unsupported assum ptions about the 
nature of mental and interpersonal semiosis as well. For this reason developing 
a well-grounded biosemiotic theory based on first principles is actually 
critical for theories o f sem iosis at all levels. It’s time that we turn to the work of 
making this heuristic theory scientific. And to do this we must start from the 
ground up -  with biosemiotics.
Biosemiotics needs to engage other scientists
HOWARD H. PATTEE
State University of New York at Binghamton, USA
I had just finished re-reading J. B. S. Haldane s Daedalus or Science and the Future 
when Kalevi asked me to write a few informal comments on the “importance 
o f semiotics for biology” for the Tartu meeting. Haldane warns that the paper 
may be irritating -  but irritation has a purpose. He says: "It will be criticized 
for its undue and unpleasant emphasis on certain topics. This is necessary if people 
are to be induced to think about them, and it is the whole business of a university 
teacher to induce people to think." M ost biosemioticians would be happy if they 
could induce biologists to think o f more meaningful ways to “make sense” o f 
their data. We all know from our own efforts, that inducing people to think in 
novel ways is often a useless exercise, especially if they are embedded in highly 
specialized and well-established disciplines, such as genetics, molecular, and 
evolutionary biology.
Haldane originally presented the paper in 1923. It was reissued with 
commentaries in 1995. The paper was both controversial and influential be­
cause it predicted, among other technologies, “birth control” and “ectogenetic 
procreation” -  topics that shocked many Victorians. This is also the paper 
where Haldane quipped that, “Einstein was the greatest Jew  since Je su s” -  an 
opinion irritating for many Christians who felt it was blasphemous. The paper 
even upset Haldane’s liberal father, the physiologist John Scott Haldane.
Haldane was skilled at being irritatingly clever enough to induce thought, 
without crossing the line and just being irritating. In my opinion, biosemiotic 
criticism o f biologists and physicists has not always been that clever. For 
example, calling physicists “reductionists” and “mechanists” will not produce 
any change in how physicists think. It will, however, produce irritation. Also, I 
have not known any biologists who feel the need for biosemiotics to “liberate” 
them from “the big-brother role” o f physics, as Hoffmeyer suggests. Haldane 
certainly did not feel that way. He pictured physics as “a degenerate form of 
biology” -  a concept that did induce some new thoughts among physicists.
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To som e extent biologists have been changing their thinking out of 
necessity, because o f the plethora of data. Joshua Lederberg in the Foreword 
to the 1995 Daedalus reissue commented that “Biology is already so fact laden 
that it is in danger of being bogged down awaiting advances in logic and linguistics 
to ease the integration of particulars’. Today, seventeen years later, data continue 
to fill petabytes of memory faster than ever. Necessity has given rise to many 
highly specialized datasets, the so-called “-omes,” and technical disciplines, 
the “-omics,” and to the re-emergence of “systems biology” as a necessary 
complement to what is often mislabelled as “reductionist” data processing.
In my opinion, biosem iotics has not yet effectively engaged biologists, 
or induced them to think differently. It is still too isolated to be influential. I 
would suggest that biosem iotics needs to actively engage more physicists and 
biologists in direct conversations if it expects to influence how they think. For 
example, I learned about biosem iotics only because Kalevi convinced me to 
write a paper (Pattee 2001), and subsequently we learned more about both 
our subjects from personal discussions (Pattee, Kull 2009). It would also help 
to invite active scientists to speak at department seminars and at biosemiotics 
meetings, especially those scientists from disciplines that biosemiotics has 
criticized and hopes to influence.
O f course, there is risk in such direct two-way engagement. One risk is 
that it would allow physicists and biologists to answer the criticisms o f their 
thinking that are often used to justify the field o f biosemiotics, like the charges 
o f reductionism and mechanism. There is also a general attitude that semiotic 
terms as used by biologists are unprincipled (Em m eches “spontaneous 
semiotics”) . !  have not found this to be the case with the biologists I have known. 
For example, speaking in defence o f Lederberg, I would say his discovery of 
communication in bacteria was certainly not unprincipled or spontaneous; 
nor was his proposal that it is the information in the coded one-dimensional 
base sequences, not the material three-dimensional D N A  structure, that 
determines enzyme folding, and therefore its function. Lederberg discussed 
this in his Nobel Lecture in 1959, before the genetic code was discovered. It 
was empirically demonstrated by Christian Anfinsen in the following year, for 
which he also received the Nobel Prize 12 years later. As far as I know, this was 
the first principled and empirically verified support for the argument that all 
life depends on symbolic information controlling material function. This is the 
level where a scientific biosemiotics first arises.
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From physics to semiotics
STUART KAUFFMAN
University of Vermont, USA, and Tampere University of Technology, 
Finland
Introduction
My greatest aim in this chapter is to take us from our deeply received scientific 
world view and, derived from it, our view o f the “real world” in which we 
live, from the world spawned by Newton and modern physics, to an entirely 
different, newly vibrant, surprising, unknowable world o f becoming, in which 
the living, evolving world -  biological, economic, cultural -  co-creates, in an 
unprestatable mystery, its own possibilities o f becoming. We will pass from 
physics to the edges o f semiotics along the wray. One issue to ask is this: Why 
is the subject o f semiotics regarded as almost a pseudoscience by so many 
scientists? I shall argue that this view is deeply wrong, among the other points 
I seek to make.
I have many points to make and ideas to explore, and hope they shall prove 
relevant and find resonance. If I am right, we are in the world in a way that 
we do not now clearly recognize. In it we will find a natural magic, in William 
G addis’ sense in The Recognitions: “There is no truth beyond magic”.
I begin with an amazing statement by the early sociologist M ax Weber, 
who said, roughly, that “With Newton we became disenchanted and entered 
m odernity”. Weber was right. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the white and 
black magi sought magical knowledge o f the world. Kepler was perhaps the 
last o f the white magi, with his transition to modern physics, starting with the 
five Platonic solids for the orbits o f the planets and finding his way to, of all 
things, ellipses.
The black magi were convinced that by incantations they could stand Nature 
on her head and wrest their due. Following Newton’s triumph in founding 
classical physics there came our Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, 
and modernity. Newton’s amazing successes left no room for magic.
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Newton
The Western and now modern world 350 years later changed with the in­
ventions of, largely, one mind, Newton: he invented not only the mathematics 
o f differential and integral calculus that gives us moderns our way of thinking, 
but from physics upward, he gave us his famous three laws o f motion, and 
universal gravitation.
Ask Newton: “I have 9 billiard balls rolling on a billiard table. What will 
happen to them?” Newton might have rightly responded: “Measure the 
positions and momenta and diameters o f all the balls, the boundary conditions 
o f the table, write down my three laws o f motion representing the forces 
between the balls and between the balls and the edges o f the table, then inte­
grate my equations to yield the deterministic future trajectories o f the balls”.
W hat had Newton done? He had mathematized Aristotle’s “efficient 
cause” in his differential equations, giving forces between the entities, the 
laws o f motion. He had invented a conceptual framework to derive the 
deterministic trajectory consequences by integration. But integration is 
deduction is “entailment”, so the laws o f motion in differential form entail the 
deterministic trajectories. In this entailment, Newton mathematized in a very 
general framework Aristotle’s argument that scientific explanations must be 
deductive: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, hence Socrates is mortal.
In the early 1800s, Pierre-Simon Laplace generalized Newton: given a 
massive computing system, the Laplacian demon, informed o f the instanta­
neous positions and momenta o f all the particles in the universe, the entire 
future and (because Newton’s laws are time reversible) past o f the universe is 
fully predictable and determined.
This statement by Laplace is the birth o f “reductionism”, the long-held view 
that there is some “final theory” down there, Steven W einbergs “Dream of a 
final theory”, that will entail all that becomes in the universe.
We need two additional points.
(a) By the time o f Poincare, studying the orbits o f three gravitating objects 
(a topic Newton knew was trouble), Poincare was the first to show what is now 
known as deterministic chaos. Here tiny changes in initial conditions lead to 
trajectories which diverge from one another exponentially. Since we cannot 
measure positions and momenta to infinite accuracy, Poincare showed that 
we cannot predict the behavior o f a chaotic deterministic dynamical system. 
Determinism, contra Laplace, does not imply predictability.
(b) Quantum mechanics overthrew the ontological determinism of 
Newton, on most interpretations o f quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, 
quantum systems obeying the Schrödinger equation deterministically evolve
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a probability distribution o f the ontologically indeterminate probabilities of 
quantum measurements.
With General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, the twin pillars of 
20th century physics were and remain firmly in place. N o attempt to unite 
General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics has been successful after 85 years 
o f trying. Success may or may not come.
Darwin
After Newton, and perhaps as profoundly, Darwin changed our thinking. 
We all know the central tenets o f his theory: heritable variation among a 
population, competition for resources insufficient for all to survive, hence 
Natural Selection culling out those variants “fitter” in the current environment. 
Thus we achieve adaptation, and critically, the appearance of design without a 
designer.
The story o f the difficulties o f Darw ins theory with “blending inheritance” 
and its unexpected rescue by Mendelian genetics, even the fact that a copy 
o f M endel’s work lay unopened on Darwin’s desk, is well known. Mendeiian 
genetics prevents blending inheritance and paved the way for the mid- 
20th century “neo-Darwinian synthesis”.
The entire panoply o f life’s evolution at last lay open, or at least the start of 
its understanding provided by Darwin.
Monod and “teleonomic”
The concepts o f “function”, “doing”, and ‘purpose” in biology, and with it, a 
potential “meaning” for signs or symbols, that are entirely absent from physics, 
where only “happenings” occur, were muted in standard biology by Jaques 
M onod. Consider a bacterium swimming up a glucose gradient. It “seems” 
to be “acting to get food”. But, said M onod, this view o f the organism is 
entirely wrongheaded. The cell in its environment is just an evolved molecular 
machine. Thanks to natural selection, the swimming up the gradient gives the 
appearance o f purpose, o f teleology, but this is false. Instead, this behavior is a 
mere “as i f ” teleology that M onod called “teleonom y”.
In short, for M onod, and for legions o f later biologists and philosophers, 
“doing” is unreal in the universe; there is only the mechanical, selected 
appearance o f “doing”.
Indeed, in so arguing, Monod is entirely consistent with physics. As noted, 
there are no “functions”, “doings”, or “meanings” in physics. Balls rolling down a 
hill are merely Newtonian “happenings” So too are the happenings in the evolved 
molecular machine that is the bacterium swimming up the glucose gradient.
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Yet we humans think that functions and doings are real in our world. If so, 
from whence come functions, doings and meanings?
Functions, meanings, and doings are real in the universe
I now give, as far as I know, an entirely new set o f arguments that, I believe, 
fully legitimize functions, doings and even meanings as real in the universe, 
but beyond physics. The discussion has a number o f steps.
The non-ergodic universe above the complexity of the atom
Has the universe in its 13.7 billion years o f existence created all the possible
fundamental particles and stable atoms? Yes.
Now consider proteins. These are linear sequences o f twenty kinds o f 
amino acids that typically fold into some shape and catalyze a reaction or 
perform som e structural or other function. A  biological protein can range in 
length from perhaps 50 amino acids to several thousands. A  typical length is 
300 amino acids long.
Then let s consider all the possible proteins that are 200 amino acids long. 
How many are possible? Each position in the 200 has 20 possible choices o f 
amino acids, so there are 20 x 20 x 20 200 times or 20 to the 200th power, 
which is roughly 10 to the 260th power possible proteins with the length of 
200.
Now let s ask if the universe can have created all these proteins since its 
inception 13.7 billion years ago. There are roughly 10 to the 80th particles 
in the known universe. If these were doing nothing, ignoring space-like 
separation, but making proteins on the shortest time scale in the universe, the 
Planck time scale o f 10 raised to -43 seconds, it would take 10 raised to the 
39th power times the lifetime o f our universe to make all possible proteins 
length 200 just once.
In short, in the lifetime o f our universe, only a tiny fraction o f all possible 
proteins can have been created. This means profound things. First, the universe 
is vastly non-ergodic. It is not like a gas at equilibrium in statistical mechanics. 
With this vast non-ergodicity, when the possibilities are vastly larger than 
what can actually happen, history enters.
Not only will we not make all the possible proteins with lengths o f 200 or 
2000, we will not make all possible organs, organisms, social systems... There 
is an indefinite hierarchy o f non-ergodicity as the complexity o f the objects we 
consider increases.
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Kantian wholes and the reality of ‘Junctions’ and “doings”
The great philosopher, Immanuel Kant, wrote that “In an organized being, the 
parts exist for and by means o f the whole, and the whole exists for and by 
means o f the parts”. Kant was at least considering organisms which I will call 
Kantian wholes.
Functions are clearly definable in a Kantian whole. The function of a 
part is its causal role in sustaining the existence o f the Kantian whole. Other 
causal consequences are side effects. Note that this definition of function rests 
powerfully on the fact that Kantian wholes, such as a bacterial cell dividing, are 
complex entities that only get to exist in the non-ergodic universe above the level 
of atoms because they are Kantian self-recreating wholes. It is this combination of 
the self-recreation o f a Kantian whole and therefore its very existence in the 
non-ergodic universe above the level o f atoms that, I claim, fully legitimizes 
the word “function” as a part o f a whole in an organism. Functions are real in 
the universe.
Now consider the bacterium swimming up the glucose gradient to “get 
food”, M onod’s merely teleonomic as if “doing”. We can rightly define a be­
havior that sustains a Kantian whole, say the bacterium existing in the non- 
ergodic universe, as a “doing”. Thus, I claim, “doings” are real in the universe, 
not merely M onod’s teleonomy.
Interestingly, Kant opined that there would never be a Newton of biology. 
Despite Darwin, a major point of this paper, which will take us beyond physics, 
is that here Kant was right. There never, indeed, will be a Newton of biology, 
for, as we will see below, unlike physics and its law entailed trajectories, the 
evolution o f the biosphere cannot be entailed by laws o f motion and their 
integration. N o laws entail the evolution o f the biosphere, a first and major 
step beyond physics at the “watershed o f life”.
Collectively autocatalytic DNA sets, RNA sets or peptide sets 
Gonen Ashkenasy at the Ben Gurion University in Israel has created in the 
laboratory a set o f nine small proteins, called peptides. Each peptide speeds 
up, or catalyzes, the formation o f the next peptide by ligating two fragments of 
that next peptide into a second copy of itself. This catalysis proceeds around a 
cycle o f the nine peptides (Wagner, Ashkenasy 2009).
It is essential that in Ashkenasy’s real system, no peptide catalyzes its own 
formation. Rather, the set as a whole collectively catalyzes its own formation. I 
shall call this a collectively autocatalytic set, CAS.
These astonishing results prove a number o f critical things. First, since the 
discovery o f the famous double helix o f DNA, and its W atson-Crick template
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replication, many workers have been convinced that molecular reproduction 
must rest on something like template replication o f D N A, RNA or related 
molecules. It happens to be true that all attempts to achieve such replication 
without an enzyme have failed for 50 years. Ashkenasy s results demonstrate 
that small proteins can collectively reproduce. Peptides and proteins have no 
axis o f symmetry like the D N A  double helix. These results say that molecular 
reproduction m aybe far easier than we have thought.
I shall only mention briefly that between 1971 and 1993, 1 invented a 
theory for the statistically expected emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets 
in sufficiently diverse “chemical soups” (Kauffman 1971; 1986; 1993). This 
hypothesis, tested numerically, is now a theorem (M ossel, Steel 2005). If it is 
correct, routes to molecular reproduction in the universe may be abundant.
Collectively autocatalytic D N A  sets and RN A sets have also been made 
(Lam, Joyce 2009; Kiedrowski 1986).
Collectively autocatalytic sets are the simplest cases of Kantian wholes and the 
peptide parts have functions
A collectively autocatalytic set is precisely a Kantian whole, which “gets to 
exist” in the non-ergodic universe above the level o f atoms, precisely because 
it is a self-reproducing Kantian whole. Moreover, given that whole, the 
“function” o f a given peptide part o f the nine peptide set is exactly its role in 
catalyzing the ligation o f two fragments o f the next peptide into a second copy 
of that peptide. The fact that the first peptide may jiggle water in catalyzing 
this reaction is a causal side effect that is not the function o f the peptide. 
Ihus, functions are typically a subset o f the causal consequences o f a part o f a 
Kantian whole.
Task closure
Collectively autocatalytic sets exhibit a terribly important property. If we 
consider catalyzing a reaction a “catalytic task” then the set as a whole achieves 
“task closure”. All the reactions that must be catalyzed by at least one of 
Ashkenasy s nine peptides are catalyzed by at least one o f those peptides. 
No peptide catalyzes its own formation. The set as a whole catalyzes its own 
reproduction via a clear task closure.
Task closure in a dividing bacterium
Consider a dividing bacterium. It too achieves some only partially known form 
of task closure in part in and via its environmental niche. But the tasks are far 
wider than mere catalysis. Among these tasks are DNA replication, membrane
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formation, the formation of chemiosmotic pum ps and complex cell signaling 
mechanisms in which a chemically arbitrary molecule can bind to part of a 
trans-membrane protein, and thereby alter the behaviour o f the intracellular 
part o f that molecule, which in turn unleashes intracellular signalling. Thus 
this task closure is over a wide set o f tasks.
Biosemiosis enters at this point
I thank Professor Kalevi Kull o f the Department o f Semiotics at the University 
o f Tartu for convincing me that at just this point, biosem iotics enters.1 As Kull 
points out, the set of molecules that can bind the outside parts of transmembrane 
proteins are chemically arbitrary -  a point M onod emphasized as well in 
considering allosteric enzymes. Thus, as Kull (2009; 2010) points out, the set 
o f states o f the different molecules outside the cell that can bind to the outside 
parts o f these transmembrane proteins and unleash intracellular signaling and 
a coordinated cellular response, constitute a semiotic code by which the cell 
navigates its “known” world, “known” -  without positing consciousness -  via 
the code and, in general, probably evolved by selection encoding of the world 
as “seen” by the organism. Change the molecule species binding the outside of 
the transmembrane proteins, and the world the cell “knows” changes.
Biosem iosis is real in the universe.
Toward: No entailing laws, but enablement in the evolution 
of the biosphere
I now shift attention to a new and I believe transformative topic. With my 
colleagues Giuseppe Longo and Маё1 Montevil, mathematicians at the 
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, I wish to argue that no law entails the evolution 
o f the biosphere.“ If we are right, entailing law, the centerpiece of physics 
since Newton, ends at the watershed o f evolving life. If this claim is right, it 
is obviously deeply important. More, it raises the issue o f how the biosphere, 
the most complex system we know in the universe, can have arisen beyond 
entailing law. I will discuss these issues as well. Again, the discussion proceeds 
in several steps.
1 Kull, Kalevi 2012, pers. comm.
2 The full article, the title o f this section, by Longo, Montevil and Kauffman, is online (2012a), 
and in press (2012b).
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The uses of a screwdriver cannot be listed algorithmically
Here is the first “strange” step. Can you name all the uses o f a screwdriver, 
alone or with other objects or processes? Well, screw in a screw. Open a paint 
can, wedge open a door, wedge closed a door, scrape putty off a window, stab 
an assailant, objet dart, when tied to a stick, a fish spear, the spear rented to 
“natives” for a 5% fish catch return it becom es a new business...
I think we all are convinced that the following two statements are true: (i) 
the number o f uses o f a screwdriver is indefinite; (ii) unlike the integers which 
can be ordered, there is no natural ordering o f the uses o f a screwdriver. The 
uses are unordered. But these two claims entail that there is no “Turing effec­
tive procedure” to list all the uses o f a screwdriver alone or with other objects 
or processes. In short, there is no algorithm to list the uses o f a screwdriver.
Now consider one use o f the screwdriver, say to open a can o f paint. Can 
you list all the other objects, alone or with other objects or processes that may 
carry out the “function” o f opening a can o f paint? Again, the number o f ways 
to achieve this function are indefinite in number, and unorderable, so again, 
no algorithm can list them all.
Adaptations in an evolving cell cannot be prestated
Now consider an evolving bacterium or a eukaryotic single celled organism. 
In order to adapt in some new environment, all that has to occur is that some 
one or many cellular or molecular “screwdrivers” happen to “find a use” that 
enhances the fitness o f the evolving cell in that new environment. Then there 
must be heritable variation for those properties o f the cellular screwdrivers, 
and natural selection will select, or cull out, the fitter variants with the new 
uses o f the molecular screwdrivers which constitute adaptation. This is the 
arrival o f the “fitter”.
But no algorithmic list o f the possible uses o f these cellular screwdrivers 
can be had, thus we cannot know, ahead o f time, what natural selection 
acting at the level of the Kantian whole organism, will reveal as the new uses 
o f the cellular screwdrivers acting in part via the niche o f the organism, 
which succeed better, hence were selected. We cannot, in general, prestate the 
adaptive changes that will occur. This is the deep reason evolutionary theory 
is so weakly predictive.
We cannot prestate the actual niche of an evolving organism 
The task closure o f the evolving cell is achieved, in part, via causal or quantum 
consequences passing through the environment that constitutes the “actual 
niche” o f the evolving organism. But the features o f the environmental “niche”
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that participate with the molecular screwdrivers in the evolving cell, which 
will allow a successful task closure, are circularly defined with respect to the 
organism itself. We only b low  after the fact o f natural selection what aspects 
o f the evolving cell and its screwdrivers, and causal consequences o f specific 
aspects o f the actual niche, are successful when selection has acted at the level 
o f the Kantian whole evolving cell population.
Thus, we cannot prestate the actual niche o f an evolving cell by which it 
achieves task closure in part via that niche.
But these facts have a deep meaning. In physics, the phase space o f the 
system is fixed, for Newton, Einstein and Schrödinger. This allows for entailing 
laws. In evolution, each time an adaptation occurs and a molecular or other 
screwdriver finds a new use in a new actual niche, the very phase space of 
evolution has changed, and done so in an unprestatable way. But this means 
that we can write no equations of motion for the evolving biosphere. Moreover, the 
actual niche can be considered as the boundary condition on selection. But 
we cannot prestate the actual niche. In the case o f billiard balls, Newton gave 
us the laws o f motion, told us to establish initial and boundary conditions, and 
then integrate laws o f motion stated in differential equation form to get the 
entailed trajectories. But in biology, we cannot write down the laws o f motion, 
and so cannot write them down in differential equation form. Nor, even if we 
could, can we know the niche boundary conditions, so could not integrate 
those laws o f motion which we do not have anyway. It would be like trying to 
solve the billiard ball problem on a billiard table whose shape changes forever 
in unknown ways. We would then have no mathematical model. Here, too, the 
profound implication is that no laws entail the evolution of the biosphere.
If this is correct, we are, as stated above, at the end o f reductionism at 
the watershed o f evolving life. Now the machine metaphor since Descartes, 
perfected by Newton, leads us to think o f organisms, as M onod stated, as 
molecular machines. Let me distinguish diachronic from synchronic science. 
Diachronic science studies the evolution o f life and its “becom ing” over time. 
Synchronic science studies the presumably fully reducible aspects of, for 
example, how a heart, once it has come to exist in the non-ergodic universe, 
“works”. In these synchronic studies, reductionism presumably works. But in 
the diachronic becoming o f the biosphere, life is an ongoing, unprestatable, non- 
algorithmic, non-machine, problem solving for survival, becoming.
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Darwinian preadaptations and radical emergence: The evolving biosphere, 
without the 'action” of selection, creates its own future possibilities of becoming 
If we asked Darwin what the function o f my heart is, he would respond, 
“Pump your blood”. But my heart makes heart sounds and jiggles water in 
my pericardial sac. If I asked Darwin why these are not the functions o f my 
heart, he would answer that I have a heart because its pumping blood was 
o f selective advantage in my ancestors. In short, he would give a selection 
account o f the causal consequence for virtue o f which I have a heart. Note 
that he is also giving an account o f why hearts exist at all as complex entities in 
the non-ergodic universe above the level o f atoms. By pumping blood, hearts 
are functioning parts o f humans as reproducing Kantian wholes. Note again 
that the function o f my heart is a subset o f its causal consequences, pumping 
blood, not heart sounds or jiggling water in my pericardial sac.
Darwin had an additional deep idea: A causal consequence o f a part o f an 
organism o f no selective significance in a given environment might come to be 
of selective significance in a different environment, so be selected, and typically, 
a new function would arise. These are called “Darwinian preadaptations” 
without this meaning foresight on the part o f evolution. Stephen Jay Gould 
renamed them “exaptations”.
I will give but one example of the thousands of Darwinian preadaptations. 
Some fish have a swim bladder, a sac partly filled with air and partly with 
water, whose ratio determines the neutral buoyancy in the water column. 
Paleontologists believe the swim bladder evolved from the lungs of lung fish. 
Water got into some lungs, now sacs partly filled with air, partly with water, 
poised to evolve into swim bladders. Let’s assume the paleontologists are right.
I now ask three questions: ( l )  D id a new function come to exist in the 
biosphere? Yes, neutral buoyancy in the water column. (2 ) Did the evolution of 
the swim bladder alter the future evolution o f the biosphere? Yes, new species 
of fish evolved with swim bladders. They evolved new mutant proteins. And 
critically, the swim bladder, once it came to exist, constituted what I will call a 
new adjacent possible empty niche, for a worm, bacterium or both could evolve to 
live only in swim bladders. I return to this point in a moment, for magic hides 
here. (3 ) Now that you are an expert on Darwinian preadaptations, can you 
name all possible Darwinian preadaptations just for humans in the next three 
million years? Try it and feel your mind go blank. We all say no. A start to why 
we cannot is this: how would you name all possible selective environments? 
Flow would you know you listed them all? How would you list all the features 
o f one or many organisms that might serve as “preadaptations”? We cannot.
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The underlying reasons for why we cannot do this are given above in the 
discussion about screwdrivers, their non-algorithmically listable uses alone 
or with other objects/processes, and the non-algorithmically listable other 
objects/processes that can accomplish any specific task (opening a can of 
paint), that we can use a screwdriver to accomplish.
The adjacent possible
Consider a flask o f 1000 kinds of small organic molecules. Call these the 
“actual”. Now let these react by a single reaction step. Perhaps new molecular 
species may be formed. Call these new species the molecular “Adjacent 
Possible”. It is perfectly defined if we specify a minimal stable lifetime of a 
molecular species. Now let me point at the Adjacent Possible o f the evolving 
biosphere. Once lung fish existed, swim bladders were in the Adjacent Possible 
o f the evolution o f the biosphere. But two billion years ago, before there were 
multi-celled organisms, swim bladders were not in the Adjacent Possible of 
the evolution o f the biosphere.
I think we all agree to this. But now consider what we seem to have agreed 
to: with respect to the evolution of the biosphere by Darwinian preadaptations, 
we do not know all the possibilities.
Now let me contrast our case for evolution with that o f flipping a fair 
coin 10,000 times. Can we calculate the probability o f 5640 heads? Sure, 
use the binomial theorem. But note that here we know ahead of time all the 
possible outcomes, all heads, all tails, alternative heads and tails, all the 2 to 
the 10,000th power possible patterns o f heads and tails. Given that we know 
all the possible outcomes, we thereby know the “sample space” o f this process, 
so can construct a probability measure. We do not know what will happen, but 
we know w4iat can happen.
But in the case o f the evolving biosphere, not only do we not know what 
will happen, we don’t even know what can happen. There are at least two huge 
implications o f this: ( l )  We can construct no probability measure for this 
evolution by any known mathematical means. We do not know the sample 
space. (2 ) Reason, the prime human virtue o f our Enlightenment, cannot 
help us in the case o f the evolving biosphere, for we do not even know what 
can happen, so we cannot reason about it. The same is true o f the evolving 
econosphere, culture, and history: we often do not know ahead o f time the 
new variables which will become relevant, so we cannot reason about them. 
Thus, real life is not an optimization problem, top down, over a known space 
o f possibilities. It is far more mysterious. How do we navigate, not knowing 
what can happen? Yet we do.
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Without natural selection, the biosphere enables and creates 
its own future possibilities
Now I introduce radical emergence, a kind o f natural magic that I find 
enchanting. Consider the swim bladder once it has evolved. We agreed above, 
I believe, that a bacterium or worm or both could evolve to live only in that 
swim bladder, so the swim bladder as a new adjacent possible empty niche, once 
it had evolved, alters the future possible evolution o f the biosphere.
Next, did natural selection act on an evolving population of fish to 
select a weU-functioning swim bladder? O f course. (I know I am here 
anthropomorphizing selection, but we all understand what is meant.) But did 
natural selection “act” to create the swim bladder as a new adjacent possible 
empty niche? N o! Selection did not “struggle” to create the swim bladder as a 
new empty adjacent possible niche.
But that means something I find stunning. Without selection acting to do 
so, evolution is creating its own future possibilities o f becoming! It is a kind 
o f natural magic.
And the worm that evolves to live in the swim bladder is a radical emergence 
unlike anything in physics.
Evolution often does not cause, but enables its future evolution 
The bacterium or worm that evolves to live in the actual niche of the swim 
bladder, whereby it achieves a task closure selected at the level of the Kantian 
whole worm or bacterium, evolves by quantum indeterminate, and ontological- 
ly acausal quantum events. Thus, the swim bladder does not cause, but enables 
the evolution of the bacterium or worm or both to live in the swim bladder.
This means that evolving life is not only a web o f cause and effect, but of 
empty niche opportunities, that enable new evolutionary radical emergence. 
The same is true in the evolving econosphere, cultural life and history. We live 
in both a web o f cause and effect and a web o f enabling opportunities that 
enable new directions o f becoming.
Toward a positive science for the evolving biosphere beyond entailing law 
The arguments above support the radical claim that no laws entail the evolution 
of the biosphere. If right, Kant was right. There will be no Newton o f biology. 
Not even Darwin was that Newton yielding entailing laws.
But the biosphere is the most complex system we know in the universe, and 
has grown and flourished, even with small and large avalanches o f extinction 
events, for 3.8 billion years. Indeed, there has been a spectacular increase in 
species diversity over the Phanerozoic.
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How are we to think o f the biosphere building itself, probably beyond 
entailing laws?
Organisms are Kantian wholes, and the building o f the biosphere o f these 
past 3.8 billion years seems almost certainly to be related to how Kantian 
wholes co-create their worlds with one another, including the natural magic 
o f creating, without selection, new empty adjacent possible niches that alter 
the future evolution o f the biosphere.
There may be a way to start studying this topic, a new quest. Collectively 
autocatalytic sets are the simplest models o f Kantian wholes. In very recent 
work with Wim Hordijk and Michael Steel, a computer scientist and a 
mathematician, respectively, we are studying what Hordijk and Steel call 
RAFs, which are collectively autocatalytic sets in which the chemical reactions, 
without catalysis, occur spontaneously at some finite rate, and that rate is 
much sped up by catalysis. Fine results by Hordijk and Steel show that RAFs 
emerge and require only that each catalyst catalyses between 1 and 2 reactions. 
This is fully reasonable chemically and biologically (Hordijk, Steel 2004).
M ost recently the three o f us have examined the substructure of RAFs 
(Hordijk, Steel, Kauffman 2012). There are irreducible RAFs, which, given 
a Food Set o f sustained small molecules, have the property o f autocatalysis, 
but if any molecule is removed from the RAF, the total system collapses. It is 
irreducible. Then, given a maximum length o f polymers allowed in the model 
as the chemicals, from monomers to longer polymers, there is a maximal RAF, 
which increases as the length of the longest allowed polymer, and hence the 
total diversity o f possible polymers allowed, increases.
The most critical issue is this: There are intermediate RAFs called “sub- 
maximal RA Fs” each composed either of two or more irreducible RAFs, or of 
one or more irreducible RAF and one or more larger “submaximal” RAF, or 
com posed o f two or more smaller submaximal RAFs.
Thus we can think mathematically o f the complete set o f irreducible RAFs, 
all the diverse submaximal RAFs, and the maximal RAF. For each we can draw 
arrows from those smaller RAFs that jointly comprise it. This set o f arrows is a 
partial ordering among all the diverse RAFs possible in the system.
The next important issue is this: If new food molecule species, or larger 
species, enter the environment, even transiently, the total system can grow to 
create new submaximal RAFs that did not exist in the system before. This is 
critical. It shows that existing Kantian wholes can create new empty Adjacent 
Possible niches, and with a chemical fluctuation in which molecular species 
are transiently present in the environment, the total “ecosystem” can grow in 
diversity. A model biosphere is building itself!
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In this system, the diverse RAFs can “help” one another: for example, a 
waste molecule o f one can be a food molecule o f another, or via inhibition 
of catalysis, or toxic products o f one with respect to another can hinder one 
another in complex ways. They form a complex ecology. Further, these RAFs, 
if housed in compartments that can divide, such as bilipid membane vesicles 
called liposom es (Luisi et al. 2004), have been shown recently to be capable 
of open-ended evolution via natural selection, where each of the diverse RAFs 
act as a “replicator” to be selected and, in that selection, chemical reaction 
“arcs” that flower from the RAF core act as the phenotype with the core.
Thus, to my delight, we have the start o f a theory for the evolution of 
Kantian wholes.
But there is a profound limitation to these models: They are in a deep sense 
algorithmic and their possible phase spaces can be prestated. The reason is 
simple: the only functions that happen in these RAF systems are molecules 
undergoing reactions, which are catalyzed by molecules. But the set of 
possible molecules up to any maximum length polymer can be prestated. 
And the set o f possible catalytic interactions can be prestated, even in models 
where the actual assignment o f which molecule catalyzes which reaction is 
made at random or via some “match rule” o f catalyst and substrate (s).
By contrast, in the discussion above, we talked about the vast task closure 
achieved by an evolving bacterium or eukaryotic cell or organism. These tasks 
were not limited to catalysis, and as we saw with the discussion o f the possible 
uses of a molecular screwdriver in a cell, those uses are both indefinite in 
number and not orderable, so no algorithm can list all those uses. Nor can we 
prestate how the evolving Kantian whole cell, where selection acts at the level 
o f the Kantian whole and culls out altered screwdriver parts with heritable 
variations, can achieve some often new functional task closure via the actual 
niche. Ih us the real evolutionary process is non-algorithmic, non-machinic, 
non-entailed.
With respect to our initial evolving RAF ecosystems, we do not yet know 
how to make this evolution non-algorithmic and non-entailed. While we have 
a start, and a useful one, it is not enough.
Re-enchantment and creating a new world
I return to M ax W ebers astonishing statement: “With Newton we became 
disenchanted and entered modernity”. Was Weber right? I think so. As noted 
above, the 15th and 16th centuries saw the black and white magi, the former 
seeking occult knowledge to stand nature on her head and wrest their due. 
With Newton, magic lost its magic, and we entered a world-view of the
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deterministic dynamics o f celestial mechanics, the Theistic G od retreated in 
the Enlightenment to a Deistic God who set up the universe with Newtons 
laws and let them unfold. The war between theistic religion and science, let 
alone science and the arts, was underway. Next came our beloved Enlighten­
ment: “Down with the Clerics, up with science for the perpetual betterment 
o f M an”. The Enlightenment was the “Age o f Reason”. Next came the Industrial 
Revolution, based on science derived from physics and chemistry. Thence we 
entered modernity.
We know the goods and ills o f our fully lived Enlightenment dreams. We 
have democracy, a higher standard of living, are better educated, have better 
health and longer lives. Yet our democracies are often corrupted by power 
elites, we are, as Gordon Brown said as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 
“Reduced to price tags” in our increasingly global economy, where we often 
make, sell and buy purple plastic penguins for the poolside. If we ask why we 
do this, part o f the answer is that we do not know what else to do.
Moreover, we are disenchanted. We are, a billion o f us, secular realists in 
a meaningless universe, to quote Steven W einberg’s famous dictum. We have 
lost our spirituality.
But our physics-based world-view, if right for the abiotic universe, seems 
badly wrong for the living, evolving world, past the watershed o f life. We do 
live in a world o f cause and effect, but also o f unprestatable opportunities that 
emerge in an unprestatable, ever growing and changing adjacent possible that 
we partially co-create, with and without intent.
It really is true that, with no selection acting to do so, the newly evolved 
swim bladder is a new adjacent possible em pty niche that alters the future 
possibilities o f biological evolution. The worm or bacterium that is enabled 
to evolve really is radically emergent. It really is true that the Turing machine 
enabled the mainframe computer, whose widespread sale created the market 
opportunity for the personal computer, whose widespread sale created 
the market opportunity for word processing and file sharing, whose wide 
use created a niche for the World Wide Web, whose creation generated an 
opportunity to sell things on the Web, which created content on the Web, 
which created a market opportunity for companies such as Google and 
Yahoo. Facebook came and the Arab Spring. None could have foreseen this. 
None intended this radically emergent becoming, so similar to the radical 
emergence in the evolving biosphere. In both cases, with neither selection 
nor intent, the evolving system creates, typically unprestatably, its own future 
possibilities.
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How much magic do we want to he re-enchanted
Moreover, the Age o f Reason assumed that we could come to know, that the 
world was solvable by reason. But if we often do not know what can happen, 
we cannot reason about it. Reason, the highest virtue o f our Enlightenment, 
is an inadequate guide for living our lives. And top-down decision making, as 
if we could know ahead o f time the variables that would become relevant and 
then “optimize”, is often an illusion. We need to rethink how we make and live 
in our worlds.
Then what if we ask whether the current First World civilization best serves 
our humanity, or do we largely serve it, price tags and all? I think we are lost in 
modernity, without a clear vision o f what our real life is.
Ralph Waldo Emerson is famous for his “Emersonian perfectionism” 
We are born with a set o f virtues or strengths, and should devote our lives to 
perfecting them. But this perfectionism seems static, like a European hotel 
breakfast room, with all the food choices laid out. We have only to choose 
among our preset virtues and perfect them.
But this is not how real life is: we live a life of ever unfolding, often un­
prestatable opportunities that we partially create and co-create, with and 
without intent. I ’m thus falling in love with “Living the Well Discovered Life”.
From this, my own dream for “beyond modernity” starts to resemble the 
thirty civilizations around the globe, woven gently together to protect the 
roots of each, yet firmly enough to generate new cultural forms by which we 
can be human in increasingly diverse, creative ways, each helping himself or 
herself and others to live a well discovered life, and ameliorating our deep 
shadow side.
We need an enlarged vision o f ourselves and what we can become.3 
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Birthing prepositional logics
M YRD EN E A N D E R SO N
Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA
Spirals
In the centripetal swirl of biosemiotics, attracting undisciplined disciplinarians 
coming from art, botany, zoology, and beyond, we share a relatively slender 
but surely deep genealogy. Some might argue for older or newer neglected 
figures from this or that intellectual tradition, but sooner or later most will 
cite, in some fashion, in alphabetical order: Peirce, Sebeok, and Uexküll. 
The next rung will be much broader and delightfully diverse, perhaps to 
include Darwin; yet, as often happens, the obvious may remain uncited. The 
most familiar intellectual threads may be western and scientific, but there is 
no aversion to other traditions provided there is some payoff in their going 
against the grain.
This is to assume that anyone finding a calling in biosemiotics assents to 
getting his or her mind wet in contact and/or conjunction with other discipli­
nes, regardless o f how provincial or catholic one might once have been.
Those drawn to biosemiotics may themselves have been centrifuged, as 
it were, from a normative discipline, and anyone thereafter associated with 
biosemiotics may likewise find themselves catapulted from biosemiotics into 
fresh endeavours, with or without leaving the fold. Given the traffic in and 
about biosemiotics, there should be no danger o f being isolated in a single 
inbred paradigmatic silo.
Conjunctions
Human language, mediated by the strange bedfellows of culture and biology, 
has provided the very generativities that enable and limit human projects 
in every realm. “Linguiculture” better captures these human faculties, more 
fundamental than ordinary notions o f either or both o f “language” and 
“culture” Linguiculture s fusion with or constitution o f the human condition -  
involving sensing/perceiving/experiencing/cognizing -  extends far beyond 
and beneath our everyday notion o f spoken grammars.
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Seldom do scholar-scientists pause to consider this human faculty of 
linguiculture, or a myriad o f other influences on humans, that together 
conspire to guarantee plural perspectives and to contest facile translations 
between them.
Over the past several decades, one has frequently heard and read about 
inter-/multi-/meta-/trans-disciplinarity -  with reference to biosemiotics as 
well as to many other literally and figuratively hyphenated endeavours. But 
biosemiotics is not really a discipline, nor is semiotics. Rather, semiotics as a 
foundation is a twisting technicolored ouroborean chameleon, having itself 
endured many labels. I am most comfortable with a general descriptor for 
semiotics: an approach for the understanding of meaning-making. If “biology” 
then links with or modifies “sem iotics”, the former may narrow the latter, or 
the former may deepen the latter, or/and any number o f other relations more 
compelling than coordination and conjunction may obtain.
The coordinating link obscured in “biosem iotics” -  from the knitting 
o f “biology and sem iotics” -  raises more questions than can be fielded by 
foregrounding that single conjunction. And should there arise some mandate 
for mutual exclusion o f biology and semiotics, as in “biology or semiotics” 
that would take us back to square one, when few scholar-scientists anticipated 
biosemiotics.
Still, biology and semiotics are far from being coordinate, especially 
since biology, unlike semiotics, has always laid claim to the mantle o f being a 
discipline. More provocative conjugations might be “biology yet semiotics!” or 
“semiotics bur biology!” or “biology even sem iotics” or “semiotics so biology!”, 
just to explore “conjunctivitis”.
Prepositions
Grammatically, conjunctions contrast with nouns, adjectives, verbs, and 
adverbs, as the latter set is endowed with content or substance, called meaning. 
The nouns, “biology” and “sem iotics”, do mean whatever users assume they 
mean, even when congruence and context are lacking. Furthermore, the 
number o f words in these meaningful parts o f speech is potentially infinite. 
Mere humans come up with content words all the time, “biosem iotics” being 
a case in point.
Conjunctions cannot be said to be endowed with meaning at all. Together 
withadpositions (prepositions andpostpositions) and pronouns, conjunctions 
are classed as function or syntax words that, by relating content words to each 
other, serve as mortar holding the bricks o f meaning in coherent place. The 
inventory o f syntax words (or their grammatical equivalents) in any language
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is limited, and their operational habits bind them into functional sets that are 
seldom perturbed through time, either by endogenous processes or exogenous 
language contacts. And no one goes about inventing any more o f them either.
Imagine how many ways biology and semiotics, in either sequence, might 
productively be related through some handy English prepositions. Just 
considering of/in /by/for/from /w ith , we could explore “biology of semiotics”, 
“semiotics in b iology” “biology by semiotics”, “sem iotics/orbiology”, “biology 
from sem iotics”, “semiotics with biology”. These prepositions probe possible 
relations through multiple angles o f space and time, while the conjunction 
hiding behind the missing hyphen in “biosem iotics” can not.
The irreverent logic justifying these preposition-linked strings can set 
other processes into gear -  abductions fuelling questions and confrontations 
and more abductions.
In other words, to zero in on biosemiotics, one can’t just add “bio” to 
“semiotics” and stir. Indeed, “biosem iotics” may be a convenient empty 
signifier -  better yet, a zone allowing a forum for those teasing the paradigms 
inherited within their home disciplines. As such, any gathering o f explorers in 
biosemiotics takes on the flavour o f fuzzy set or tribal group or foraging band. 
Biosemioticians find themselves related through time and space, through 
similarity and contagion, through genealogical kin and lateral friend, captured 
and captivated in an emerging fabric that stretches and folds, elastic and 
plastic, while overall remaining amorphous, egalitarian, and thriving despite, 
or because of, fission and fusion. These very processes mimic those in our 
focal subject matters, such as evolution and development, genes with somatic 
as well as extrasomatic environments, and organisms refocused as swarms.
Logics
To review: the conjunction tames relationships; the preposition troubles 
them. The conjunction proposes; the preposition preposes, suggests, tickles. 
The flat, linear conjunction comports with deductions and inductions; 
these arguments are dedicated to proposing, not preposing. Conjunction 
operates in logical propositional space and, occasionally, in time, promising 
through suspense some resolution, closure, “endarkenment”. The irregular, 
alinear preposition wiggles, assaults, assails, nimble as a trickster or a knight 
in chess, prom ising nothing but for waves o f surprise and contingent serial 
enlightenments, not any comfort o f closure.
Propositional logic could be plural, but only with effort; basically it is 
beautifully crystalline. Propositional logic represents, and especially re­
presents rationality as we’ve come to call tame overdetermined logic. As
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“proposed” here, wild prepositional logics obligate open abductive musements 
that problematize jagged nonlinear linkages, valencies, alignments, scales, 
synchronicities, all suspended from underdeterminacy. Yet these kinks may 
still spring back to feed any argument, including a monolithic linear logic.
Propositional arguments flatter themselves when water-tight; prepositio­
nal inducements leak. Sometimes we get wet.
Prepositional logics entail risk. Individually and collectively, our human 
disposition for curiosity guarantees that we succumb to episodic bouts of 
rhizomic discovery. Even so, there can be no instruction manual for these 
preposterous prepositional logics. So, we persevere, also in biosemiotics, 
tinkering with objects along with ideas, toying with digital units of analysis 
and analogue ranges of flow, trusting that we may avoid throwing out the 
paradigmatic trash cans along with the garbage.
Prepositional logics do not expect answers, but rather invite responses. I 
will nevertheless close, provisionally, with conventional “how ” questions that 
touch, however peripherally, with the expansive and expanding biosemiotic 
project.
How can we descendants o f fish expect to detect the water;
How can we organisms relying on our finite senses investigate living­
ness and life, let alone comprehend ourselves inquiring about our 
organic selves;
-  How can we humans diversely saturated lingui'culturally contemplate 
any phenomenon except through that variable and varying lens, 
language-cum-culture, and our other senses, that distinguish our 
individual selves, our collective experiences, and our species?
In contrast with the demands o f any strident, distal “why”, the more modest 
“how” invites plural and proximate responses from ongoing biosemiotic 
inquiries.
Background note
I com posed the above paean to biosemiotics from the hip and heart, without 
leaning on any particular literature that has informed biosem iotics or that has 
emerged from biosemiotics.
When I started the essay, I expected to be drawing on such literatures, 
perhaps my own slender contributions to it, and definitely my experience in 
participating in conferences from a wide range o f disciplines over the past 35
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years. Some such conferences were inaugural ones o f nascent thought groups 
that might persist or fizzle out. After reflection about all these numerous 
congregations o f scholar-scientists, I notice a pattern. Each inaugural con­
ference seemed to offer the most irresistible mix o f people, ideas, and venue:
I would become hooked, but following conferences typically never matched 
the first, and I would drop out.
The exception: these international and interdisciplinary Gatherings in 
Biosemiotics. One reason for their synergy must be the tensions between 
the vague and the general that are tolerated if not accommodated in bio­
semiotics.
Though this essay is subliminally saturated with a literature that is richer 
for its incommensurabilities, I will only list these few uncited bibliographical 
items.
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II. HISTORY
OF THE GATHERINGS
A short history of Gatherings in Biosemiotics
JESPER HOFFM EYER 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
One gloomy day in 2000 Claus Emmeche called me to tell that Kalevi Kull 
would stop over in Copenhagen later that day on his way back to Tartu. We 
immediately arranged to meet with him in my office at the Molecular Biology 
Institute. Neither I, nor Claus I suppose, had any idea o f what was on Kalevi s 
mind, but knowing Kalevi as I do now I should o f course have anticipated that 
this visit would lead to lots o f unpredicted work. After the usual talk o f this 
and that Kalevi -  en passant -  suggested that perhaps the time had come to 
organize some meetings that would focus on biosemiotics from the biology 
angle rather than from the semiotics angle. And this suggestion then became 
the birth o f Gatherings in Biosem iotics1.
Throughout the 1990s all three of us had travelled around the world and 
presented the idea o f biosemiotics in a range o f different fora. Thus, as far back 
as in 1989 Claus had presented the two joint papers on the “semiotics of nature” 
that we wrote together (Emmeche, Hoffmeyer 1991; Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 
1991) at a conference in Oslo. One of the participants in this conference took 
these papers back to New York and showed them to Stanley Salthe who already 
had an open mind to biosemiotics. Stan further contacted Myrdene Anderson 
and thus we soon found important support from professional semioticians, 
not the least o f whom, o f course, were Tom Sebeok and John Deely. In the 
next 10 years biosem iotics was put on the agenda at a number o f semiotic 
conferences (Berkeley 1994, Trondheim 1994, Imatra 1996, Guadalajara 
1996, Toronto 1997, Sao Paulo 1998, Imatra 1998, Dresden 1999) -  most of 
these meetings were organized by the LASS (the international association for 
semiotic studies).
I remember that Myrdene Anderson at the first Gatherings in Biosemiotics pointed out that in 
anthropology the term gatherings was used to denote remnants from the past. I have nothing 
against this connotation since I indeed hope that something will be left to the future from our 
gatherings.
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Also other fora were open to the idea however. In 1995 I was invited to 
speak on biosemiotics at a conference in Vienna on evolutionary systems, 
assembling a number o f scientists from different areas (ecology, biochemistry, 
evolutionary biology, mathematics, bioinformatics, complex systems research, 
philosophy o f science, etc.) and opposing the prevailing genocentric paradigm 
inside evolutionary biology (Vijver et al. 1998). Many o f the contributors to 
this meeting and a later meeting in Ghent (1999, see Chandler, Vijver 2000), 
have contributed to the development o f biosemiotics, are active members 
o f ISBS, and some o f them have taken part in our ‘Gatherings’. Biosemiotics 
was also presented at meetings in the ISH P SSB 2 (Leuven 1995 and Seattle 
1997), and at the conference on the Baldwin effect organized by Bruce Weber 
and David Depew at Bennington College, Vermont 1998 (Weber, Depew 
2003). A  third important track in the 1990s was biosem iotics in the context of 
medical science. Thus biosem iotics was on the agenda at medical conferences 
in Jerusalem  1995, Karlskrona 1995, Heidelberg 1996, Lisbon 1996, and 
Glotterbad 1998. In addition to such major events, biosemiotics was o f course 
also presented at a lot o f minor seminars around the world.
Therefore, when Kalevi and Claus arrived in my office that day in 2000, 
biosem iotics was already well established in many areas. Yet, we always had 
to speak about biosem iotics in the context o f some other major theme such 
as general semiotics, evolutionary biology, ecology, information biology, 
psycho-neuro-immunology, or psychosomatic medicine. Seen against this 
background Kalevi s idea was to establish a forum dedicated to biosemiotics 
as such, i.e. fully dedicated to the study o f the semiotics o f living systems. We 
o f course warmly embraced this idea but also saw some serious problems. 
First and foremost among them, how should we get funding for such an event? 
As biologists/biochem ists we were well aware that normal scientific channels 
would not easily commit themselves to fund a conference on biosemiotics, a 
concept members o f normal scientific boards would hardly understand even 
if they should happen to know what was implied by the term semiotics. From 
the beginning therefore it was clear to us, that we would have to organize the 
conference in such a way that major funding would not be necessary.
From this requirement follows one o f the principles that may have 
been most important for how the Gatherings in Biosem iotics have always 
transpired. Without major funding it has been impossible to invite any big 
shots to come and emit their brilliance upon us, implying that everybody 
would come on his own account and participate on equal footing. Perhaps this
2 ISH PSSB stands for International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of 
Biology.
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principle more than anything else has contributed to create the open-minded 
and egalitarian atmosphere that everybody tells us has always characterized 
the Gatherings in Biosemiotics. Its amazing how a simple reframing of 
normal conference procedures can generate wholly unexpected effects, but 
a contributing factor to the good climate may also have been the general 
open-mindedness of people that cannot feel at home inside the narrowness of 
prevailing reductionist thinking in biology. Be this as it may, the fact remains 
that these meetings have generally taken place in an extraordinarily friendly 
and egalitarian atmosphere.
Q 0 0
Figure. Participants of the first Gatherings in Biosemiotics, 2001 ( l  Vefa Karatay,
2 Andreas Roepstorff, 3 Elling Ulvestad, 4 Yagmur Denizhan, 5 Stefan Artman,
6 Tom Ziemke, 7 Claus Emmeche, 8 Jyoo-Hi Rhee, 9 Jan T. Kim, 10 Jacob Havkrog,
11 Alexei Sharov, 12 Wolfgang Hofkirchner, 13 Tommi Vehkavaara, 14 Dominique 
Lestel, 15 Jesper Hoffmeyer, 16 Soren Brier, 17 Abir U. Igamberdiev, 18 Kalevi Kull, 
19 Andres Luure, 20 Anton Fürlinger, 21 Mette Böll, 22 Anton Markoš).
(Photo by Don Favareau.)
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Up to the first ‘Gathering’ in Copenhagen May 2001 we, the organizers 
(Claus and m yself), were of course tremendously excited about how this 
project would proceed: with no big names to attract attention and with 
everybody having to pay his or her own expenses, would anybody at all find 
it worthwhile to come to Copenhagen and discuss biosem iotics? In fact, we 
hadn’t needed worrying. We received more than 30 abstracts from scholars 
representing 16 different nations (Austria, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Russia, Sweden, 
Taiwan, Turkey, U SA ) and a wealth o f different approaches o f high quality3.
My welcome speech at the first Gatherings in Biosemiotics in Copenhagen 
was short, and I quote here a passage that may give the flavour o f our ideas: 
“The point is that ever since Darwin definitively made it clear that man is just 
another animal, although a very peculiar one, it has been unbearable that the 
humanities and the natural sciences could in no way establish a basic common 
understanding. One side reduced man to pure object, the other to pure 
subject.” In the end o f the speech I paid tribute to the great attendance and 
observed that I was well aware “that people assembled here are not necessarily 
in total agreement with the biosemiotic idea, but I take it that we are most 
o f us willing to admit that these questions are worthwhile to pursue”. By the 
term “the biosem iotic idea” I referred to biosemiotics as envisioned by Tom 
Sebeok and like minds4. The Copenhagen gathering was a great success and 
we were happy to announce that next year there would be a second Gatherings 
in Biosem iotics in Tartu, Estonia with Kalevi Kull as the organizer.
The 2002 conference in Tartu was also a great success with even more 
papers presented than in Copenhagen. But here we also encountered our first 
real confrontations. One of the papers presented attempted to use biosemiotics 
as a tool for legitimizing the alleged healing effect o f homeopathy5. It was 
one o f the unfortunate experiences we already had in the 1990s that the term
3 All abstracts are available at http://www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/pr/gath.2001.div/gath.2001.abs.html
4 At the time it had not yet occurred to me that others might conceive o f biosemiotics along very 
different lines o f thought.
5 The fact that not a single atom o f plant extract would be left in the highly diluted solutions used 
in this kind o f therapy, and that the healing effect therefore would presuppose an absurd ability 
o f water molecules to remember the pollen they were formerly exposed to, made no impression 
on the presenter. It always strikes me that adherents o f this theory never seem to consider the 
possibility that if water molecules were indeed capable o f remembering absent pollen, then why 
shouldn’t they remember all other kinds o f things? Imagine for instance that every time you 
drink a glass a water some of the water molecules will, statistically seen, at another time have 
passed through the intestinal system of Adolf Hitler. Who knows which bad vibrations this pas­
sage might have effectuated? If water molecules were indeed capable o f remembering things life 
would be very unpredictable.
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“biosemiotics” apparently attracts all kinds o f New Age babble, and the lesson 
of having biosemiotics mixed up with homeopathy prompted us to advise 
a stricter selection procedure for future gatherings in order to prevent this 
kind of unscientific speculation from slipping through. But a more serious 
confrontation also appeared at this meeting for the first time. While most if 
not all participants in Copenhagen had taken for granted that biosemiotics 
approaches an understanding of life that had been instituted in the writings 
of people like Tom Sebeok, Thure von Uexküll, Myrdene Andersson, John 
Deely -  not to speak of Kalevi, Claus and myself -  Marcello Barbieri, who was 
here present for the first time, forcefully defended a conception of biosemiotics 
that is very much at square with Peircean-inspired conception of these writers. 
As is well-known to members o f ISBS, Marcello Barbieri claims that code 
rather than sign action (sem iosis) constitutes the fundamental grounding for 
biosemiotics. I think it is fair to say that by far most o f the participants in Tartu 
heavily disagreed with Marcello on this issue as I certainly did -  and still do -  
myself. But dogmatic definitions were never part o f the conceptual matrix that 
lay behind the call for these meetings. On the contrary, dialogue and exchange 
of views were seen as the raw meat for scientific development, and by letting 
Marcello present his views also at the following Gatherings in Copenhagen 
(2003) and Prague (2004) this pluralistic nerve was clearly honoured.
It is not the aim o f this brief account o f the early events in our gatherings 
history to also follow the development up to the present time. I am too much 
involved personally in this development to be able to make a decent historical 
sketch. But allow me to finish my little story with a short account o f the 
organization behind the Gatherings and a warning in this context. Experience 
has taught us that the very anarchistic way of organizing our biosemiotic 
community that was instituted through the first meetings could not fully be 
maintained. Not only did we have to construct a strict system for the selection 
of abstracts to be presented at the Gatherings, but as more and more people 
were accommodated in our society the question of organizational rules 
became pertinent. After the meeting in Prague 2004 a group of people that 
had been active in our meetings from the very beginning decided that we 
had better organize ourselves as an international society, the ISBS (Favareau 
2005), and in the following years this same group of founders (the so-called 
executive committee) took care o f the few necessary decisions, mostly 
concerning questions o f where upcoming conferences should be located and 
the election o f an advisory board to take care o f the selecting o f abstracts. In 
2007 we had to build a more bureaucratic constitution in order to handle the 
economic contributions from Springer, and our society became registered in
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Singapore (where the vice-president happened to be located). However, this 
constitution has never been used in the daily practical affairs since everybody 
considered it a pure formality, and in fact everything went on without any 
organizational changes.
It has now become clear that this anarchistic way o f running the society 
can no longer be maintained. We need a constitution that delineates a 
democratic procedure for how decisions should be made. While writing this 
I very much hope we can establish a functional set o f constitutional clauses at 
our general meeting this summer in Tartu. The problem is that the “Singapore 
constitution” in its present form is bureaucratic and inconvenient for the 
purpose o f managing a scientific society like ours.
The danger I see before me for future Gatherings in Biosemiotics is the 
belief that our group is split up into different schools’ For all I know this idea 
has very little reality: we all diverge in our views o f the field along multiple 
dimensions, and the claim that we belong to this or that school’ is in a sense 
quite offensive. None o f us have a one-dimensional set o f views that easily fall 
into one or another class. So my warning is this: Let not this talk o f schools 
poison our usually open-minded discussions at the Gatherings.
The reason why anarchistic ways o f organization are so attractive is that as 
soon as we set up rules those rules takes on a life o f their own. I therefore think 
that in general a society’s welfare is inversely proportional to the number of 
“rules” it has been forced to introduce. Let us keep the rules to a minimum.
References
Chandler, Jerry; Vijver, Gertrudis Van De (eds.) 2000. Closure. Emergent Organi­
zations and Their Dynamics. New York: New York Academy of Science.
Emmeche, Claus; Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1991. From language to nature: The Semiotic 
metaphor in biology. Semiotica 84(1/2): 1-42.
Favareau, Donald 2005. Founding a world biosemiotics institution: The International 
Society for Biosemiotic Studies. Sign Systems Studies 33(2): 481-485.
Hoffmeyer, Jesper; Emmeche, Claus 1991. Code-duality and the semiotics of nature. 
In: Anderson, Myrdene; Merrell, Floyd (eds.), On Semiotic Modeling. New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 117-166.
Vijver, Gertrudis Van De; Salthe, Stanley; Delpos, Manuela (eds.) 1998. Evolutionary 
Systems: Biological and Epistemological Perspectives on Selection and Self-Organization. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Weber, Bruce; Depew, David (eds.) 2003. Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Efect 
Reconsidered. Cambridge: MIT Press.
A letter from March 15, 2001
THOM AS A. SEBEO K
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2001 08:45:52 -0500 (EST)
From: thomas sebeok <sebeok@indiana.edu>
To: Jesper Hoffmeyer <hoffmeyer@mermaid.molbio.ku.dk>
Cc: kalevi@zbi.ее, Claus Emmeche <emmeche@nbi.dk>
Subject: Re: Gatherings in Biosemiotics
Dear Jesper, Kalevi, Claus:
I was immensely pleased and flattered to read your most 
cordial invitation, so I cannot tell you how much I would 
like to be with you at this occasion. Having said this, I 
think I had better stick to my decision, announced publicly 
last June in Imatra, to restrict my overseas travel to 
just one more Atlantic crossing, namely, to stand behind 
a commitment 1 made many months ago to teach an intensive 
course on the subject of nonverbal communication this coming 
April/May, climaxing with an international conference on 
„Semiotics and the Communication Sciences” at the recently 
established University of Lugano.
I mention the latter because I shall devote my own 
contribution to a Memorial Essay for my late friend Heini 
Hediger, who spent most of his life as a director of a 
string of Swiss zoos, notably that gem, the Zurich zoo, and 
devoted his scholarly career to the study of the behavior of 
animals in captivity (zoos, marinelands, circuses, and the 
like). He was variously, though discreetly, linked to J. v.
Ue., as I make clear.
I framed my paper (which is even now being printed) with 
such background that I possess, based on protocols I have 
collected over many years, with professional animal trainers. 
My remarks, heavily illustrated with images collected by 
Hediger himself, will be appearing shortly in a little 
pamphlet. When they appear in this preliminary format,
I will get some copies to you in the hope that you can 
display them at your Copenhagen Gathering. A more extended 
version, with a Swiss semiotic orientation, will eventually 
be published by the host University of Lugano in a book of 
proceedings. In the longer run, I may, further, publish in
62 THOMAS A. SEBEOK
some venue my voluminous, but hitherto unpublished animal 
training protocols.
Physically -- although I am now in my 81st year, but in 
good shape —  it would have been possible for me to attend 
your meetings, because, after Lugano and a very brief trip 
to Italy attendant on the publication of a book of mine in 
Rome and another about me in Milano, I was supposed to be 
at the annual Budapest meetings of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, ending very shortly before mid-May. But I think I 
had better conserve my energies for my research and writing, 
and restrict further travel within North America, notably 
Canada, where I retain both scholarly and administrative 
reponsibilities.
You might consider a future „Gathering" in Toronto. If 
you would like me to mention this there to the powers that 
be, let me know: I shall next be there between March 22nd & 
28th. Again, with utmost appreciation for your kindness and 
consideration, and wishing you a productive,
Cordially = Tom
On Thu, 15 Mar 2001, Jesper Hoffmeyer wrote:
> Dear Tom
>
> As you will probably know Kalevi, Claus, and I are orgnizing a
> meeting in Copenhagen which we have called Gatherings in
> biosemiotics (you can look up the details at
> http://www.zbi.ee/~uexkull/biosemiotics/index.html)
>
> The idea was to have a regular (annual) opportunity to meet and
> discuss ideas in the biology end of biosemiotics. From the
> beginning
> we decided this was a low budget, I would say no-budget,
> event, so
> that we would not depend on laborious and, in fact, unlikely
> fundings. And also, this would guarantee that people would
> come only out of a serious interest in these matters.
>
> Now, this Hirst 'Gathering' seems to become quite an event.
> Several interesting approaches, which I didn't even know
> of beforehand, have been announced.
> We have presently received 27 abstracts from many
> different countries, even Canada and US.
>
> So I am increasingly sad that we haven't been able to
> invite you.
>
A letter from March 15, 2001 63
> However, in case you already are in Europe during this
> period (May 24-27) - as I remember you quite usually are -
> Claus and I will Hind the means for covering
> your travel and hotel expenses. We cannot offer business
> class, but then inside Europe flying times rarely
> exceed 2 hours.
>
> Is this a possibility?
>
> We would leave it to yourself to decide the extent of your
> contribution. We would be happy just to have you giving
> lustre to the event, but also of course it would be very
> nice to have a full lecture, or a shorter presentation
> (appr. 25 minutes) as you prefer.
>
> With warm regards
>
> Jesper
>
Twelve years with the Gatherings 
in Biosemiotics
D O N  FAVAREAU
National University of Singapore, Singapore 
“Dear Friends...”
History will record that these were the very first two words spoken at the 
very first talk of the very first Gatherings in Biosemiotics, on an overcast May 
morning in 2001, by the botanist and biosemiotician Kalevi Kull.
It is hard for me to convey how strange and somewhat shocking it was 
for me to hear such words spoken in the context o f an academic setting back 
then -  or how auspicious and absolutely fitting that they seem to me now, in 
retrospect.
Yet this was not to be the only novelty awaiting me during that first, and 
most unforgettable, meeting at the University o f Copenhagen’s Institute for 
M olecular Biology (in the very room, my hosts soon noted, that Wilhelm 
Johannsen first introduced the word “gene” into the discourse of science 
in 1909). Rather, with the successive talks o f each new speaker, a new and 
profoundly revolutionary world o f thought seemed to be coming into being 
right before my very eyes.
An American graduate student pursuing a joint degree in philosophy of 
mind and the neurobiology o f language, I had been struggling for years to 
find an explanation of biological mindedness’ that, in the words of Thomas 
Sebeok and his colleagues, “avoids crashing into the philosophical roadblock 
thrown up by forced choices between realism and idealism, as though this 
exclusive dichotomy were also exhaustive o f the possibilities for interpreting 
experience”.1
Happening upon Jesper Hoffmeyer’s sui generis masterwork, Signs oj 
M eaning in the Universe, in April 2001 was thus a life-changer for me -  and as 
I have learned since, it has been for so many others. And as I have recounted 
elsewhere (Favareau 2 0 0 7 ), my reading o f this incredible volume progressed
1 Anderson et al. 1984.
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no further than page 40, where Jesper compares the problem o f “self-reference 
in a system” to that o f the perpetual creation o f “a map which is so detailed that 
the cartographer and the map that he is making are swept up into it”, when I 
immediately put the book down and logged on to the Internet to find out how 
I might contact this subtle and profound thinker.
For Jesper s elegant little analogy so perfectly captured the paradox that 
contemporary neuroscientific theory both entailed and yet, it seemed to 
me, seemed to be simultaneously denying and/or attempting to run away 
from -  i.e., the understanding that it is in the very nature o f a “sign” relation 
to always and ineliminably possess both an internal and  an external, as well 
as a mediating -  or interpretant -  mode of being. And that were any one of 
these three aspects of being missing -  which is to say, not fulfilled biologically, 
culturally or consequentially -  nothing resembling information, representation, 
signification or meaning could possibly exist in our world of physical-chemical 
being.
And in one o f the happier coincidences of my lifetime, the first hit that 
came back for my web search o f “Jesper Hoffmeyer” was the webpage for the 
upcoming First International Gatherings in Biosemiotics, to be held at the 
University o f Copenhagen, Denmark just three weeks hence. Clicking the 
e-mail link at the bottom  of the page, I explained that while I realized that 
the deadline for paper submissions had passed some months ago, I was only 
now finding out about this fascinating project o f ‘biosem iotics’ and asked if 
there would be any way at all that the organizers might consider accepting the 
paper on mirror neurons and intersubjectivity that I had just written, such that 
I might attend this conference.
The e-mail reply that I received a few hours later, I realize now in retrospect, 
was classic Jesper Hoffmeyer: “The deadline for the abstracts has passed,” he 
wrote to me, “but if you feel that you must come, I suppose that we can make 
a space for you.”
Under-stated but eminently hospitable, this, I was to learn, was the Danish 
way. And now, twelve years later (to the day, in fact, as I am writing this on May 
24), I can still recall most vividly the first time I laid eyes on the people who 
were, in fact, to becom e such “dear friends” and intellectual colleagues to me 
in the ensuing decade.
Cell biologist Anton Markoš was next to speak after Kalevi Kull, as I recall, 
and he was followed by the sociologist Thierry Bardini, systems theorists 
Yagmur Denizhan and Vefa Karatay, semiotician and literary analyst Han- 
liang Chang, and animal ethologist Dominique L estel... and this was just the 
opening session! For over the course of the next three days, the assembled
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group of about 40 scholars -  all o f whom stayed for every session, and who 
debated amongst themselves rigorously, animatedly and respectfully -  were 
treated to talks by biologists Soren Brier, Luis Bruni, Claus Emmeche, Anton 
Fiirlinger, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Alexei Sharov and Abir Igamberdievj physicist 
Peder Voetmann Christensen, philosophers Stefan Artmann, Andres Luure 
and Tommi Vehkavaara; anthropologists Myrdene Anderson, Peter Harries- 
Jones and Andreas Roepstorff; linguist Tuomo Jämsä; psychologist Wolfgang 
Hofkirchner; roboticist Tom  Ziemkej and semioticans Frederik Stjernfelt and 
Edwina Taborsky. The conference was memorably concluded with an only 
somewhat tongue-in-cheek talk by molecular biologist Elling Ulvestad on 
“the implications of the just now developing field of biosemiotics for the study 
o f the yet to be developed field of astrobiology”!
As has been often reported, approximately forty researchers and scholars 
from eighteen different countries were present at that initial Gatherings, with 
backgrounds ranging from physics and molecular biology to robotics, animal 
ethology, psychology, sociology and philosophy of language and of mind.
W hat has been less widely reported upon -  though what is immeasurably 
more important -  was that few o f those researchers had actually met one 
another before, and yet the entire conference was carried out in a spirit of 
overwhelming good-will and respectful mutual puzzlement and enlightenment. 
There was no end of theoretical disagreements and alternative approaches 
advanced as to how to understand biological “sign” processes -  but there 
was no hostile antagonism, dogmatic intransigence, nor vain and self-serving 
displays o f intellectual one-upmanship that, as an American academic, I had 
always known to be the “default” style o f such conferences.
Rather, inspired directly by the “under-stated but eminently hospitable” 
ethos o f our Danish (and Estonian) hosts -  Claus, Jesper and Kalevi -  the 
First International Gatherings in Biosemiotics set the standard for all subsequent 
Gatherings to strive to live up to. Indeed, without actively “planning” it as such, 
the elements that made that first Gatherings so memorable, productive, and 
enjoyable -  no parallel sessions, the equality of speakership, the camaraderie of 
open discussion over beer-fuelled meals in beautiful surroundings, and most 
o f all, the recognition that there are others who share the same discomfort 
with the mainstream view of things, yet who are still willing to not shut the 
discussion down prematurely by resorting to “replacement dogma”, but instead 
to together explore new paths, to learn from one another’s perspective, and to 
slowly but surely improve upon the way that “sign” relations are understood 
(or misunderstood) in both biology and culture.
“Dear friends” indeed, to find ourselves embarked together upon such a 
journey!
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Accordingly, as subsequent Gatherings in Biosem iotics have taken place, the 
list of colleagues and Gatherings regulars has grown and grown. The Second 
International Gatherings in Biosemiotics, held at the university that Thomas A. 
Sebeok dubbed “a singular Mecca-like field for us pilgrims labouring in the 
domain o f sem iotics” -  this year s very own Tartu University, now home 
to both the Thomas A. Sebeok Library and the world s first PhD granting 
program in Biosemiotics -  saw the introduction o f molecular biologist and 
embryologist Marcello Barbieri, who would go on to do such ground-breaking 
work in setting up both the journal Biosemiotics and the Springer Book Series in 
Biosemiotics; zoologist Aleksei Turovski and animal ethologists Timo Maran, 
Stephen Pain, M orten Tonnessen and Mette Böll; biologist and semiotician 
Sergey Chebanov; musicologist Mark Reybrouck; information scientists 
Christoper M enant and Toshiyuki Nakajima; philosopher of science, John 
Collier; and head of the then just opened Jakob von Uexküll Archives at the 
University o f Hamburg, Torsten Rüting.
Convened with opening remarks by semiotician Mihhail Lotman, son of 
the renowned Juri Lotman, and concluding with a private guided tour of the 
Tallinn Zoo by zoologist and Estonian television celebrity Aleksei Turovski 
himself, the Second International Gatherings in Biosemiotics -  under the 
meticulous direction of now Full Professor o f Biosemiotics, Kalevi Kull -  
inaugurated yet another annual tradition to the Gatherings: that of the local 
and biosemiotically relevant “excursion” -  three, in this case, for in addition 
to the guided tour of the Tallinn Zoo, attendees to this Gatherings also visited 
the historic hom e and workplace o f Estonian biologist Karl Ernst von Baer 
(1 7 9 2 -1 8 7 6 ), as well as the summer house, in Puhtu, o f legendary proto- 
biosemiotician Jakob von Uexküll (1 8 6 4 -1 9 4 4 ) .
2003 sawa return to the University o f Copenhagen for The Third International 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics, and here we were joined, for the first time, by animal 
musicologist Dario Martinelli; cell biologist Mia Krause; psychologist Alfred 
Lang; molecular biologist Mogens Kilstrup; philosophers Stacey Ake, Adam 
Skibinski, and Mads Vestergaard; semiotician Juipi Chien; Peirce scholar 
Joäo Queiroz; biologist Christian Baron; and an entire contingent from 
the interdisciplinary Department o f Philosophy and History of Sciences at 
Charles University in Prague, led by cell biologists Anton Markoš and Fatima 
Cvrckova, and including Filip Grygar, Laszlo Hajnal, and Karel Kleisner. 
Our excursions included a guided tour o f the enzyme processing sectors of 
the Danish biotechnology company Novozymes, as well as what was billed
2 Sebeok 1998.
68 DON FAVAREAU
on the programme as “an excursion to a famous ecosem iotic experiment’ 
in the middle o f Copenhagen”: the world-famous ex-military base turned 
autonomously governed commune, the “free-town” known as Christiania.
The Fourth International Gatherings in Biosemiotics took place in the 
oldest and most beautiful university in the Czech Republic, Prague’s Charles 
University, which was founded in 1938 and has been in continuous operation 
since. Hosted by cell biologists and philosophers o f science Anton Markoš 
and Fatima Cvrckova, and featuring a convocation speech by faculty mentor 
Zdenek Neubauer, the annual International Gatherings in Biosemiotics had by 
this time already developed a steady core o f ‘regular’ attendees, made up of the 
majority of scholars listed in the first three Gatherings above. To this already 
quite impressive and increasingly tight-knight group, the 2004 Gatherings 
added cognitive scientist Yair Neuman; semiotican Kaie Kotov and biologist 
Charbel El-Hani; landscape ecologist Almo Farina; and applied philosopher 
o f biology Günther Witzany. Also making their initial appearance as speakers 
at this Gathering were the philosophers O laf Breidbach, Ulrich Krohs, Jiri 
Neustupa and Andreas W eber; molecular biologist Mehmet Ozansoy, and 
biochemist and philosopher Lenny Moss. This was also the Gatherings at 
which the establishment o f the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies 
(ISB S) was first proposed in a nearby pub.
By the following year, the ISBS was up and running, biosemiotics had 
established an official presence on the Web, and The Fifth International 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics was hosted by Marcello Barbieri and Almo Farina 
at the University o f Urbino in the beautiful Marche region o f central Italy. 
Notable first-timers to the Gatherings community at this conference included 
the roboticists and philosophers Noel and Amanda Sharkey; geneticist 
Hernän A. Burbano; information scientist Gerard Battail; molecular biologist 
Marcella Faria; embryologist Johannes Huber; psychologist Ingolf Schmid- 
Tannwald; biochem ist Eugenio Andrade; ecosemioticians Maricela Yip 
and Pierre Madl; neuroscientist Alessandro Villa; and philosophers Assen 
Dimitrov, Arantza Etxeberria and Marila Läzaro. This Gatherings also marked 
the year in which Marcello Barbieri edited and published the first Journal of 
Biosemiotics with Nova Publishers, comprising largely o f papers first presented 
at the Gatherings in Biosemiotics.
2006  saw The Sixth International Gatherings in Biosemiotics take place in the 
idyllic Austrian town o f Salzburg, under the direction o f Telos Philosophische 
Praxis founder Günther Witzany. Held at the University o f Salzburg’s Center 
for Advanced Studies and Research in Information and Communication 
Technologies and Society, and covered extensively by the Austrian press
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and radio, the Sixth International Gatherings featured talks by geneticist 
Randy Jirtle; cell biologists Nickolaus Bregsen, Albert Duschl, Peter Eckl, 
and Mario Gimona; physicist Robert Logan; communications scientist 
Erich Hamberger; botanists František Baluška, Peter Barlow and Jacqueline 
Liick; systems engineers Argyris Arnellos, M artien Brands, Thomas Spyrou 
and John Darzentas: and philosophers Hellmut Löckenhoff, John Pickering, 
and Konrad Talmont-Kaminski. Memorably, this was also the conference 
attended by Catherine Cotton o f Springer Science Publishers, at the invite 
of Marcello Barbieri, and from which both the Springer journal Biosemiotics 
and the Springer Book Series in Biosemiotics were birthed. An unforgettable 
excursion to the breathtakingly beautiful Salzburg Alps concluded the 
conference, and its proceedings were published the following year in a volume 
entitled Biosemiotics in Transdisciplinary Contexts, edited by Günther Witzany 
and published by Umweb Press.
By the beginning o f 2007, Introduction to Biosemiotics: The New Biological 
Synthesis, edited by Marcello Barbieri and featuring a collection o f writings 
from many o f the scholars most regularly presenting at the Gatherings, had 
already come out in hardcover, and the influence of this interdisciplinary 
project was beginning to be felt across more and more scholarly domains. Not 
surprisingly, then, The Seventh International Gatherings in Biosemiotics, held 
at the University o f Groningen in the Netherlands, and hosted by Professor 
of Culture and Cognition, Dr. Barend von Heusden, saw the arrival of yet 
more ‘newcomers’ who today seem like having been with the project and 
the community o f biosemioticians from the start. These include complexity 
theorist Victoria Alexander; semiotician and philosopher of science Eliseo 
Fernandez; linguist and cognitive scientist Stephen Cowley; and interaction 
analyst Charles Goodwin. Attending also, but not presenting, were long-time 
Gatherings attendees, the radiologist Robert Cantor and SET I social scientist 
Douglas Vakoch, as well as soon-to-be regular presenter, neuroscientist Franco 
Giorgi.
The Eighth International Gatherings in Biosemiotics was held at the Uni­
versity o f the Aegean, on the gorgeous island of Syros, Greece. Hosted by 
systems engineers Argyris Arnellos and John Darzentas, this iteration of the 
Gatherings featured afternoon breaks where biosemioticians o f all natio­
nalities could be seen floating in the waters o f the sun-dappled Aegean Sea, 
and at night-time discussing the finer points o f sign biology at an outdoor 
seaside bar or restaurant, underneath a vast canopy of stars. Eight years into 
the project now, the presenter’s list was full o f regulars. But still scholars whose 
work would turn out to be vital to the development o f biosemiotics were
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attending for the first time. Notably at the Eighth International Gatherings, we 
had the pleasure of hearing talks for the first time by cultural theorist Wendy 
W heeler; psycholinguist and dynamic systems theorist Joanna R^czaszek- 
Leonardi; biophysicist Koichiro Matsuno; neuroscientist Franco Giorgi; cell 
biologists Michal Schmoranz and Jana Švorcovä; roboticist Ryad Benosman; 
and semioticians Alexander V. Kravchenko, Jonathan Hope and Pierre-Louis 
Patoine. The conference concluded with a special video presentation recorded 
for the Gatherings by neuroscientist and bioanthropologist Terrence Deacon -  
followed by yet another unforgettable outdoor meal provided by our hosts.
Charles University in Prague was once again the site of The Ninth Inter­
national Gatherings in Biosemiotics, once again hosted under the auspices of 
the Department o f Philosophy and History o f Science by cell biologists and 
philosophers o f science Anton Markoš and Fatima Cvrckovä. Linguists Natalia 
Abieva and Prisca Augustyn; psychoanalyst Anna Aragno; semioticians Paul 
Cobley and Sara Cannizzaro; primatologist David Leavens; botanists Helena 
Lipavskä and Ted Baenziger; philosophers Isabel Ferreira, Martin Neumann, 
and Joäo Carlos M ajor; cell biologist Robert Prinz; anthropologist Marco 
Stella; and computer scientists Elisabeth zu Erbach-Schönberg, Dennis 
Görlich and Peter Dittrich all made their initial appearances at a biosemiotics 
Gatherings at this conference, which also featured a group-wide discussion 
on the definition of the term ‘meaning’ within biosemiotics. Yulia Volokitina 
closed the conference by detailing her fascinating project o f establishing a 
Russian-language site on the Internet for biosemiotics, and commemorative 
engraved pilsner glasses were given to each attendee as a memento by our 
gracious hosts!
Held in 2010, The Tenth International Gatherings in Biosemiotics took 
place in Braga, Portugal under the auspices o f the Faculty o f Philosophy of 
the Portuguese Catholic University in Braga. Hosted by philosophers Joäo 
Carlos M ajor and Alfredo de Oliveira Dinis, the first day of the conference saw 
the publication o f both Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health, 
edited by Stephen J. Cowley, Joäo Carlos Major, Sune V. Steffensen and Alfredo 
de Oliveira Dinis and published by Catholic University o f Portugal Press, as 
well as the fourth volume in the Springer Book Series in Biosemiotics, Essential 
Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Com m entary  (Favareau, ed.), which 
brings together work from the earliest proto-biosem iotic analyses o f Charles 
Peirce and Jakob von Uexküll with seminal contemporary biosemiotics 
texts by contributors to the annual Gatherings -  and every attendee to this 
conference was given a complimentary copy o f the former volume upon 
entering the conference hall.
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Once again, the roster for this Gatherings featured dozens o f familiar 
names -  yet once again, the ranks of practicing biosemioticians swelled not 
just in quantity, but far more importantly, in quality, with the addition to the 
biosemiotics community o f such first-time Gatherings speakers as philo­
sophers Susan Stuart and Gerald Ostdiek; semioticians Charls Pearson, 
Vinicius Romanini, and Shuo-yu Charlotte Wu; animal ethologists Tomäš 
Kocnar and Filip Jaroš; psychologists Clara Costa Oliveira and Maria Rita 
Leal; roboticist Siohoi Ieng; linguist Angelo N. Recchia-Luciani; commu­
nication scientist Patrick Vyncke; biocybernetician Maciej B. Pokora; and 
systems biologist Dennis P. Waters.
And last year, in 2011, our beloved annual conference was held for the 
first time outside of Europe. Hosted by complex systems theorist Victoria 
Alexander and the Dactyl Foundation for the Arts and Humanities, The 
Eleventh International Gatherings in Biosemiotics was held at Rockefeller 
University for Biomedical Research in New York City, USA -  and once again, 
the high level o f discussion and engagement was heightened even further with 
the addition o f such first-time Gatherings participants as semioticians Susan 
Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio; science writer Dorion Sagan; biochemist and 
systems theorist Jan-Hendrik S. Hofmeyr; primatologists Daniel C. Mayer and 
Leonard A. Rosenblum; cognitive scientists Liz Swan and Louis J. Goldberg; 
Artificial Intelligence developer Joachim  De Beule; philosophers Jonathan 
Beever, Luciana Garbayo, Jeffrey Goldstein and David Rothenberg; sociologist 
Eugene Halton; medical scholar Thomas Lawrence Long; educationist Gary 
Shank; biomedical imaging expert Dolores A. Steinman; architect Tim Ireland; 
immunologist and philosopher Hidetaka Yakura, and animal ecologists Tina 
Roeske and Ofer Tchernichovski. The conference ended with the showing 
of rare film footage o f an interview with neurologist, psychologist and proto- 
biosemiotican Friedrich S. Rothschild (1 8 9 9 -1 9 9 5 ) , with commentary pro­
vided by psychologist and historian Astrid Thome. Legendary biologist and 
an inspiration to many biosemioticians, Lynn Margulis (1 9 3 8 -2 0 1 1 )  was also 
in attendance at this iteration of the Gatherings, which took place just five 
months before her untimely death.
Today, o f course, you hold in your hand the programme for The Twelfth 
International Gatherings in Biosemiotics, held once again in that M ecca o f b io­
semiotic development, the University of Tartu. This Gatherings, too, promises 
to be as fecund and enjoyable as each o f the eleven prior iterations -  yet for 
me, personally, marks the end o f (at least one phase o f) an amazing journey. 
For with this, my twelfth consecutive Gatherings in Biosemiotics, I officially 
step down from the position I have held as Vice-President o f the ISBS since its
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inception in 2004. Twelve years brings a lot o f changes, and in my compiling 
o f this short history of the Gatherings, one may notice that I focused not so 
much upon specific ideas, nor upon the conventional ‘markers of success’ 
that the community of biosemioticians has attained -  though there is surely 
no lack o f either -  but instead upon the steady accretion o f new community 
members that have joined the original group o f “dear friends” over the course 
o f the last dozen years, and have now, hopefully, becom e dear friends to one 
another as well.
We read o f how the ancient Greeks realized the deep connection between 
friendship and the advancement o f wisdom, and yet today the world of 
inquiry that they initiated is full o f “academic disciplines” where unceasing 
combat and self-advancement, zero-sum thinking, and a deep distrust of, 
and rivalry with, one’s supposed ‘colleagues’ is the norm. The Gatherings in 
Biosem iotics -  indeed, the very project o f biosem iotics as initiated by Thomas 
A. Sebeok in the manifesto cited at the outset of these remembrances -  was 
designed specifically to oppose that odious model of intellectual barbarism, 
and to replace it with a community o f inquirers who, united in that very inquiry\ 
would also function as a community o f friends. Twelve years on, I do believe 
that the majority of people in the community o f biosemiotics have tried 
exceedingly hard to stay true to this vision -  and that it has been the upholding 
o f the spirit that was introduced at the outset of the original Gatherings in 
Biosem iotics, more than any other single factor, that has contributed most 
effectively to their success in doing so.
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The 1st Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Copenhagen, Denmark 
May 24-27, 2001
CLAUS EM M ECHE
One sign o f the continuity between the zoosemiotics o f Tom Sebeok and the 
biosem iotics o f the Tartu-Copenhagen axis is a preoccupation with the history 
of their respective fields, and their narrators’ own roles as actors here. Maybe 
I ’m unfair to Tom, whose total work I admire and have learned so much from, 
but let me confess one thing. W hat bemused me, having been lucky to hear 
Tom ’s voice and stories in places like Toronto, Tartu, Copenhagen, and Imatra, 
some of the pre-gathering stages for informal or formal biosemiotic sessions, 
was his style of presentation, in which he was able to develop almost his whole 
thesis, point, or take-home-hypothesis in a contribution to a symposium by 
fleshing it out upon a skeleton consisting of anecdotes about his own ways and 
merry strollings through his semiotic web o f names in semiotics, linguistics, 
ethology, biology and many more fields. It is clear to me that in offering a few 
comments upon the first programmes for the Gatherings in Biosemiotics, I 
cannot follow  ^the honourable path o f Sebeok in commenting upon this the 
way he would do, as I am not as old-and-experienced as he was when he 
displayed this eminently erudite style, and I haven’t arrived yet at the stage 
where I begin to remember what I did yesterday, a year ago, or ten years ago, 
with the same precision, and I haven’t yet learned how to tell a story about a 
past I don’t exactly remember in detail as if it happened yesterday.
One important feature of these first meetings wholly dedicated to bio­
semiotics that I think established a minor tradition (see also Jesper’s nice story 
piece and D on’s short history) was that all o f us would follow all presentations, 
that is, even though we could have squeezed the meeting into a two day event 
by making some sessions parallel, that wouldn’t have worked, since one of 
the nice things that emerged from the Gatherings meetings was a feeling 
o f comprehension. That is, even though people came with a wide variety 
o f disciplinary backgrounds and special expertises, the open and informal 
atmosphere that was enacted clearly meant that a feeling o f coherence 
appeared, suggesting that we were all on the same track towards something 
bigger, maybe closer to a fulfilment o f a theoretical biology that would be, 
at the same time, a handy tool for understanding the complexity o f living 
nature.
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As an organizer it was nice to see that all the announced people in fact 
came and presented their stuff (except Tiberiu Mustata from the US who 
had to cancel1), and looking back, it’s also nice to see how many of those who 
presented papers at the 1st meeting continued to be a part of the newly emerged 
community (or perhaps “cross-disciplinary research network” is a better term) 
of biosemiotics. The 2001 meeting took place in the old botanical auditorium 
in Gothersgade street, with its old-fashioned drawings of herb anatomy on the 
back wall and a nice view to the Botanical Garden, and a bust of the geneticist 
Wilhelm Johannsen who coined the phenotype/genotype distinction 90 
years before biosemioticians gathered here to discuss the interplay between 
analog and digital codes. As you can see from the programme, we simply (and 
nerdishly) stopped with an “End and farewell” at mid-Sunday, without any 
collective touring, which first became instituted next year in Estonia. However, 
we started the meeting with a social’ part in the “Sojlehallen” (the pillar room) 
in the Solvtorv-building (formerly a part of a poly-technical higher education 
institution founded by Hans Christian 0rsted ) of the Institute of Biological 
Chemistry, where Jesper’s biochemist colleagues had their daily doings. Here, 
the participants met upon arrival on Thursday evening to have some catered 
food, exchange symbolic signs, and drink 10 bottles of white wine, 15 of red 
wine, and a box of beer (as a collective, not each). I can see from my notes that we 
also bought 10 bottles of water. It was all very self-organized, relaxed and quite 
fun. We had no clear imagination of ending up as an international scientific/ 
scholarly society or an abstract-indexed journal; all that only came later.2
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Programme
May 24
Evening: Social gatherings.
M ay 25
Session: The status of biosemiotics as a field of research 
(chair: Claus Emmeche)
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  Welcome note
Kalevi Kull -  Biosemiotics means biology
Anton Markos -  An attempt of a hermeneutics of the living
Thierry Bardini -  Does junk DNA break the genetic code metaphor?
Vefa Karatay, Yagmur Denizhan -  Evolution of the “window”
Han-liang Chang -  Naming animals in Chinese writing
Dominique Lestel -  Human/animal commmunications, language and evolution
Session: Peirce and other approaches to biosemiotics (chair: Kalevi Kull)
Jorge de Barros Pires -  The universality of sign in Charles S. Peirce Semiotics
Tommi Vehkavaara -  Н олу and why to naturalize semiotic concepts for 
biosemiotics?
Edwina Taborsky -  Energy and evolutionary semiosis 
Soren Brier -  Intrasemiotics
Myrdene Anderson (moderator): General discussion 
M ay 26
Session: Agents sensing sense, qualia and umwelten (chair: Claus Emmeche)
Alexei A. Sharov -  Pragmatics and biosemiotics 
Tom Ziemke -  Robosemiotics
Luis Emilio Bruni -  Does “quorum sensing” imply a new type of biological 
information?
Donald Favareau -  Beyond self and other: The neurosemiotic emergence of 
intersubjectivity
Jyoo-Hi Rhee -  Qualia: From the mind-body dichotomy to the biosemiocybernetic 
paradigm
Anton Fiirlinger -  Is movement the “highest” code?
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Session: Historical and philosophical perspectives (chair: Jesper Hoffmeyer)
Stefan Artman -  Three types of semiotic indeterminacy and their relevance to 
biosemiotics
Claus Emmeche -  Biosemiosis, downward causation, and function in the organism
Wolfgang Hofkirchner -  Biosemiosis in the context of self-organization
Tuomojämsä -  Like a sheet of paper: The interplay between sign and meaning in 
nature
Abir U. Igamberdiev -  Semiotic structure of living systems: imprints, codes and 
language games
Andres Luure -  Understanding life: Trans-semiotic analogies
Nightime Group discussion on determinism and experimentation 
Don Favareau -  The fallacy fallacy
May 27
Session: Relations between physico-, bio- and anthroposemiosis (chair: Kalevi Kull)
Peder Voetmann Christiansen -  Habit formation as symmetry breaking in the early 
universe
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  Life, energy and semiosis
Peter Harries-Jones -  Where bonds become binds: The necessity for Batesons inter- 
subjective perspective in biosemiotics
Martin Skov -  Some problems in neurosemiotics
Frederik Stjernfelt -  Symbols and the evolutionary transition from animal to man
Andreas RoepstorfF -  Thinking with animals
Elling Ulvestad -  Evolution, semiotics and extraterrestrial life
End and Farewell!
The 2nd Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Tartu-Puhtu-Tallinn, Estonia 
June 14-17, 2002
KALEVI KULL
Life, including the academic kind, is related to place. At the second inter­
national Gatherings, we thus tried to show the places in Estonia that are 
related to biosem iotics -  through Karl Ernst von Baer, Jakob von Uexküll, 
local biodiversity and landscape, and zoosemiotic studies. The sessions were 
held in the W hite Hall o f the University of Tartu History Museum (the former 
university library). A reception (a garden party) with Estonian food took 
place in the Baer House in Tartu, and another one at the organizer s home in 
Tammekuru Street. After the working days in Tartu, we made a bus trip via 
the west coast to Tallinn. We visited Uexküll s house in Puhtu, with a couple 
o f talks taking place in the open air in front o f the building. We walked in a 
wooded meadow (at Nedrema), in order to demonstrate a place of very high 
biodiversity. We had our final evening in the Tallinn Zoo with the guidance of 
Aleksei Turovski.
Aleksei Turovski, an Estonian zoosemiotician and also a great artist, who 
particularly likes to draw (and also carve from wood) fantastic mythological 
animals, made a logo for the meeting that was used in the abstract booklet, on 
nametags, and on the special T-shirt (together with Jakob von Uexküll s and 
Juri Lotm ans portraits). The logo was a stylized ouroboros.1
In the introduction to the abstract book (edited by Kaie Kotov and Kalevi 
Kull) we wrote the following:
““The process of message exchanges, or semiosis, is an indispensable 
characteristic of all terrestrial life forms. It is this capacity for containing, 
replicating, and expressing messages, of extracting their signification, that, 
in fact, distinguishes them more from the nonliving -  except for human 
agents, such as computers or robots, that can be programmed to simulate 
communication -  than any other traits often cited. The study of the twin 
processes of communication and signification can be regarded as ultimately a 
branch of the life science, or as belonging in large part to nature, in some part 
to culture, which is, of course, also a part of nature. (Sebeok 1991: 22)
1 Ouroboros has been used for several years as a major logo for the biosemiotics society, particu­
larly as started by Alexei Sharov, who made the very first homepage for biosemiotics.
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This meeting represents a step in our joint effort to understand living beings 
as sign systems. The Gathering in Tartu also means that the annual worldwide 
conferences on biosemiotics have turned into a reality. After a very successful 
first Gathering in Copenhagen -  in May 24-27,2001 -  the current meeting is 
going to develop the ideas of semiotic biology.
In order to maintain the international network, the current abstracts volume 
includes both the abstracts of the papers presented at the meeting, and several 
contributions by the authors who attend it in an epistolary way.
The meeting has been organised by the Department of Semiotics of the 
University of Tartu, Jakob von Uexküll Centre, Tallinn Zoo, and the Bio­
semiotics Group of the University of Copenhagen.”2
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Programme
June 14
Opening, forewords: Myrdene Anderson, Mihhail Lotman, Claus Emmeche,
Kalevi Kull
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  Scitoi mesoib -  or why the genome is so small 
Marcello Barbieri -  Organic codes: metaphors or realities?
Anton Markos, Fatima Cvrckovä -  Who is the addressee of the genetic text
Stefan Artmann -  Four principles of Jacobian biopragmatic
Stephen Pain -  Introduction to biorhetorics: applied rhetoric in the life sciences
Frederik Stjemfelt -  The core hypotheses of biosemiotics
Kalevi Kull -  Biosemiosis: A search for other
Discussion: Organic codes and first principles of biosemiotics
2 See also brief reviews of the meeting in Kull (2002a, 2002b).
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Wolfgang Hofkirchner -  The differentia specifica of biosemiosis in the perspective of 
a theory of evolutionary systems
Yagmur Denizhan, Candas Sert -  In search of a reconciliation between semiotics, 
thermodynamics and metasystem transition theory
John Collier -  Information expression requires cohesive levels
Claus Emmeche -  Biosemiotics and experiential biology
Tom Ziemke -  Affordance vs. functional tone: a comparison of Gibson’s and 
Uexkiill’s theories
Donald Favareau -  Collapsing the wave function of meaning: the contextualizing 
resources of talk-in-interaction
Toshiyuki Nakajima -  Construction of umwelt to control probabilities of events in 
living
Tommi Vehkavaara -  An outline of basic semiotic concepts for bio- and 
robosemiotics and the emergence of umwelt
Mark Reybrouck -  Abiosemiotic approach to music cognition: event perception 
between auditory listening and cognitive economy
Andres Luure -  The role of relations in semiotics
Sergey Chebanov -  Bilateral biosemiotics: a problem of sense on a super-triplet level 
Elisabeth Johansson -  Biosemiotic perspectives in gasflux models 
Christophe Menant -  From biosemiotics to semiotics 
Discussion: Formalisation in biosemiotics
June 16
Edwina Taborsky -  A pansemiotic architecture 
Soren Brier -  Biosemiotics and the Third Culture 
Luis Bruni -  The global phenotype
Alexander Sedov -  Sustainability during development depends on the types of part- 
whole interactions: logical comparisons of biological systems of various structural 
levels
Myrdene Anderson -  Neoteny and its role in taming and domestication 
Mette Böll -  The evolution of empathy in social systems 
Domonique Lestel -  On the expression of negation among animals
June 15
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Gottfried Süssenbacher -  Mythology and evolutionary psychology: on the 
relevance of prehistoric fire usage for the evolution of human culture, consciousness 
and language
Aleksei Turovski -  The signs of bizarre characteristics in the semiometabolism of 
animal associations
Timo Maran -  Mimicry and mimesis in the bio-semiosphere
Mark Vian -  Biotic integrity ecosemiotic archetypes, and the boundary of self: 
Some thoughts on the intentional coupling of human and non-human semiotics
Morten Tonnessen -  Umwelt ethics
Tiberiu G. Mustata -  The semiotic substance of homeopathy 
General discussion: Experimental use of biosemiotics
June 17, Puhtu
Kalevi Kull -  Genius loci
Sune Frolund -  Teleology and the ‘natural history of signification’: the implications 
of Hans Jonas’ bioontology for biosemiotics
Torsten Rüting -  A project to establish the Jakob-von-Uexküll-Archiv at the 
University of Hamburg
Ester Võsu -  How to stage nature 
Tallinn (Tallinn Zoo)
Aleksei Turovski -  The zoo as a field of reestablishing semiotic boundaries
The 3rd Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Copenhagen, Denmark 
July 11-14, 2003
CLAUS EM M ECHE
In the call for papers to the 3rd Gatherings, we wrote that biosemiotics is “an 
interdisciplinary field of theoretical and empirical studies of communication 
and signification in living systems” O f course, it’s rather unclear what an 
‘interdisciplinary field’ really is, but all the participants -  coming from fields 
such as behavioural biology, physics, philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, 
molecular biology, anthropology, neurobiology, cognitive science, systems 
theory, bioinformatics and cybernetics -  seemed to feel quite at home with 
interdisciplinary work. I think that at the time, speculations had already begun 
as to what kind of ‘field’ biosemiotics really was. We had such different back­
grounds that at times it seemed to be a miracle that we could communicate (and 
often we felt that we were speaking different dialects, which we certainly were). 
It was, and to some extent still is, an open question whether biosemiotics and 
the Gatherings could age and grow into a more coherent field, or whether it 
would persist in being a kind of marketplace of ideas or a ‘trading zone’ (although 
not quite as well-defined as a meeting point between less than a handful of 
scientific communities, cf. Peter Galison’s notion of a trading zone in his Image 
and Logic, 1997).
As the organizers of the 3rd Gatherings, we (jesper, Kalevi, Soren Brier 
and m yself) were fully convinced that the very idea behind biosemiotics as a 
research field -  i.e., to study life processes from the perspective o f semiotics, 
and to see life and sign action as inextricably connected -  was a fundamental 
innovation in science and the humanities. However, innovations in science 
may have implications for the existing body of knowledge and the established 
ways o f knowledge production in a number of different ways, since there are 
several modes o f progress in science. An interesting essay by the sociologist of 
science M. J. Mulkay (1975 ; unknown to us at the tim e) distinguishes three 
modes or models o f scientific development. The m odel o f  openness is closest 
to the oft-cherished ideal o f ‘pure science’ in which new ideas are met with an 
open yet critical mind and seriously considered in a process guided by norms 
o f objectivity, impartiality, universality, novelty and critical scepticism, the 
norms known after R. K. M erton as the C U D O S norms.
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Needless to say that we, the participating researchers gathering again in 
the Botanical Auditorium, had not experienced much openness from our 
colleagues in the biosciences. It was Kuhn who radically problematized this 
model as a true description of progress by pointing out the often dogmatic 
character o f normal science’ in which scientists are devoted to solving “a 
limited range o f problems rigidly defined by their group” as Mulkay puts it. 
Here, in this m odel o f  closure, deeper innovations (more than just another 
articulation o f the established paradigm) have to be brought forth by crisis 
and a new generation of researchers who will introduce both a completely 
new way of looking upon the subject matter, a new theory, new values for 
what count as good questions and procedures, new background assumptions, 
and new exemplars for showing how to use the theory in practice. If we had 
any ideas about the possible impact o f biosem iotics if it was to survive, grow 
and flourish, at that time many of us conceived something like a Kuhnian 
revolution to be necessary.
Only seldom did we have vague glimpses of a third model in mind, which 
Mulkay calls the m odel o f  branching. This term may in fact cover more modes 
of discovery than Mulkay s own examples indicate, but in any case, scientific 
development in this model neither conforms to the open or closed models, 
nor to Kuhnian revolutions, but rather to a smoother branching off of some 
parts of the networks of science by “scientific migrants”, as Mulkay calls them -  
and, looking back, we were indeed all migrants!
Scientific migrants tend to come from research networks with definite 
characteristics: networks in which there has recently been a pronounced 
decline in the significance of results; networks whose members have few or 
no avenues of research easily available; networks whose members have special 
competence in knowledge or techniques which have given some indication of 
being more widely applicable; and networks which have been disrupted, often 
by events such as war originating outside the research community, and whose 
members consequently have no firm commitment to an established problem 
area. (Mulkay 1975: 520)
In retrospect, it is interesting to see that many of the characteristics that 
Mulkay ascribes to this mode of innovation indeed applied to the later history 
of biosemiotics, a kind of intellectual entrenchment process or the establish­
ment of a settlement upon the continued Gatherings series, scaffolded by well- 
known but loosely institutional structures as a society and a journal.
84 Gatherings in Biosemiotics 3
But now I ’m far ahead of the events of the 3rd Gatherings, with its extended 
series of papers, its diversity of topics and rich discussions, and sometimes -  
as cognition is embodied -  corporeal fights about how to understand the 
adjective scientific’ when we all wanted to demarcate biosem iotics (as decent 
research, revolutionary or not) from mysticism, alchemy, tarot card semiotics 
and what have you.
The social part that finalized the 2003 meeting might be seen as a further 
move to demarcate an identity for biosem iotics by doing a little boundary 
work in the field: The first field was Novozymes, a cutting edge biotech in­
dustry in Denmark that draws upon the semiotic capacities o f molecular re­
cognition to make energy-low ‘smart’ processing in various industries. From 
there we went to an ecosemiotic experiment’, that is, to the freetown of 
Christiania, another self-governing society, or self-proclaimed autonomous 
neighbourhood close to the city of Copenhagen, founded by squatter hippies 
in 1971.
Although biosem iotics is hardly a hippie science, we all would like the 
field to thrive autonomously, with a high degree o f independence from 
external interests, and as Myrdene Anderson recently aptly expressed (in an 
email exchange on organizational matters), catching some of the atmosphere 
surrounding biosemioticians at work and play so well that I’ll make her words 
mine: “I am more comfortable in the egalitarian apolitical tribal society that the 
G A TH ER IN G S stand for. W ith love and sympathies”...
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Programme
July 11
Session: Sign action in biosystems (chair: Jesper Hoffmeyer)
Mogens Kilstrup -  Substructures in the Peircean sign triad.
Mia Krause -  Biological aging and death in a Peircean perspective
Jorge de Barros Pires; Jose Wagner Garcia -  A new leucine zipper conduct in 
response of microgravity.
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Session: Sign, meaning, and codes (chair: Luis Bruni)
Marcello Barbieri -  The definitions of information and meaning: Two possible 
boundaries between physics and biology
Laszlo Hajnal -  A new model for biology?
Anton Markos; Fatima Cvrckovä -  What does meaning mean?
Session: Ethology and cognitive zoosemiotics (chair: Soren Brier)
Mette Böll -  The evolution of empathy in social systems, part II
Dario Martinelli -  40 years of animal signs: Old and new questions posed by the 
zoosemiotic research
Kim Rasmussen -  Are cognitive ethology and classical ethology mutually exclusive?
Session: Towards an understanding of the Innenwelten of life (chair: Mia Krause)
Filip Grygar -  Hermeneutic approach to the phenomenon of the living
Toshiyuki Nakajima -  Cognitive processes of constructing internal models of the 
environment
Claus Emmeche; Frederik Stjernfelt -  Sign action and emergent intentionality in 
bacterial chemotaxis.
July 12
Session: Representational tools and theories (chair: Frederik Stjernfelt)
Georg Toepfer -  Representing life: Graphical models for the fundamental processes 
of life
Christophe Menant -  Evolution of meaningful information generation through the 
evolution of life.
Vefa Karatay; Yagmur Denizhan -  Relation between evolution and development:
A metasystemic approach
Session: Semiosis beyond biology (chair: Kalevi Kull)
Peder Voetmann Christiansen -  Energy-bond-graphs: a semiotic formalization of 
modern physics.
Edwina Taborsky -  Interpretive symmetry: The semiotic measurement and 
formation of reality
Alfred Lang -  From Peircean interpretative to generative semiotic: Structure 
formation and interaction in life, psyche, and culture as conceived in semiotic 
ecology.
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Session: Foundational perspectives (chair: Anton Markoš)
Soren Brier -  Similarities and differences between second order cybernetics, 
autopoiesis, and biosemiotics
Kalevi Kull -  Organic needs, and other problems in biosemiotics.
Andres Luure -  Causality and functionality: metaphysics and semiotics.
Myrdene Anderson -  Plumbing biosemiotics for chords of fundamentals
July 13
Session: Uexküllian and Peircean perspectives ( l )  (chair: Don Favareau)
Han-liang Chang -  Notes towards a semiotics of parasitism.
Torsten Rüting -  Uexkülls “Institut für Umweltforschung” -  biosemiotics in action?
Juipi Angelina Chien -  Diagramming as a convergence of С. S. Peirce, Jakob von 
Uexküll, and Ernst Gombrich
Session: Uexküllian and Peircean perspectives (2) (chair: Myrdene Anderson)
Stacey E. Ake -  “Homo semeiosis” -  a guess at the riddle of the evolution of human 
language
Mads Vestergaard -  The impossibility of biological physicalism and the necessity of 
the biosemiotic turn
Stephen Pain -  What is the meaning of pheromone to a moth?
Session: The biosemiotics of values (chair: Mette Böll)
Donald F. Favareau -  Biosemiotic constructivism and the ethics of irreversibility 
Tommi Vehkavaara -  Biosemiotics as objective ethics and esthetics?
Christian Baron -  Scientific values and biosemiotics
Session: The emergence of symbols and culture (chair: Edwina Taborsky)
Peter Harries-Jones -  No representamen without misrepresentamen: Bateson, 
boundaries and biosemiotics.
Adam Skibinski -  Time-binding or cumulative cultural evolution or second-order 
code-duality or self-coding or can we have one biosemiotic explanation how we 
became humans?
Joäo Queiroz, Ivan de Araujo, Sidarta Ribeiro -  The emergence of referential 
symbolic process in non-human primates communication: a zoosemiotic analysis 
based on the Peircean extended theory of sign
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July 14
Session: Biosemiotics meets Novozymes (chair: Claus Emmeche)
Lene Lange -  Novozymes’ technologies: unlocking the magic of nature 
Thomas Schou Larsen -  Coping with complexity: a bioinformatics perspective 
Mikako Sasa -  From natural diversity to enzyme diversity 
Tour of robot facilities (Steffen Ernst)
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  The ecosemiotic turn in technology
Luis Bruni -  Virulence and health in multitrophic systems. A case for biosemiotic 
technology
The 4th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Prague, Czech Republic 
July 1-5, 2004
AN TON  MARKOS
I was formally responsible for the organization o f two Gatherings that took 
place in Prague, in 2004  and 2009. As far as I can remember, people were 
satisfied with the scientific content as well as the overall organization -  so 
I will restrict myself but to some personal remarks that may illustrate the 
development o f the Gatherings during those years. From my perspective, 
there was a radical difference between the two events.
“The Fellowship o f  the Ring"
The decision for Prague was made in Tartu in 2002, in order to break the rule 
o f regular yearly exchanges between Copenhagen and Tartu. In principle, 
we copied the pattern I saw at the three previous events: with one plenary 
lecture in the morning, followed by short communications. The applications 
and abstracts came to my hands, and the local organizing committee (my 
colleagues and I) were responsible for putting together the programme and 
accessory events. As far as I remember, there were no complaints and no 
serious drawbacks. Personally, as a biologist, I was a little bit disappointed by 
the fact that a great fraction o f participants were plain semioticians, without 
any interest in problems o f biology; there were also too many contributions 
that could be given the com m on title “W hat is biosem iotics?”. But all this is 
part o f any discipline that is in statu nascendi.
And the naissance was close -  o f our Society. A very important event took 
place in Prague. A group of people working in the field (jesp er Hoffmeyer, 
Marcello Barbieri, Claus Emmeche, Kalevi Kull, D on Favareau, Soren Brier, 
and myself) met unofficially -  in a beer pub, o f course. We agreed on the 
usage o f the term “biosem iotics” as a unifying name for describing our doings 
(dropping, for example, “semantic biology”, “bioherm eneutics” and similar 
alternatives). Moreover, we decided to work towards establishing an official 
base for our activities -  to found an international society. This finally happened 
in 2005, after the Urbino Gatherings.1
1 See also Favareau 2005.
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Programme
Julyl
Opening (A. Markos)
Zdenek Neubauer -  The scandalness of novelty 
July 2
Session: Methods and methodology (chair: Tommi Vehkavaara)
Tommi Vehkavaara -  From the motives and methods of biosemiotics to experiential 
existential naturalism
Ulrich Krohs -  Why semiotic models may have explanatory power in biology -  and 
why economic metaphors may not
Edwina Taborsky -  The interface as the key nodal site of a dynamic semiosis
Myrdene Anderson -  The who, what, when, where, why, and how of “violence”
Georg Töpfer -  The concept of sign and the concept of function: similarities and 
differences
Toshiyuki Nakajima -  Internal entropy and survivability of living systems 
Andres Luure -  Functions and roles in biosemiotics
Sessions: Past and future (chair: Torsten Rüting)
Session: Starting from Uexküll
Torsten Rüting -  History of biology and Uexküll’s biology as ethics for investigators 
of life
Han-liang Chang -  The “Philological Understanding” of Jakob von Uexküll 
Session: Along historical paths
Jui-Pi Chien -  Baron Uexküll’s French connections -  Georges Canguilhem, etc. 
Mads Vestergaard -  Life, difference and biosemiotics (Henri Bergson)
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Session: To future projects 
Kalevi Kull -  Biology of sympathy
Andreas Weber -  The wake of consilience produces monsters: Evolutionary 
psychology, social construction, and a biosemiotic proposal for symmetry
Joäo Queiroz, Charbel Nino El-Hani -  On the emergence of semiosis: Toward a 
multi-level hierarchical approach
Kaie Kotov -  Media and the human umwelt: Where does cultural semiotics stand? 
Jose Wagner Garcia, Fernando Pellon de Miranda, et al. -  COGNITUS project
July3
Session: Life as a dialogue with the world (chair: Aleksei Turovski)
Aleksei Turovski -  The signs as arguments in dialogical network of animals 
associations
Mette Böll -  Social is emotional
Tobias Cheung -  Merleau-Ponty and the primacy of perception
Stephen Pain -  Ants in the pants of the cognitive scientist : Biorethorics and ants
Dario Martinelli -  A whale of a sonata: Organisation and form in zoomusicological 
structures
Joäo Queiroz, et al. -  The emergence of referential symbolic process in non-human 
primates: A semiotic analysis based on C. S. Peirce’s extended theory of sign
Cornelius Steckner -  Environmental misfit in vision and grasp
Film: “Life as a dialogue with the world”
Session: Semiotics of the countryside; “ecosemiotics”: Excursion to the outskirts of 
Prague (guides: Ivan Horäcek and Vaclav Cflek)
July 4
Mini-symposium: Information and meaning in biology (acknowledging 100th 
anniversary from the birth of Gregory Bateson) (chair: Peter Harries-Jones)
Peter Harries-Jones -  Gregory Bateson, abduction, and ecosystem communication
Don Favareau -  Making the differences that make a difference: The evolutionary 
and ontogenetic creation of iconicity
Charbel Nino El-Hani, Claus Emmeche -  A biosemiotic analysis of the gene concept 
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  From things to relations
Soren Brier -  What is the pattern that connects? Bateson in cybersemiotic perspective
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Session: Organism and ontogeny (chair: Lenny Moss)
Lenny Moss
Andreas Weber -  Molecular intentionality: Robust embryological networks and 
“autonomous agents”
Mia Krause, Ala Trusina and Kim Sneppen -  Adaptation, differentiation and aging 
modeled as a dynamical network process
Alexei A. Oskolski -  Narrative on “biological sense”: an actant model 
Thierry Bardini -  Mapping Metaphors of Junk DNA
Karel Kleisner -  Genes-memes-semes: Towards the new concept of mimicry
Jin Neustupa -  Geometric morphometries -  a promise of structuralistic 
morphology for the science of life
Luis Emilio Bruni -  Signal transduction and categorial perception
M. Mehmet Ozansoy, Yagmur Denizhan -  Disease as semiotic misinterpretation.
A model study: Parkinson’s disease
July S
Session: Information and ontogeny (chair: Marcello Barbieri)
Marcello Barbieri -  Steps in the history of life. Information, meaning, interpretation 
and signs
Fatima Cvrckovä, Anton Markos -  Beyond bioinformatics: Can similarity be 
measured objectively in the digital world?
Alexei Sharov -  Why biosemiotic systems are hierarchical?
Almo Farina -  Eco-field versus habitat: Shifting a paradigm in developing a cognitive 
ecology
OlafBreidbach -  Internal representations -  A prelude for neurosemantics
Vefa Karatay, Yagmur Denizhan -  Semiotics of individuation and individuation of 
signs
Wolfgang Hofkirchner -  Cognition, communication, and co-operation in living 
systems
Günther Witzany -  From biosphere to semiosphere to social lifeworlds: Biology as 
an understanding social science
Agora: discussion forum
The 5th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Urbino, Italy 
July 20-24, 2005
ALMO FARINA
The spirit in which we organized the 5th Gatherings in Biosemiotics is sum­
marized in the following introduction by the two responsible parties (Almo 
Farina and Marcello Barbieri):
“It is a pleasure and an honour for us to host the 5th Gathering in Biosemiotics 
in Urbino. The science of signs is increasingly becoming the science of life and 
we are very much looking forward to seeing the blossoming of its theoretical 
and practical developments. Perhaps it is not inappropriate that people gather 
in an old Renaissance town to put the seeds of a new scientific Renaissance. 
The programme of the Gathering and the abstracts of the communications 
are a guarantee of excellence and we thank you warmly for your presence 
and for your contributions. On behalf of Urbino University of the Faculty of 
Environmental Sciences and of the Institute of Biomathematics we wish you 
all a most fruitful meeting and a pleasant stay.”
The meeting was a good event in the relaxed atmosphere o f the Urbino 
Scientific Campus, with the dense programme here attached gladdened by 
good music. In fact, the Music Conservatory “Rossini” o f Pesaro introduced 
three “musical sessions” dedicated respectively to Fisarmonica Quartet, Flute 
Quartet and Flute Quartet.
An excursion to the Ducal Palace in Urbino, to the Montefeltro landscape 
and to San Leo “The Castle”, which are the three major examples of Renais­
sance architecture and o f territory governance in Central Italy, represented 
important cultural landmarks at the end o f the meeting.
From the distance o f seven years there remains intact the enthusiasm 
with which I am addressing biosemiotics, which seems to me a more diffuse 
science thanks to the efforts o f many of us.
In Urbino, biosem iotics has been incorporated into the ecological 
curriculum, and the new field o f soundscape ecology “uses” biosemiotic 
principles extensively.
I hope to organize another Gatherings in Urbino, but in the meantime 
it is in my plan to organize, at the end o f 2013, an international conference
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on soundscape ecology, which would be a great opportunity to engage 
biosemioticians by inviting plenary speakers on this matter. Biosem iotics has 
been utilized to reinforce and to complete the eco-field theory and to develop 
the hypothesis o f the sound-tope, both being important steps in investigating 
and interpreting ecological complexity and communication networks.
Programme
July 21
Session: Historical problems (chair: Almo Farina)
Don Favareau -  Examining the vital signs of biosemiotics 
Marcello Barbieri -  The mind-body problem -  is dualism back?
Tommi Vehkavaara -  Biosemiotics as a science and as an existential philosophy
Session: The Scientific framework (chair: Almo Farina)
Kalevi Kull -  Semiotics and physics
Stefan Artmann -  Consilience and the history of biosemiotics 
Session: Semiotic networks (chair: Kalevi Kull)
Fatima Cvrckova, Anton Markoš -  Metabolic pathways from wiring diagrams to 
semantic networks
Cornelius Steckner -  The touch of the world
Stephen Pain -  The semiotic and cognitive architecture necessary for meaning 
production in invertebrates
Session: Biosemiotic research (chair: Soren Brier)
Claus Emmeche -  Towards a biosemiotic concept of function and semiotic 
causation
Charbel El-Hani, Joäo Queiroz -  Downward determination in semiotic processes 
Luis Emilio Bruni -  Towards a hierarchical understanding of health
July 22
Session: Biosemiotics and information theory (chair: Claus Emmeche)
Gerard Battail -  Information theory and biology
Amanda Sharkey, Noel Sharkey -  Robots, insects, and emergence
Wolfgang Hofkirchner -  What is biological information? A transdisciplinary view
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Session: Biosemiotics and molecular biology (chair: Claus Emmeche)
Yair Neuman -  The specificity enigma: From mechanics to poiesis
Marcella Faria -  RNAs as code makers: A biosemiotic view of RNAi and cell 
immunity
Session: Epigenetic systems (chair: Don Favareau)
Alessandro Villa -  The neuro-heuristic paradigm
Johannes Huber, Ingolf Schmid-Tannwald -  Epigenetic mechanisms following 
mammalian fertilization reveal basic principles of constructivist epistemology
Karel Kleisner and Läszlõ Hajnal -  The pretty carabids in a small world: Inferring 
biological resemblances from the “small world network”: An attempt
Session: Semiotic communication (chair: Don Favareau)
Soren Brier -  The biosemiotic paradigm: Is a common philosophy of science 
reflected description possible?
Günther Witzany -  From umwelt to mitwelt: Natural laws versus rule-governed 
sign-mediated interactions (rsi’s)
Vefa Karatay, Yagmur Denhizan -  The mediating role of sign processes in the 
dynamics of becoming
July 23
Session: Biosemiotics and language (chair: Anton Markos)
Tuomo Jämsä -  Language and nature 
Frederik Stjernfelt -  A biosemiotic Scala Naturae?
Arantza Etxeberria, Marila Läzaro -  On manufactured life and the biology of the 
impossible
Session: Biosemiotics, art and feelings (chair: Anton Marko)
Mette Böll -  The social emotions
Mark Reybrouck -  The musical code between nature and nurture: biosemiotic and 
ecological claims
Session: Ecosystems (chair: Stefan Artmann)
Peter Harries-Jones -  Increasing fittedness: Ecology, aesthetics and ecosemiotics 
Almo Farina -  Semiosis, the common currency of landscapes
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Maricela Yip, Pierre Madl -  Semiosis aspects of ecosystems of the invasive Caulerpa 
taxifolia
Session: Theoretical biology (chair: Stefan Artmann)
Assen Dimitrov -  Nonalgorithmic order
Toshiyuki Nakajima -  Managing uncertainty of events by semiosis in living system 
Hernän Burbano -  Determinism, indeterminism and semiotic election
July 24
Excursion day -  Guided tour of Urbino and surroundings
The 6th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Salzburg, Austria 
July 5-9, 2006
G Ü N TH ER W ITZA N Y
At the 4 th Gatherings in Prague, I first met Wolfgang Hofkirchner from IC TS1 
in Salzburg, whom I had never met before. Spontaneously, we decided to invite 
the Sixth Gatherings to Salzburg. W hen I returned to Salzburg I enquired of 
Alfred Winter, my mentor and a successful manager o f cultural affairs, and he 
said that he would support the meeting.
W hen the event started I felt very happy and I was also very glad about 
the pre-programme with some truly prominent researchers o f plant biology 
(František Baluška, Peter Barlow), cell biology (Nikolaus Bresgen) and a 
leading expert in epigenetics ( Randy Jirtle), all of whom are people outside of 
biosemiotics, but which, as the Proceedings expressed it in its title, was rather 
appropriate ( “Biosem iotics in Transdisciplinary contexts” -  see Witzany 
2 0 0 7 ).2
The whole Gathering was very fine, including the excursion into the Alps 
and the exciting evening programme and the excellent musician.3
At this stage I shared the opinion that biosemiotics as a whole would 
integrate the results o f the philosophy o f science discourse o f the 2(У century, 
i.e. the pragmatic turn, as has been done by most of the human sciences. As 
a result this would have led to a coherent scientific method in biosemiotic 
research and investigations.
In the following year, I noticed that the (hidden) metaphysical, onto­
logical, information theoretical, pansemiotic, naturalistic and mechanistic 
approaches went on as usual, and no progress in clarifying the methodo­
logical foundations took place. At this point I founded my biocommuni­
cation theory -  a further development o f the theory of communicative 
nature -  which is completely independent o f Peirce’s philosophy or any other 
“holy ghost” o f biosem iotics (mind, consciousness, sign, code...), but essen­
tially needs only the basics o f modern communication theory, i.e. the three
1 Information and Communication Technologies and Society Centre.
2 In connection with the Gatherings, a few local newspaper articles (e.g. Witzany 2006) and a 
radio programme were produced.
3 See also the review of this meeting in Sign Systems Studies (Witzany, Yip 20 0 7 ).
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levels of semiotic rules, consortial agents o f sign users, and context depen­
dency o f sign meanings. W ith these tools in hand, it is a rather exciting pro­
cedure to start applying biosemiotics within the biological realm. W ithout 
my experiences in biosemiotics this would not have occurred. In this respect, 
biosemiotics served as a good ladder.
References
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Programme
July 4
Pre-Programme: Biosemiotics in Transdisciplinary Contexts
Morning sessions (chair: Donald Favareau)
Wolfgang Hofkirchner -  Introduction
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  Gregory Bateson as a precursor for biosemiotics
František Baluška -  Neurobiological communication in plants: From molecules to 
plant synapses
Peter W. Barlow, Jaqueline Lück -  L-systems and other symbolic means of 
representing morphogenetic events in plants
Randy L.Jirtle -  Biological consequences of divergent evolution ofM6P/IGF2R 
imprinting
Kalevi Kull -  Diversification: Biosemiotic approach 
Günther Witzany -  The agents of genomic creativity
Afternoon sessions (chair: Wolfgang Hofkirchner)
Nikolaus Bresgen -  Signal and context
Erich Hamberger -  Signal -  Sign -  Word: Transdisciplinary remarks on the field of 
research called (bio-)semiotics
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Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski -  Biosemiotics, bioinformatics and responsibility: 
Ambivalence of the effects of the deciphering of the human genome on society and 
science
Don Favareau -  Animal sensing, acting and knowing: Bridging the relations 
between brains, bodies and world
Albert Duschl -  Evolution and mechanisms of mixed analog/digital information 
processing in living cells
John Collier -  Do systems biology and biosemiotics have anything to tell each 
other?
Ingolf Schmid-Tannwald -  Towards a more comprehensive scientific model of man
Main programme
July 6
Session: Semantics in biosemiotics (chair Kalevi Kull)
Stacey E. Ake -  From semiotics to biosemiotics: The insurrection of life 
Marcello Barbieri -  The origin and evolution of semiosis
Joäo Queiroz, Charbel El-Hani -  Towards a multi-level approach to the emergence 
of meaning processes in living systems
Tommi Vehkavaara -  Meaning of life
Wolfgang Reitberger -  From ant hills to ambient intelligence: Cues for signalling, 
coordination and persuasion
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski -  Active externalism and biosemantics
Session: Methods of biosemiotics (chair: Günther Witzany)
Kalevi Kull -  Methods of biosemiotics
Sergej Chebanov -  The current situation in modern biosemiotics
Peter Harries-Jones -  Editing Biosemiotics in ‘ Wikipedia’
Helmut Löckenhoff -  Integrative biosemiotics: A transdisciplinary systemic 
approach
Session: Semiotics in biosemiotics (chair: Günther Witzany)
Donald Favareau -  How to make Peirce s ideas clear
Cornelius Steckner -  Peirce’s sop to the Cerberus and the biosemiotic self as the 
interpretant of object and sign: An experimental appraoch
Alfred Lang -  A-dualistic generative semiotic
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July 7
Session: Applied biosemiotics (chair: Wolfgang Hofkirchner)
Argyris Arnellos, Martien Brands, Thomas Spyrou, John Darzentas -  A biosemiotc 
analysis of serotonin s complex functionality
Almo Farina, Davide Morri, Silvia Scozzafava -  The eco-field hypothesis and the 
human use of resources in cultural landscapes
Timo Maran -  Structural and semiotic aspects of biological mimicry
Toshiyuki Nakajima -  Evolution of life in the global network of genetic exchange: 
Sexuality and the universal genetic code.
Günther Witzany -  Applied biosemiotics: Fungal communication
Gerard Battail -  Impact of information theory on the fundamentals of genetics
Seän O’Nualläin -  Genome and natural languages: How far can the analogy be 
extended?
Session: Biosemiotics and information theory (Chair: Tommi Vehkavaara)
Assen I. Dimitrov -  How could nature turn into a manufacture?
Ingolf Schmid-Tannwald, Johannes Huber -  Human life: An “endless semiosis” 
through different human sign-systems
Paolo Manzelli -  What means life?
Pierre Madl, Maricela Yip -  Biophotonics and information, matter and energy -  
a non-linear world-view
Dietmar Payrhuber -  Information alters matter
Conference Dinner, with an extraordinary music performance by Doris Kirschofer 
July 8
Session: Evolution, development and sign functions (chair: Jesper Hoffmeyer)
Eugenio Andrade -  A semiotic analysis of the interface between evolutionary and 
developmental processes
Marcella Faria -  Signal transduction codes and cell fate
Randy L.Jirtle -  Nutrition, epigenetics and disease susceptibility
Mario Gimona -  Protein linguistics -  a grammar for modular protein assembly?
Yair Neumann -  The polisemy of the sign: A quantum computing perspective
John Pickering -  Affordances of signs
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Session: Biosemiotics and mind models (chair Marcella Faria)
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  The awakening of species: Grades of consciousness 
Mette Böll -  The evolution of consciousness
Robert Logan -  Propagating organization and the extended mind model of the 
origin of language and culture
Rainer E. Zimmermann -  Topological aspects of biosemiotics
The 7th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Groningen, the Netherlands 
June 6-9, 2007
BAREND VAN HEUSDEN
The 7th Gatherings in Biosemiotics, which was held in Groningen in 2007, 
brought together an impressively varied group of scientists and scholars. Apart 
from the usual suspects’, who guarantee a firm core and continuity, there were 
several newcomers, as well as a number o f Dutch colleagues who caught the 
opportunity to interact, through presentations and discussions, with ‘hard 
boiled’ biosemioticians.
This is certainly one o f the important advantages o f ‘travelling gatherings’: 
it allows ‘locals’ to get in touch and acquainted with, and eventually also very 
enthusiastic about, an approach that combines the study of nature with that of 
culture through the study o f semi otic processes.
One of the things that comes to mind immediately when recalling the 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics in Groningen in 2007 is the ubiquity of Don 
Favareau -  he was definitely the driving force, first through the Internet and 
later ‘on the ground, behind these Gatherings. His experience and effectiveness 
were of an immense help to us as organizers and he decidedly set the tone for 
the event.
I also recall some quite heated debates, in which Don Favareau, Marcello 
Barbieri, Jesper Hoffmeyer, Kalevi Kull, Frederik Stjernfeldt and Claus 
Emmeche figured prominently -  and one in particular on the ‘intelligence of 
evolution’ which was triggered by the theme of another conference that Jesper 
Hoffmeyer had attended before coming to Groningen.
There was one lecture that stuck to my mind for a very long time. It was 
given by Stephen Pain, an independent scholar, and it was about sponges 
( ‘Sponge: On the Cusp o f an Integrated Sem iotics’) -  it was impressive, not 
only because o f the topic, but certainly as much because of the spectacularly 
witty and erudite presentation.
Thus during those three days, back in June 2007, we were more or 
less secluded in the Groningen Academy Building. A quick glance at the 
programme makes it clear how broad the scope o f the meeting was, both in 
terms of the topics addressed and in terms of the backgrounds and affiliations 
of the participants.1 But this is probably as it should be in biosemiotics: the
See also a review by Yair Neuman (2 0 0 7 ).
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study o f semiotic process on all levels o f life and complexity necessarily 
involves a very broad spectrum of disciplines, epistemologies and characters. 
That is probably the gist o f it.
On Saturday, those who had not left yet ‘recovered’ a little, enjoying 
an excursion to the ‘Ommelanden -  the countryside around the city of 
Groningen. We visited the Menkemaborg, a 17th century mansion surrounded 
by a beautiful park. The walks through the house and the park provided the 
opportunity for most o f us to round up some last arguments and tackle a few 
issues left unfinished.
Biosemiotics was not and still isn’t an established discipline at the University 
o f Groningen, but through our study o f culture and cognition, with particular 
reference to the arts, we certainly do hope to be able to contribute again in the 
future to the biosemiotics project.
References
Neuman, Yair 2007. The 7th Gathering in Biosemiotics: A review. Sign Systems 
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Programme
June 6
Session (chair: Kalevi Kull)
Claus Emmeche -  Biosemiotics and the biological sciences -  a Kuhnian perspective 
Marcello Barbieri -  Organic codes and evo-devo
Eliseo Fernandez -  Signs, instruments and self-reference in biosemiotics 
Session (chair Claus Emmeche)
Donald Favareau -  De anima and De interpretation: Aristotle on life and signs 
Victoria Alexander -  Teleology, emergence and poetics 
John Pickering -  What’s wrong with vitalism?
Session (chair: Yair Neuman)
Frederik Stjernfelt -  Roots of biosemiotics in German thought 
Nicole Rossmanith -  Exploring semiosis through concept formation 
Barend van Heusden -  Getting rid of the sign
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Session (chair: Marcello Barbieri)
Gerard Battail -  Genomic error-correcting codes in the living world
Gemma Bel-Enguix, Dolores Jimenez-Lopez -  From the genetic code to a 
biomolecular-based linguistics
Marcella Faria -  DNA organization: Boundaries, territories and islands 
June 7
Session (chair: John Pickering)
Gottfried Süssenbacher -  Prehistoric fire usage -  the prime origin of memes? 
Mette Rakel Böll -  The molding of moods
Martien Brands -  Medical diagnosis in a biosemiotic perspective 
Session (chair: Victoria Alexander)
Hellmut Löckenhoff -  A transdisciplinary invitation to socio-semiotics
Stephen J. Cowley -  The biosemiotics of imaginary codes
Charles Goodwin -  The multi-modal organization of human action
Session (chair: Barend van Heusden)
Almo Farina, et al. -  Exploring the semiotic nature of bird soundscapes 
František Baluška, et al. -  Synaptic concept in an expansive mood 
Stephen Pain -  The sponge: on the cusp of an integrated semiotics
Session (chair: Luis Bruni)
Yagmur Denizhan, et a l  -  Magnetotactic bacteria as a challenge for semiotic 
description
Raymon Bruce -  Where is the sign? the single cell as an urmodel of perception 
Arno Goudsmit -  Self-referentiality and sensitivity in living beings
June 8
Session (chair Marcella Faria)
Toshiyuki Nakajima, et al. -  Encounter probability in proto-semiotic systems 
Sergey V. Chebanov -  Biosemiotics and biohermeneutics
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Session (chair: Yagmur Denizhan)
Rob Withagen -  Evolutionary analysis of the information-based theory of 
perception
Andreas Reichelt -  Motor control approaches to goal-directed behavior 
Cornelius Steckner -  When a baby points at a flower: sign and environment
Session (chair: Jesper Hoffmeyer)
Walter Riofrio -  Enquiries about the emergence of cognition in evolution 
Luis Emilio Bruni -  Is the umwelt in the associative cortex -  or vice-versa?
Yair Neuman -  Memory: a bio-semiotic perspective
Session (chair: Don Favareau)
Morten Tonnessen -  Umwelt transition and the umwelten of domesticated animals 
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  Biosemiotic design is “intelligent”
Kalevi Kull -  A biosemiotic theory of evolution
The 8th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Syros, Greece 
June 23-28, 2008
ARGYRIS ARNELLOS
The 8th Gathering in Biosemiotics was organized by the Department of Pro­
duct and Systems Design Engineering o f the University o f the Aegean in 
Syros, Greece. The event lasted for four hot and sunny summer days, where 
presentations of meticulously prepared works were combined with good food 
and joy at the beaches.
The welcome party was full of conference participants dining and discussing 
on a very colourful and festive atmosphere. M ost o f them had already arrived, 
and the truth is that they couldn’t believe that they should attend, early in the 
morning of the very next day, the conference at 9 a.m.! The conference was held 
at the Cultural Center o f Hermoupolis, near the central square.
The conference programme was full and in-depth (as always), with 43 talks 
of almost 30 minutes each, and with Kalevi Kull being very strict on keeping 
time within limits. A  striking characteristic of the gathering was the plurality 
of different perspectives and applications o f biosemiotics, with works ranging 
from the modelling o f basic biological processes o f signal transduction to 
others discussing biosem iotics in wine-tasting.
Neither biosemiotics, nor semiotics as such, are primary topics of research 
in the Department of Product and Systems Engineering. However, the concept 
has been substantially studied and used in both postgraduate programs (M Sc 
in Design of Interactive Systems and M Sc in the Design o f Health Systems -  
Holistic Approach to M edicine). Postgraduate students from both programs 
attended the conference and had the opportunity to discuss several issues 
with many o f the people whose theories they were taught and had been 
studying in the previous semesters.
The dinner took place at the Faros Village H otel, in a small village just 20 
minutes outside the town, during a sweet night and a full m oon that many 
took advantage o f for swimming and playing like small children in the pool. 
And yes, you do remember correctly: Marcello was also in the pool, playing, 
laughing, and having a good time.
After the last day of talks and after Terrence D eacons asynchronous remote 
presentation (i.e. a powerpoint’ presentation with his recorded voice following
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the slides), Don had an interesting surprise for everybody. His talk was a collage 
of all other talks that were given at the conference, aiming to demonstrate the 
plurality o f the field as well as its multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature. 
I remember that we were all not only emotionally but also mentally touched by 
his inspiration, since this was the simplest thing we could do to present a fine 
resume of what had been taking place during the last four days.
The conference closed with a round-trip guided group bus excursion to the 
M edieval Settlement o f  Ano Syros and to the Historical Center o f  Hermoupolis, 
which lasted from early in the afternoon until late in the evening. I wasn’t 
sure how interesting this excursion would be, but to my surprise it turned out 
to be a great success, which made me very happy. After that, it was time for 
me to rest, but not much, just for a while. Then, and for the next couple of 
days, many of the attendees were scattered in the several villages o f the island, 
enjoying the sea and the summer weather, while others took advantage of the 
timing and visited other islands.
I ’d like to believe it was truly a many-sided gathering in all respects.
Programme
June 24
Kalevi Kull -  Biosemiotic concept of species 
Marcello Barbieri -  Three types of semiosis
Tommi Vehkavaara -  The failure of evolutionary epistemology: A lesson for 
biosemiotics?
Luis Emilio Bruni -  Hierarchical categorical perception and semiotic integration
Eliseo Fernandez -  Biosemiotics and self-reference from Peirce to Rosen
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  A biosemiotic approach to a theory of meaning
Wendy Wheeler -  “Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart”: Going backward to о 
forward -  layers of biosemiosis and the logic of abduction in aesthetic and scientific 
creativity
Yair Neuman -  Why do we need others?
Argyris Arnellos, Spyros Vosinakis, Joäo Queiroz, Charbel Nino El-Hani, John 
Darzentas -Biosemiotic modeling of signal transduction in В-cell activation: 
Implications for simulation methods
Thierry Bardini -  What does it mean for biosemiotics if there is no more “junk” on 
DNA?
Mette Boll -  Investigations of the social subject
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June 25
Stephen Cowley -  Language and physics: Implications for biosemiotics
Joanna R^czaszek -  Symbols as constraints in biological systems and natural 
language: Apsycholinguistic perspective on Pattee’s framework
Alex Kravchenko -  Linguistic semiosis and the bounds of human cognition
Charbel El-Hani, Joäo Queiroz, Frederik Stjernfelt -  Firefly femmes fatales: A case 
study in the semiotics of deception
Timo Maran -  How should an egg look like? Some semiotic observations of brood 
parasitism
lacqueline Lück, Peter W. Barlow -  Context and variability as problems in plant 
development and biosemiotics
Han-liang Chang -  Semioticians make strange bedfellows! Or once again: ‘Is 
language a primary modelling system?’
Jui-pi Chien -  Can Saussure’s Orangery manuscripts shed new light on 
biosemiotics?
Victoria Alexander -  The poetics or semiotics of purpose
Jana Švorcovä, Anton Markoš -  Organic codes at the level of chromatin
John Collier -  Control in biological systems: Where do need semiotics and not just 
control theory?
Gerard Battail -  Applying semiotics and information theory to biology: A critical 
comparison
June 26
Myrdene Anderson -  The play of a metaphor in ecosemiotics: footprints, 
handprints, mindprints
Marcella Faria -  Representation in biology -  expanding the landscape
Almo Farina -  Exploring the cognitive landscape of the Robin (Erithacus rubecula) 
wintering in a Mediterranean region
Gennaro Auletta -  Biological systems as integrating a processor, a regulator, and a 
decider
Sergey Chebanov -  Alternatives of biosemiotics
Joäo Queiroz, Claus Emmeche, Kalevi Kull, Charbel El-FIani -  Semiotic approach in 
biology: Relating theoretical bases to applied models
Karel Kleisner -  Eye for eye: On the evolution of semantic organs by means of 
signification
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Mehmet Ozansoy, Yagmur Denizhan -  endomembrane system as a representation 
of the extracellular medium
Michal Schmoranz, Zdenek Neubauer -  A conversation of forms -  bacterial colony 
as a symbol of teamwork and a pure aesthetic evidence
Thibaud Debaecker, Ryad Benosman -  A practical model of the retina codification 
and its applications in localization and camera networks
Franco Giorgi -  A biosemiotic approach to neurophenomenology
Jonathan Hope, Pierre-Louis Patoine -  Does a glass of white wine taste like a glass 
of domain Sigalas Santorini Asirtiko Athiri 2005? A biosemiotic approach to wine- 
tasting.
June 27
Walter Riofrio -  A proposal on biosemiotics
Ingolf Schmid-Tannwald -  Interpersonal relationship in everyday life: a semiotic 
model
Martien Brands -  Does biosemiotics assist in understanding complex medical 
interventions?
Vanessa Carvalho dos Santos, Joao Queiroz, Charbel Nino El-Hani -  A Peircean 
semiotic approach to alternative RNA splicing and cellular signaling pathways: 
Implications for the concepts of gene and genetic information
Vefa Karatay, Yagmur Denizhan -  Individuation as a general framework for semiosis
Terrence Deacon -  The general theory of evolution1
Don Favareau -  Examining the vital signs of biosemiotics in 2008
Peter Harries-Jones -  Ecosemiotics and the collapse of ecosystems
Terrence Deacon had sent in a video presentation.
The 9th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Prague, Czech Republic 
June 30 -  July 5, 2009
ANTON MARKOŠ
"No man ever steps in the sam e river twice"
The five years between the two Prague meetings can be characterized 
by incessant activity. The Society had been established, and thanks to the 
inexhaustible Marcello Barbieri, we got a base at Springer: the journal B io­
semiotics and the book series complemented the journal Sign Systems Studies 
and books published in Tartu. My greatest personal disappointment was 
with my role in 2009: instead o f being the organizer o f the Gathering, I 
was supposed to organize the catering only; we had no say concerning the 
programme. I was not present for the Salzburg and Groningen events, and my 
second-hand information suggests that there were some “ideological” problems 
concerning some presentations: as a result, the Executive committee took over 
the organization. Apart from other things, they dropped the plenary lectures, 
leaving only short communications. I was naive in supposing that compiling 
the programme itself would be, as five years before, the duty of the organizers. 
O f course, it is up to the Society to approve the programme, but alas, they took 
over all the initiative: two days after the abstracts deadline -  even before I was 
able to look at them -  I was presented a detailed  programme of the gatherings. 
My role was only to send letters o f acceptance or refusal to the authors. No 
plenary lectures, 20 minutes for everybody, yet extremely crowded, with no 
time left for longer discussion or informal personal meetings: just an endless 
train of short presentations. I did not succeed with suggesting parallel sessions, 
neither was I allowed posters for those presenting technical papers. Frustrated, 
I decided to insert at least two introductory lectures at the very beginning -  
one of them mine. But this was an abortive effort: I was speaking to people 
saying hello to each other and to new incomers to the hall, not paying much 
attention to the speakers.
Maybe I am wrong in criticizing the decision: I know from my colleagues 
and students that they have enjoyed all the meetings, and established many 
contacts and friendships; after all, this is the goal o f such events. Yet I was 
disappointed at seeing leading figures of the field (Hoffmeyer, Barbieri, 
K u ll...) presenting but short contributions, lost among the flood o f students
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and postdocs. Just before the gatherings, the book Biosemiotics by jesper Hoff­
meyer had appeared -  and there was no time to reserve for the presentation it 
deserved. To illustrate that the frustration was not only mine: after the official 
closing of the gathering, when everybody was about to leave, Marcello Barbieri 
rose up and asked people to stay -  and he gave an extra lecture he had had no 
opportunity to deliver in regular time.
Well, my glance back may sound quite pessimistic, but such were my 
feelings after the second gathering in Prague...
Programme
June 30
Timo Maran, Karel Kleisner -  Semiotic selection, cooption, and good old Darwin:
Is there a common basis for the explanation of mimicry, sexual selection, and 
domestication?
July I
Eugenio Andrade -  Evolution by natural abduction
Kalevi Kull -  On consortia, umwelten, and biophony (and the ecological codes)
Marcello Barbieri -  On the definition of meaning
David Leavens -  Ape pointing: A case study in distributed cognition
Natalia Abieva -  Indexical species: acquisition of external semiotic competence in 
human evolution
Fatima Cvrckovä -  Context-dependent meaning in plants: a model for non-animal 
semiosis
Stephen Pain -  The barnacle and the whale: A fable of semiotic explanation 
Irena Pätkovä -  Reading bacterial messages
Erbach-Schönberg -  Generating signal transduction codes with an evolvable 
network representation of cells
Jana Svorcovä -  The hourglass, the zootype and the phylotypic stage
Michaela Zemkovä -  Linguistic metaphor of life -  potential and limites of its 
application in analysis of different texts
Michal Schmoranz -  Becoming a semantic object. Bacterial colony 
as a bio-aesthetic model
Ted Baenziger -  Phytosemiosis in orchids
Group Discussion on “How to define the term ‘meaning’ in biosemiotics?” 
(moderator: Don Favareau)
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July 2
Stephen Cowley -  From biomechanisms to interpretation
Martin Neumann -  The semiotic construction of social reality
Marco Stella -  The Invention of the Clever Hans effect: Was Sebeok right?
Ryad Benosman -  Neuromorphic asynchronous images: Toward a new paradigm of 
image-based semiosis
Maciej Pokora -  Link between common yes-maybe-no  head gestures and 
directional properties of human vestibular system
Paul M. St. Pierre -  Biosemiotic neurobiology of finger-snapping as end-effector 
sonic signaling process
Prisca Augustyn -  Workshop: Uexkiill translation project
Myrdene Anderson -  Information -  vague, general, curious, spurious
Eliseo Fernandez -  Biosemiotics and the relational turn in biology
Robert Prinz -  Cells as semiotic systems practical and quantitative implications
Fabio Bacchini -  Biological cluster and properties as real signs
Sara Cannizzaro -  Flexible models: on differentiation, systems and biosemiotics
Tamara Popowski -  A Derridean approach to the biosemiotic problem
July 3
Peter Harries-Jones -  All over the map: Heterarchical topology for Batesons context 
and meta-context
Alexei Sharov -  Partitioned semiosphere: barriers of communication and relativistic 
epistemology
Dominique Lestel -  How to make sense of animal complex semiotic activities?
Isabel Ferreira -  Towards a biologically-motivated approach to meaning 
Jerry Chandler -  A natural number system for biosemiotic and medical signals 
Joao Carlos Major -  Neuronal versus relational man
Marcella Faria -  Cell-matrix adhesion complexes and their dynamic assembly: The 
poetics of cell migration control
Franco Giorgi -  Receptor oligomerization as a mechanism controlling cellular 
semiotics
Morten Tonnessen -  On contrapuntuality: Semiotic niche vs. ontological niche:
The case of the Scandinavian wolf population
Maria Dmitrieva -  Directions in interpretative biosemiotics
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Anna Aragno -  The biosemiotic roots of psychoanalytic metapsychology
Martien Brands -  Metaphor comprehension in patient doctor interaction:
A biosemiotic perspective.
Andres Luure -  The semiotic threshold and the threshold of life 
July 4
Thierry Bardini -  How can Simondons relational ontology contribute to 
biosemiotics?
Argyris Arnellos -  Emergent representations, digital-analog forms and biosemiotics: 
Integrating the tools to model complex phenomena in living organisms
Jonathan Hope -  Umwelträume and multi-sensory integration
Mark Reybrouck -  Musical sense-making between nativism and empiricism: An 
evolutionary approach to musical semantics
Gerard Battail -  Living versus inanimate: the information border
Yulia Volokitina -  Reconstruction of a Russian-language site in biosemiotics
The 10th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Braga, Portugal 
June 22-27, 2010
JOÄO CARLOS M A JO R
The 10th annual Gatherings in Biosemiotics took place in Braga, Portugal, at 
the Faculty of Philosophy of the Portuguese Catholic University. The event was 
organized by joäo  Carlos M ajor and Alfredo de Oliveira Dinis in collaboration 
with the International Society for Biosem iotic Studies.
The gathering received contributions from scholars from all over the 
world. It included interventions from countries such as Austria, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, Taiwan, Czech Republic, Estonia, United States o f America, 
Singapore and even Brazil.
It was, indeed, a truly international meeting. For the first time, Braga had the 
opportunity to receive the most productive minds in the field of biosemiotics. 
The event constituted an oasis of sharing knowledge, and provided connections 
between scholars that, eventually, resulted in published papers.
Coronating the efforts o f the biosem iotic community, the book Signifying 
Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and H ealth  (Cowley et a l  20 1 0 ) was published 
for this gathering. W ith contributions from several influential scholars, it 
was a truly collaborative book aimed at promoting the relationship between 
psychology and biosemiotics.
To this meeting, Donald Favareau came with the freshly printed, monu­
mental Essential Readings in Biosemiotics (Favareau 2010). No doubt this is a 
major achievement and a historical cornerstone for both biology and semiotics.
O f course, the gathering had a social component. The first day welcome 
party took place in the Nogueira da Silva Museum, where the participants 
learned about the history o f Braga, and met each other. The social component 
included a trip to Bom-Jesus cathedral, an icon o f religious devotion in Braga. 
There, participants felt the religious side of the site. During this trip the scholars 
also visited a water-moved elevator, considered as another icon o f Braga.
At the end of the Gathering, as is custom, there was a social dinner. The finest 
plates of Portugal were introduced to the international biosemiotic community 
and, considering the comments, everybody enjoyed the Portuguese cuisine.
The event was an opportunity for knowledge sharing and strengthening of 
social ties. As a result, the biosemiotic community won with the gathering.
114 Gatherings in Biosemiotics 10
References
Cowley, Stephen J.; Major, Joäo C.; Steffensen, Sune V.; Dinis, Alfredo (eds.) 2010. 
Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health. Braga: The Faculty of Philosophy 
of Braga Portuguese Catholic University.
Favareau, Donald (ed.) 2010. Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Com­
mentary. (Biosemiotics 3). Dordrecht: Springer.
Programme
June 23
Session. Chair: Joäo Carlos Major
Donald Favareau -  Celebrating a milestone in biosemiotics -  but certainly not 
standing still
Jesper Hoffmeyer, Claus Emmeche, Donald Favareau, Kalevi Kull -  On signs and codes
Kalevi Kull -  Biosemiotics has to study what the organisms know: The case of 
adaptation
Maria Rita Leal -  From signal to sign... The facts
John Collier -  Immediate and final interpretants in the immune system
Alexei Sharov -  Functional information: towards synthesis of biosemiotics and 
cybernetics
Session. Chair: Kalevi Kull
Günther Witzany -  Biocommunication of cancer cells 
Luis Emilio Bruni -  Heterarchical semantic congruence
Tommi Vehkavaara -  A road to empirical biosemiotics -  better formed concepts?
Joäo Queiroz, Charbel El-Hani, Frederik Stjernfelt -  Notes on the semiotics of 
biological mimicry
Frederik Stjernfelt, Charbel El-Hani, Joäo Queiroz -  On the emergence and 
evolution of dicisigns in biological mimicry
Eliseo Fernandez -  Living is surviving: Causation, reproduction and semiosis 
June 24
Session. Chair: Karel Kleisner
Michaela Zemkovä -  The linguistic measure -  what does it say about language and 
evolution?
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Natalia Abieva -  Biological and social levels complementarity in human 
communication
Han-liang Chang -  The biological foundation of Roland Barthes’s ‘Writing Degree 
Zero’
Marcello Barbieri -  On the origin of language
Paul Thibault -  On the relationship between first-order languaging and second- 
order language
Marcella Faria -  Common cues in endothelial and axon guidance or patterning 
codes in nervous and vascular systems
Session. Chair: Natalia Abieva
Alfredo Dinis -  Mind beyond the brain? The ‘extended mind’ debate 
Peter Harries-Jones -  Swarm intelligence: Biodiversity and biosemiotics 
Angelo Recchia-Luciani -  Exaptation as re-signification 
Margus Ott -  The question of the self
Gerald Ostdiek -  Cast in plastic: Semiotic plasticity and the pragmatic reading of 
Darwin
Andres Luure -  On needs 
June 25
Session. Chair: Jesper Hoffmeyer
Karel Kleisner, Tomäš Kocnar -  Eye color and facial shape form one semantic 
ornament: On the semiotic co-option of iris color
Franco Giorgi, Roberto Maggio, Luis Emilio Bruni -  Are olfactory receptors really 
olfactive?
Filip Jaroš -  Coat patterns among felids -  function or sign?
Morten Tonnessen -  We the living: The reception of Uexküll in Norwegian 
ecophilosophy
Patrick Vyneke -  Fitness cues and fitness indicators: Can evolutionary psychology 
and biosemiotics become complementary sciences?
Shuo-yu Wu -  Autopoiesis and interpretive semiosis: Translation as a biological 
phenomenon
Session. Chair: Marcella Faria
Dennis Waters -  Von Neumann’s theory of self-reproducing automata: A useful 
framework for biosemiotics?
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Siohoi Ieng, Stephen Pain -  A biosemiotic formulation of survival strategies for 
robots
Stephen Pain -  Semiotic appraisal in invertebrates
Gerard Battail -  Identity, species, order
Peter Barlow -  To life on Earth: Messages from the Moon
Isabel Ferreira -  Interactive bodies: The semiosis of architectural forms -  a case 
study
Edward Baenziger -  Alpha and Omega: The oldest and newest example 
of interphylogenetic semiotics -  the orchid
June 26
Session. Chair: Donald Favareau
Joäo Carlos Major -  From biosemiotics to health
Clara Costa Oliveira -  Suffering, education and health (biosemiosis and health) 
Susan Stuart -  Enkinaesthesia, biosemiotics, and the ethiosphere 
Charls Pearson -  “My dog uses intensional logic”
Vinicius Romanini -  Grounding biosemiotics: how Peirce’s semeiotic explains 
Uexküll’s concepts of umwelt and self-world
Marco Stella -  The invention of the Clever Hans effect: Was Sebeok right?
The 11th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
New York, USA 
June 22-25, 2011
VICTORIA  N. ALEXAN DER
The 2011 conference in New York was the first Gatherings in Biosem iotics on 
American soil, but it followed advance guard presentations by Jesper Hoff­
meyer and Don Favareau in 2006  at the Dactyl Foundation. Dorion Sagan and 
Lynn Margulis also spoke at that conference and learned about biosem iotics 
for the first time. Initially, Lynns reaction was, well, a reaction: “Cells don’t 
use signs!” Nevertheless, she kept the back door of her mind ajar, and by 2011, 
Lynn had become, not quite a convert to biosemiotics, but a willing listener. 
She drove down from Amherst to spend a day with us. During the dinner, 
Lynn sat next to the ever-gracious host Kalevi Kull. Before the main course 
was served, he had convinced her to attend Tartu. She would have been here 
with us were it not for her untimely death in November.
Although everyone was very kind to compliment me on the organization of 
the meeting, it’s not true that I am a good organizer. The coffee service was kind 
of crappy. There were no frills. As an environmentalist, I am always reluctant 
to distribute more paper and plastic items than is absolutely necessary. I didn’t 
provide note pads or tourist brochures, and I rationed out the plastic name 
badge holders. However, everyone said the diversity of the attendees, the 
intensity o f the discussions during breaks, and the quality o f the presentations 
made it an extraordinary gathering.
One of the highlights, for me, was getting caught up in a gay parade with 
Marcello, Don, Jesper, Soren, Kalevi, Paul, and Myrdene on our way to dinner 
in the West Village. It was the day gay marriage was approved in New York 
State. I couldn’t have planned a better NY-themed site-seeing excursion. One 
can depend on NYC to provide material for colourful memories. Another 
highlight for some was the Manhattan registration experience. (There were 
two registration locations: Queens, which I manned, and Manhattan, manned 
by my eccentric assistant Ben.) Ben decided (without informing me) to 
move the registration desk from the nicely-appointed lobby we had chosen 
to his cramped apartment. Several people who registered at that location 
were delighted by the unusual and informal circumstances. One registrant, 
who was asked to take over the desk while Ben took a shower, said it was like
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“Registration N oir”. It was mostly newcomers who happened to register at 
that location. Although I tried to apologize profusely for Ben’s decision once I 
found out about it, they all said there was no need as Ben had made them feel 
really welcomed into the biosem iotics family.
The presentations were some of the most diverse that ISBS has ever seen, 
and it was one of the largest of the Gatherings, with forty-three presentations 
and about a dozen people who came just to listen. We had a high percentage of 
non-members and new members at the New York meeting. In all, I think the 
2011 Gatherings in Biosemiotics was pretty successful in terms o f spreading 
the word and bringing more people into the fold.
Programme
June 22
Don Favareau -  Eight theses on biosemiotics
Gerald Ostdiek -  The objective artifice: Social performance and the pragmatic 
semiotics of Constantin Stanislavski
Kalevi Kull -  Biotranslation
Vinicius Romanini -  Perception grounds communication
Eugene Halton -  Virtuality, effacement, and symboling
Natalia Abieva -  Ambiguity in Iconic and indexical relations
Victoria Alexander -  Mysterious objects: Integrating biosemiotics with complex 
systems science
Jeffrey Goldstein -  Generalizing from the potency of linguistic context for 
biosemiotic theory
Alexei Sharov -  Evolution of natural agents: Preservation, development, and 
emergence of functional information
Almo Farina, Rachele Malavasi, Nadia Pieretti -  Soundtope: The acoustic 
consortium of bird communities
Louis Goldberg, Leonard A. Rosenblum -  Analysis of a simian semiosphere
Dolores Steinman, David A. Steinman -  Computer biosimulations as tool 
of translation and communication
June 23
Paul Cobley -  Codes, communication and interpretation
Dennis Görlich, Stefan Artmann, Peter Dittrich -  Cells as semantic systems
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Liz Stillwaggon- Swan, Louis J. Goldberg -  The search for meaning in biosymbols 
and computer codes
Marcello Barbieri -  Names and nominable entities
Jan-Hendrik Hofmeyr -  Fragile, yet persistent: Biosemiotics and self-fabrication
Joachim De Beule -  Agency and the creation of meaning
Mark Reybrouck -  Musical sense-making between nature and nurture:
An ecosemiotic and psychobiological approach
David Rothenberg -  Animal music, animal aesthetics
Tina Roeske, Philipp Sprau, David Rothenberg, Gary Marcus, Ofer Tchernichovski, 
Marc Naguib -  Melody and rhythm in nightingale song
Jonathan Beever -  Toward a biosemiotic approach to environmental ethics
Peter Harries-Jones -  Meaning rationalism and an algebra of aesthetics
June 24
Stephen Cowley -  Languaging, writing systems and codes
Prisca Augustyn -  Meaning in nature and semiotic modeling
Susan Petrilli, Augusto Ponzio, Julia Ponzio -  Communication, modeling and 
dialogism in the biosemiotic sphere
Soren Brier -  How biosemiotics can produce an evolutionary theory of conscious 
experience and intersubjective meaning production in communication
Eliseo Fernandez -  Energy, semiosis and emergence: The place of biosemiotics 
in an evolutionary conception of nature
Franco Giorgi, Luis Emilio Bruni, Roberto Maggio -  Semiotic selection of 
misfolded oligomeric receptor proteins in bacteria and germ cells
Pierre-Louis Patoine -  Organic life in fictional environments: A biosemiotic 
approach to immersive video gaming
Myrdene Anderson -  Making sense out of “sustainability”
Dorion Sagan -  Thermosemiosis: the thermodynamic background of meaning- 
making in an energetic cosmos
Daniel Mayer -  Semiosis and anticipation
Sara Cannizzaro -  Cybernetics, Soviet semiotics and the quest for homology:
The interdisciplinary past of Thomas Sebeok’s biosemiotics
Astrid Thome (film) -  Interview with Friedrich Salomon Rothschild
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June 25
Gary Shank -  The semiotics of PS 101
Morten Tonnessen -  Integrated biological individualism and the primacy 
of the individual level of biological organization
Luciana Garbayo -  On signaling games of adaptive morality: Biosemiotic 
considerations
Tim Ireland -  Space as a creative phenomenon: A biosemiotic approach to spatial 
configuration
Thomas Long -  Pain as sign and symptom: A semiotic analysis of nursing clinical 
practice and research
John Collier -  Immediate interpretants in the immune system
Hidetaka Yakura, Alain Leplege -  On the information transfer in immune cell 
signaling
Anna Aragno -  The marriage of psychoanalytic methodology with the biosemiotic 
agenda
The 12th Gatherings in Biosemiotics 
Tartu, Estonia 
Juiy 16-21,2012
KALEVI KULL, TIM O  MARAN, SILVER RATTASEPP
The 2012 annual gathering o f the biosemioticians o f the world has attracted 
more submissions than ever before. Thus the work o f the program committee 
(Anderson, Bruni, Cobley, Hoffmeyer, Kull, Maran) was not an easy task.
Our Tartu group organised the Gatherings ten years ago. At the time, in 
2002, we put an emphasis on Baerian-Uexküllian sites and the biodiversity of 
the Estonian ecosystem. Although meanwhile a whole new generation of 
scholars has grown up, we decided not to repeat these walks. Most of the 
meeting will take place in the very centre of Tartu, in the building next to the 
main building of the University of Tartu. Since 2011, this has been the home of 
the Department of Semiotics, with an excellent semiotics library, including the 
memorial collection of Thomas A. Sebeok, taken over from Bloomington, USA, 
Although on July 18 we shall be in the countryside for half a day, at Leigo 
(about 40 km south of Tartu), surrounded by lakes and hills so characteristic of 
South-Estonia, the majority of our time together will be spent in the university.
The Gatherings is organised by the International Society for Biosemiotics 
Studies, together with the Department o f Semiotics o f the University o f Tartu, 
Jakob von Uexkiill Centre, and the Estonian Semiotics Association.
The Gatherings includes two satellite meetings, or pre-seminars -  “B io­
semiotics and the study o f culture”, organised by Tim o Maran, and “Language 
and life”, organised by Stephen Cowley. After these, the main program is 
scheduled for four and a half days. The thematic variety o f presentations 
appears to be rather expansive this year. To emphasise this diversity, the 
sessions in the main programme were provided with unique titles. Perhaps 
high (bio)diversity is still a pecularity o f Estonia: there is no singular truth, 
nor two or three, but rather a multitude o f concording views in biosemiotics.
Programme
16 July
Pre-conference seminar “Biosemiotics and the Study of Culture”
Kadri Tüür -  Zoosemiotic theory in the analysis of nature writing
Timo Maran -  Biosemiotic criticism: Modelling the environment through literature
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Raquel Renno -  Waste, innovation and emerging life forms
Morten Tonnessen -  In the gaze of the other: Describing cultural affordances by 
conducting comparative umwelt mapping in animal studies
Natalia A. Abieva -  Concrete vs. abstract semantics in mental images
Farouk Y. Seif -  Semiotic animal in a transmodern world: Hovering between 
zoosemiotics and anthroposemiotics
Grzegorz Kapuscinski -  Dog -  human communication: Semiotic phenomenon on 
the verge of nature and culture
Louise Westling -  Cultural sedimentation parallels biological sedimentation: 
Embedded histories in Merleau-Ponty and Hoffmeyer
Deana Neubauer -  George Eliot’s hermeneutics of sympathy as a prefiguration of 
Hoffmeyer’s semiotic freedom
Silver Rattasepp -  The philosopher and the leaf insect
Roundtable. Biosemiotics and the study of culture -  possibilities, problems, 
perspectives
17 July
Research cluster “Language and life”
Openings of the main programme
Jesper Hoffmeyer -  The semiotics of human nature
Jana Svorcovä, Anton Markoš -  The language of life
Peter R. Wills -  Genetic information, mechanical interpreters and thermodynamics: 
The physico-informatic basis of biosemiosis
Donald Favareau -  Including absence
18 July
Foundations
Andreas Weber -  There is no outside: A biological corollary for poetic space 
Kalevi Kull -  Modelling of semiosis: Juri Lotmans legacy
Susan Petrilli, Augusto Ponzio -  Morris, Sebeok and beyond: From biosemiotics to 
semioethics
Philosophical
Tommi Vehkavaara -  Senses of significance and meaning in the models of 
biosemiotic sign
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Louise Westling -  Merleau-Ponty’s ontological bridge between biosemiotics and 
culture
Timo Maran -  Are ecological codes archetypal structures?
Developmental (in Leigo farmstead)
Franco Giorgi, Louis Goldberg and Luis Emilio Bruni -  The egg as a semiotic 
gateway to reproduction: Digital and analogical communication in the oocyte-egg- 
zygote transition
Gerald Ostdiek -  Scaling life: Developmental semiotics in infancy and beyond 
Myrdene Anderson, Katja Pettinen -  Trans-somatic mindfulness
Evolutionary (in Leigo farmstead)
Alexei Sharov - The origin of mind: Transition from protosemiosis to eusemiosis 
Katya Mandoki -  Evolition: A reassessment of Rothschild’s biosemiotics
19 July
Codes
Marcello Barbieri -  Code semiotics -  a new science of life
John Collier -  Codes and their interpretation in endobiosemiotics
Joachim De Beule -  Overcoming the tragedy of the commune in the Hawk-Dove 
game through conventional coding
Endosemiotic
Argyris Arnellos, Alvaro Moreno -  Internalization of functions as a model of 
minimal semiosis in autonomous systems: Towards a scientific biosemiotics
Fatima Cvrckovä -  Periphrasis and paraphrasis in cellular regulatory pathways
Jan-Hendrik Servaas Hofmeyr -  Modelling the cell as a formal system that writes its 
own production rules
Zoosemiotic
Almo Farina - Acoustic patterns of the Red-billed Leiothrix (Leiothrix lutea\ an 
invasive species in the Mediterranean scrublands
Filip Jaroš -  Felids, their coat patterns, camouflage and signs
Joäo Queiroz, Frederik Stjernfelt, Charbel Nino El-Hani -  Dicisigns in mimicry
Human-animal
Riin Magnus -  The semiotic challenges of the guide dog and blind person team
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Nelly Mäekivi -  Communication in zoos and communicative zoo
Karel Kleisner - Seeing each other: An international comparison of the eye colour 
effect on perception of trustworthiness, dominance and attractiveness
20 July
Processes
Victoria N. Alexander -  Creativity: The negation of self-reference through 
misinterpretation
Daniel Mayer - Hymenomorphism 
Information
Kathrine Elizabeth Anker -  Bio-logos: Asking for the logic of life through a study of 
artificial life art and biosemiotics
Vinicius Romanini -  Biosemiotic information
Yagmur Denizhan - Information in biological individuation
Historical
Han-liang Chang - Iconicity and mimicry: The classical legacy and Peirce, and its 
biosemiotic aftermath
Davide Weible - Augustine and the ape: A biosemiotic investigation into the nature 
of life
Sergey Cnebanov -  Results of the development of biosemiotics 
Medical
Marco Annoni -  Meaning in medicine: Toward a biosemiotic model of placebo effects 
Mette Miriam Rakel Böll - Neural and behavioural semiotics of fear
21 July
Continuity
Krystyna Bielecka -  Symbol grounding problem and causal theory of reference
John Pickering - Why biosemiotics cannot solve the symbol-matter problem
Eliseo Fernandez - Semiosis and phase transitions in biology: The place of 
biosemiotics within a genuinely evolutionary conception of nature
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Distributed
Didier Bottineau - Making sense out of one’s own actions: The case of human 
language
Stephen Cowley - Interactivity: Origins and consequences
Paul Matthew St. Pierre -  Pointing, reaching, grasping, and tapping as self-signifying 
gestures: End-effectors, from pebble tools to smart devices
Paradigmatic
Ramsey Affifi -  Not pedagogy but “biogogy”: On linking biosemiotic and education 
research
Daniil Berezhnoy, Vera Serkova, Kira Nikolskaya - Semiotics as an instrument for 
animal cognition research: Experimental study
Sara Cannizzaro - Biosemiotics as systems theory: An investigation into 
biosemiotics as the grounding for a new form of cultural analysis
Uexkilllian
Morten Tonnessen - On the notion of induced semiosis, with emphasis on 
anthropogenic semiosis
Ondrej Bradäc - Reflection of Jakob von Uexkiill’s thoughts from the point of view 
of Czech theoretical biologists and philosophers from Charles University of Prague
Torsten Rüting -  Uexküils contribution to an interdisciplinary concept of vision 
and knowing
III. ABSTRACTS
FOR THE 12th GATHERINGS
Pre-seminar I 
Biosemiotics and the Study of Culture
Introduction
The research interests of biosemiotics -  sign processes in and between bio­
logical organisms -  go far beyond the human cultural sphere. At the same 
time there are noticeable historical and cross-disciplinary relations between 
biosemiotics and several humanities, such as anthroposemiotics, linguistics, 
philosophy and human communication studies. To discuss connections and 
cross-influences between biosemiotics and the disciplines that study human 
culture, the Department of Semiotics at the University of Tartu organises a 
one-day seminar that precedes the conference Gatherings in Biosemiotics 12.
The seminar takes as points of departure the following questions: ( l )  
how does biosemiotics influence the study of culture, given the biosemiotic 
understanding that human culture is surrounded by a multitude of other 
semiotic systems; (2) how can biosemiotic theories and methods be applied 
in various humanities; (3) in which ways is biosemiotics encumbered by its 
terminological and historical roots in the humanities; (4) is biosemiotics a 
global or a local science, considering the local peculiarities of cultural and natural 
environment; (5) what are the potentials and dangers of transdisciplinary 
hybridization, as expressed in biosemiotic criticism or literary biosemiotics, 
biohermeneutics, biosemiotic ethics, and others.
The pre-conference seminar will include 10 individual presentations and a 
round-table “Biosemiotics and the study of culture -  possibilities, problems, 
perspectives”.
Timo Maran
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Concrete vs. abstract semantics in mental images
NATALIA A. ABIEVA
Herzen State Pedagogical University, St. Petersburg, Russia
Of all biological species, humans demonstrate an unparalleled capacity for 
abstract thinking that enables them to develop complex sign-systems for 
information exchange. They successfully combine biological and socio­
cultural semiosis, thus expanding their cognitive and communicative abilities 
to an unprecedented degree. Archaeological artefacts such as stone tools can 
be traced to the prehistoric times of Homo habilis (ca. 2.5 million years ago), 
being the earliest evidence of specifically human and intentionally created 
sign systems for social use. Over this course of time communally relevant 
codes have multiplied continuously. As of 100 000 years ago Homo sapiens 
successfully operated numerous sign systems among their more elaborate 
tools. The so-called cognitive explosion that occurred around 40 000 years 
ago showed a sudden increase in different types of manufactured artefacts, 
including prehistoric art. It was at about that time that, according to many 
specialists (Johansson 2005), our species acquired verbal communication. 
The recorded history that began about 6000 years ago shows a steady and 
continuous increase of semiotic competence in all fields of communal life - 
information exchange in human societies has become more varied and 
intense ever since. Human cultural evolution has passed several stages: pre- 
orality, orality, literacy and computer-mediated literacy (the latter still being 
in progress at the moment). Every new step introduced new codes that were 
incorporated into the existing ones, providing people with extra forms and 
channels of communication. Even at a glance it is evident that human cultural 
evolution demonstrates a steady tendency towards the intensification of 
abstract mental activity.
External sign-systems (language, tools, rituals, sociocultural patterns of 
behaviour, etc.) constitute a communally-shared total semioticon used for 
interpersonal communication. One of the key traits of all human cultural 
artefacts is their artificial and intentional character, which specifies human 
cognition and communication. According to C. S. Peirce’s classification, 
the sign-systems created by humans can be divided into iconic (pictures, 
photos, realistic sculptures, onomatopoeia, etc.), indexical (knocks on a door, 
doorbells, etc.) and symbolic (natural and artificial languages -  numbers, 
chemical and physical symbols, Morse code, etc.), all used as media in different 
communicative acts to unite people, coordinate their actions and help to realize
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common goals. Icons and indices are usually described as simple or primitive 
signs of an analogue type that possess concrete semantics by preserving in their 
forms isomorphic characteristics of the denotates, while symbols are treated as 
difficult and complex, demanding high levels of mental abstraction to operate 
them. Deacon (1997) has demonstrated the hierarchical interdependence of 
icons, indices and symbols, the latter resting on the foundation of the analogue 
sign and being the most abstract of all. Despite the fact that the cultural signs 
listed above can be referred to as either analogues or symbols, nevertheless 
all of them are products of mental abstraction and intentional reflection, the 
degree of abstractness being different though. It is not quite correct to describe 
cultural icons and indexes as bearers of concrete semantics -  their interpretation 
involves associative mechanisms that trigger processes with which the mind 
classifies, sorts, orders, and organizes facts, i.e. relies on the mental abilities that 
are included into higher-order abstraction. The question is -  how could such 
specific abstract thinking develop inside the animal mind?
Archaeological evidence shows that the general logic of cultural evolution 
was from iconic and indexical artefacts of material culture to more intricate 
and complex forms of symbolic signs systems. In the course of time, symbols 
have become more and more indispensable in human communication, 
having taken the leading position among all cultural codes. The second key 
trait distinguishing humans’ semiotic capacity is the ability to communicate 
via different codes off-line -  when communicants are distanced in time and 
space. The hypothesis is that specifically human abstract thinking developed 
from the semantic form of interaction with the objects of the environment 
when the living organism operates the analogue (iconic and indexical) mental 
representations perceived on-line.
All external codes are rooted in internal mental processes of individuals, 
and there must exist some interior mechanisms of linking analogues and 
symbols. According to the dual-coding approach (Paivio 1971), all mental 
representations can be divided into pictorial and verbal, all together forming 
a mental lexicon that can be taken for the internal semioticon, because 
mental representations function as signs in information processing. In terms 
of evolution, mental images (internal icons and indexes) are definitely older, 
and abstract semantics had to mature within them before symbols were 
born. Even under the condition of so-called concrete thinking and semantic 
communication (Millikan 2004) via analogues, an individual has considerable 
competence in abstract categories and logical propositional thinking. Mental 
images are of a semiotic character as they substitute real objects and stand for 
them in mental processing. Even in the situation of on-line interaction, decision­
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making relies not only on the spontaneous images of the objects perceived at 
the given moment, but on a sum of previously perceived and processed images 
stored in the memory of the individual. Visual perception initiates associative 
links in the memory, bringing out representations that ensure recognition of 
the objects and modalities accompanying them (Kosslyn, Tompson, Ganis 
2010). That information deposited in the mind in analogue form is of abstract 
character as it contains the generic and most relevant data about the object. 
Due to learning, it is stabilized and constitutes the individuals knowledge 
acquired during his life-time. This interior abstract imagery is the foundation for 
externalizing in analogue form the codes communally relevant for information 
in early Homo.
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Dog-human communication: Semiotic phenomenon 
on the verge of nature and culture
GRZEGORZ KAPUSCINSKI 
University of Gdansk, Poland
Communicative interaction between man and dog is a unique natural pheno­
menon. For centuries a useful, at times indispensable assistance and a handy tool 
for man in many fields, currently the dog has become, in Western civilisation in 
particular, a companion, whose main task is to communicate with man. Canis 
lupus, on the other hand, is the only species which has acquired that extent of the
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capacity to decode communicative activity of another species -  Homo sapiens. 
Indeed, communication between man and dog is a unique phenomenon in this 
context, as it constitutes a communicative interaction beyond the traditional 
distinction of nature and culture, symbolic communication and non-symbolic 
behaviour. The subject of the presentation is an analysis, from the semiotic 
perspective, of these relationships as a cross-section of classical semiotics, 
whose subject and context is the cultural activity of man, and biosemiotics, with 
semiosis as a universal phenomenon of the animate world.
Biosemiotic criticism: 
Modelling the environment through literature
TIMO MARAN 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Biosemiotic criticism is the study of literature and other manifestations of 
human culture with an emphasis on the biosemiotic understanding that life 
is, down to its most fundamental levels, organised by sign processes (Maran, 
forthcoming). Such an approach means contextualizing human cultural 
activities within the environment that is semiotic because of natural signs 
embedded into material objects, and because of semiosic and communicative 
activities of other species. Manifestations of human cultural activities 
can be described in such a framework as being comprised of several layers 
of modelling process (Sebeok, Danesi 2000). In their relations with the 
environment, humans share with other animals zoosemiotic modelling, where 
signs are distinguished by the organism’s species-specific sensory apparatus 
and aligned with its behavioural resources and motor events (Sebeok 1991). 
Verbal anthroposemiotic modelling is unique to the human species, and 
may link further to higher poetic, artistic, ideological or religious forms of 
modelling, denoted as secondary modelling systems’ in the Tartu-Moscow 
school of semiotics (Lotman 1967). Whereas structuralist schools support 
the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and the independence of literary 
representation from the environment, in the Peircean biosemiotic approach 
language is partially grounded in the material environment by iconic and 
indexical relations. Nature writing in this context can be considered as a sum 
of modelling activities of different levels, or in other words, every piece of 
nature writing is essentially a model o f the human relationship with nature, both
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in its present state and as it is anticipated in the future. By their modelled nature 
literary works can feed back to the human involvement in the environment 
and shape the material structures of the world.
References
Lotman, Juri 1967. Tezisy к probleme “Iskusstvo v ryadu modeliruyuschih system”. 
Trudy po znakovym sistemam (Sign Systems Studies) 3: 130-145.
Maran, Timo (forthcoming). Biosemiotic criticism. In: Garrard, Greg (ed.), Handbook 
of Eco criticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sebeok, Thomas A.; Danesi, Marcel 2000. The Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems 
Ълеогу and Semiotic Analysis. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Sebeok, Thomas A. 1991. In what sense is language a “primary modeling system”? 
In: Sebeok, Thomas A., A Sign is Just a Sign. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
49-58.
George Eliot’s hermeneutics of sympathy 
as a prefiguration of Hoffmeyer’s 
semiotic freedom
DEANA NEUBAUER
London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom
In recent accounts of biosemiotic history (Favareau 2010; Deely 2001) much 
emphasis has been put on the developing concept of sign and sign interpretation 
in relation to the argument that living organisms, from the most simple to the 
most complex (in humans for example) are sign making and sign receptive 
creatures, thus entailing a fundamental continuity between the natural and 
cultural world which Hoffmeyer has described in terms of semiotic freedom. 
However, this continuity has been prefigured in the nineteenth century by 
the Victorian writer George Eliot (1819-1890), who articulated the link 
between nature and culture through her concept of sympathy, which stems 
from her organic understanding of the natural world and its application to the 
interpretation of aesthetic practice as advocated by German Romanticism.
In this paper I shall look at the influences exerted on Eliots thought 
by German Romanticism in order to show how these have informed her 
understanding of nature’s creativity and human creativity in art as being related 
and interdependent, thus helping her develop the concept of sympathy as a
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sign interpreting faculty, or rather as responsiveness and reciprocity in living 
systems, which echoes Hoffmeyer s concept of semiotic freedom.
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The philosopher and the leaf insect
SILVER RATTASEPP 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Philosophy is sometimes thought of, among other things, as a poetry of con­
cepts, its key activity being the imaginative generation of conceptual thought. 
This art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts is tasked with providing 
answers to the question, “how and what else can we think?”
However, even in this mode of imaginative thought, nonhuman animals 
barely register in the philosophical landscape as being worthy of consideration 
as sources and examples of such novel possibilities for philosophical ideas. 
Much like Ranciere s poor shoemakers, animals are to be drawn and measured, 
talked about and down to, but not invited into philosophy proper. Differences 
between philosophical ideas seem to disappear the moment the discussion 
turns to address animals.
With this in mind, the presentation will provide a series of musings on 
philosophical topics generated by placing particular species of nonhuman 
animals before the thinker’s gaze: the dialectics of preying, the in-so-far-as cat, 
the embodiment of the death of living nourishment in leaf insects, and the 
praying mantises whom we all love.
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Waste, innovation and emerging life forms
RAQUEL RENNÕ
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Brazil
According to Kull, “Ecological knowledge is not sufficient to understand or 
solve the ecological problems which humans face, since these are consequences 
of certain deeply semiotic and cultural processes, intertwined with ecological 
and biological ones” (Kull 1998: 366). The notion of residue or waste maybe 
used not only as an adjective to the constitution of a material form, but also as 
a concept of elements that don’t belong to a codified system, contemplating 
the possibility of connection and new configurations of fragments from 
apparently distant semiotic systems. The different manner in which waste or 
residual codes can be appropriated requires an intense ability of adaptation as 
well as the creation of new languages, by making systems more complex. Such 
flexibility towards adapting to environmental changes enables the expansion 
of living organisms and a new understanding of ecology. Living forms are 
altered not only in biology labs, but also by the changes humans generate in 
the environment. Although these are well-known events, these changes are 
considered casual mutations that should be ignored or “corrected” as deviations 
from the norm. The paper aims to analyse the generation and appropriation 
of material and informational waste by living organisms through the work 
of researchers and artists working with biology and technology that explore 
and expose these “deviations”, not only as an ecological issue, but also as an 
innovative potential.
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Semiotic animal in a transmodern world: Hovering 
between zoosemiotics and anthroposemiotics
FAROUK Y. SEIF
Antioch University, Seattle, USA
The dualistic separation between the realms of zoosemiotics and anthropo­
semiotics is a fallacy. Although the notion of “semiotic animal” is conceived 
to overcome the human-animal dualism, still many supporters of zoo­
semiotics remain anthropocentrically biased. And despite the fact that the 
late works of Darwin have radically changed the scientific perception and 
conceptualization of animal semiotics, the dualism remains distorted toward 
human idiosyncrasy.
Phenomenologically, however, zoosemiotics and anthroposemiotics are 
an integrated reality that cannot exist without both. In a transmodern world -  
which is characterized by diaphanous perception, cognitive revolution, 
inter-connectivity, and cultural metamorphosis -  zoosemiotics is implicit in 
anthroposemiotics and vice versa, in mutually transparent, co-evolutionary 
semiotic processes. Diaphanous perception, which is the quintessential feature 
of transmodernity, is inclusive of modernity and postmodernity, and it does 
not reject the characteristics of either. Ironically, transmodernity has roots in 
an age-old tradition characterized by reciprocity between zoosemiotics and 
anthroposemiotics.
Human beings as semiotic animals are capable of developing awareness, 
relationships, and mediation toward semiosis with more-than-human systems. 
In this sense, the human species has an unlimited semioethical responsibility 
toward others -  not just toward other cultures, but also toward more-than- 
human systems. Such awareness must be developed for the full recovery of 
the ethical dimension of semiosis that embraces not only humans but also 
more-than-human forms of life.
This paper attempts to recover the primordial relationship between human 
and more-than-human systems. Certainly, this recovery of integration has the 
potential to foster cultural transformation and environmental renewal in a 
world we as semiotic animals со-inhabit and co-interpret.
References
Abram, David 1996.1be Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than- 
Human World. New York: Pantheon Books.
138 Pre-seminar I
Deely, John. 2004. A sign is what? A dialogue between a semiotist and a would-be 
realist. The American Journal of Semiotics 20( 1/4): 1-53.
Deely, John. 2010. Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of “Human Being” 
Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine s Press.
Martinelli, Dario 2010. A Critical Companion to Zoosemiotics: People, Paths, Ideas. 
New York: Springer.
Seif, Farouk Y. 2009. Communication in the age of the great turning: Understanding 
the role of analog and digital modes in liberating imagination. In: Tarasti, Eero (ed.), 
Communication: Understanding /  misunderstanding. (Proceedings of the 9th World 
Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Helsinki-Imatra, 
Finland, 2007): 1626-1641.
Nöth, Winfried 1990. Handbook of Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
In the gaze of the other: Describing cultural affordances 
by conducting comparative umwelt mapping 
in animal studies
MORTEN T0N N ESSEN  
University of Stavanger, Norway
The umwelt theory of Jakob von Uexküll is well known in biosemiotic circles. 
However, not many have undertaken to develop umwelt methodology as 
foundational for comparative studies. Umwelt theory can, for example, be 
applied to describing the manifold affordances of human constructions, 
artefacts, etc. from a non-human point of view. Whenever umwelten are 
discussed, the focus tends to be on each particular, “species-specific” umwelt. 
The human umwelt is thereby characterised as being fundamentally different 
from any animal’s umwelt. But in the age of the Anthropocene -  the global era of 
anthropogenic development -  countless animals and other creatures regularly 
encounter human constructions, artefacts and waste (indeed, numerous life 
forms have adapted to such occurrences). How do the products of human 
civilization manifest themselves in the umwelten of other creatures?
This topic -  which could also in some measure be conducted by way of a 
comparative study of humans as umwelt objects in non-human umwelten -  can 
be organised in terms of four major categories, enveloping human products as 
perceived by non-humans
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(1) in urban and household settings,
(2) in agriculture,
(3) in wildlife settings,
(4) in “the shadows of human civilization” (think of rats thriving in our 
sewage systems, etc.).
Some of these categories may overlap somewhat. In combination they 
represent the way our culture qua human products appears in the umwelten of 
non-humans -  in the gaze of the other.
Zoosemiotic theory in the analysis of nature writing
KADRI TÜÜR 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Several theoretically-oriented ecocritical debates (Phillips 2003; Clark 2011) 
have pondered the question of interdisciplinarity: would ecocriticical analysis 
of nature writing benefit from informed interdisciplinarity (as designated in 
Love 2003)? If not, then what is the specific ecocritical method? If yes, then 
what are the other disciplines that need to be bonded with?
From a yet wider approach to methodological issues (Duranti 2005) it 
could be asked whether it is necessarily interdisciplinarity that is to be striven 
for? Perhaps it is trans-disciplinarity? The latter also implies a need for wider 
institutional co-operation that definitely is not a purely methodological issue. 
In any case, the pre-requisite for applying either of these approaches is still 
the definition of one’s own disciplinary identity. Perhaps, then, it is informed 
theory-building (as expressed in Lynham 2002) that we need in order to 
conduct viable research.
In relation to the options mentioned above, my question is whether 
semiotics can be regarded as an all-embracing disciplinary identity and a 
foundation for theory-building which the development of ecocritical theory 
would benefit from relying upon. My particular examples stem from personal 
experiences in analysing Estonian nature writing by applying zoosemiotic 
theory (e.g. Tüür 2009). The traps, threats and benefits of such an approach 
are discussed in the presentation.
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Cultural sedimentation parallels biological 
sedimentation: Embedded histories 
in Merleau-Ponty and Hoffmeyer
LOUISE WESTLING 
University of Oregon, USA
This paper will demonstrate how Maurice Merleau-Ponty s philosophy of 
language anticipated the insights of biosemiotics as described by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer in Biosemiotics: An Examination into the Signs o f Life and the Life of 
Signs (2008) and his recent essay “Semiotics of Nature” (2010). My particular 
focus will be on the species memory sedimented in human languages and 
cultural artefacts. Merleau-Ponty s chiasmic ontology describes a world 
in which we are individuals formed by differentiation within a spatial and 
temporal pulp, carrying in our bodies the history of our kind (1968: 114). 
Human language, literature, and art are our species’ modes of self-reflection, 
or coiling back upon, the embedded histories of our various communities in 
ways that help us define and adapt to emergent realities. Hoffmeyer describes 
the interpretive activity of organisms at the biological level as functioning 
in similar ways for evolutionary natural selection. The biological lineage 
“maintains -  and continuously updates -  a selective memory (the momentary 
pool of genomes) of its past that in most cases will be a suitable tool for 
producing individuals capable of dealing with the future” (Hoffmeyer 2010:
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33). Preservation and continual reinterpretation of cultural works, such as 
Homers epics and Shakespeares plays, enables the embedded histories of 
Europe and the Mediterranean world to shape the narratives and poetry of 
our own era, much as our bodies carry our particular biological inheritance 
forward. For Merleau-Ponty, the physical, visible world is not separate from 
the invisible world of ideas: “no one has gone further than Proust in fixing 
the relations between the visible and the invisible, in describing an idea that 
is not the contrary of the sensible, that is its lining and its depth” (Merleau- 
Ponty 1968: 149). Human language and literature, as well as other cultural 
behaviours, share features with other semiotic systems, e.g. ape and canine 
vocalizations and body language, beaver constructions, and structures made 
by bower birds. However, human cultural artefacts carry self-reflection and 
deliberate preservation to a degree not likely found in other semiotic systems.
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Language and Life: The double interface
Introduction
Overview
The Language and Life (L&L) meeting aims to be a forum where people 
create, respond to and elaborate echoes from a unifying question:
W hat are language and languaging doing to us (as living beings)?
Background
The L&L research cluster emerged from the Distributed Language Group. 
In this, the cluster’s inaugural meeting, a number of invited parties will seek 
to connect their concerns with biosemiotic traditions. This is a step towards 
becoming a community with an interdisciplinary agenda. The focus falls on a 
‘double interface’ that is lived by each human being. As part of the ecology, we 
are each part of a world (including other people) that links our evolutionary 
history with skills based on using techniques that link social institutions, 
artefacts and verbal patterns. Our lives are thus lived and mediated: each of 
us enacts a double interface. Therefore, as what lies beyond the skin changes, 
so do we. Oddly enough, if acknowledged, this is usually related to abstract 
concepts, such as ‘economy’ or ‘discourse’. By contrast, our focus is on direct 
implications for the world of the living (and ourselves).
Theoretical framework
The distributed perspective on languaging and language breaks with both lay 
views and their scientization in linguistics. Language is not, we say, a set of 
words and rules (or constructions): such views fall foul of written language 
bias. By challenging ‘code views’, the distributed language movement aims to 
transform the language sciences.
On a distributed view, language is rethought around three central claims:
(1) Language animates the public world. As part of the ecology it is 
inextricable from human action and perception. As we act and think, 
we engage in languaging.
(2) Language and languaging are dialogical: as Bakhtin saw, to speak is to act 
by calling up the voices of others. This is equally true of silent thinking.
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(З) Languaging is situated whole-bodied activity (that can be described 
by many measures) and is also heard around verbal patterns. Though 
speakers of a given community can repeat ‘the words actually spoken 
in local language (s), they cannot replicate neuro-behaviour -  langua­
ging never recurs. Language is therefore both situated and non-local: its 
patterns conform to the laws of physics without being strictly physical.
Consequences
The distributed perspective allows for many interpretations and developments: 
it claims only that language is both dynamical and symbolic; whole-bodied 
human activity can often be perceived as having a verbal aspect. Both 
verbal patterns and language-activity exploit many time-scales. However, 
in examining how languaging affects people-in-the-world, much depends 
on how biosystems constrain dynamical processes (as has been described 
in, for example, biosemiotics, ecological psychology and enactivism). Like 
other living systems, persons act as part of a world-environment which, of 
course, influences how other persons develop, learn and perceive. However, 
since language is also verbal (it echoes second-order constraints), techniques 
based in cultural history can be used to shape and enhance other modes of 
action-perception. Unlike other living systems, human actions connect up an 
abstract ‘reality’: culture and technology constrain how we develop, learn and 
perceive. This gives us a second interface.
The distributed perspective is broad (L& L is one of ten research clusters).1 
Our focus on the double interface arises because, with literacy, technology 
and information processing, human agency is exerting a growing influence 
on all life-forms. This appears to be a truism if the world is seen as reflected 
in discourse (whatever that is). However, on the distributed view, the 
bidirectional links of language and life are more far-reaching and intricate. 
Above all, it is emphasised that as the world changes, it impacts on both the 
ecology and human agency. In challenging the transparency of discourse, we 
turn to our theme: What are language and languaging doing to humans and 
other living beings? And that, of course, is an open question: while our lives 
matter to us, our practices favour/eliminate many kinds of living beings.
The link with biosemiotics is that we treat language as part of action/ 
perception (and neural processes): rather than separating what Thomas 
Sebeok called first and second order modelling systems, we are concerned 
with their со-function -  the effects on (and at) the human ‘double interface’.
1 See the Distributed Language group homepage at www.psy.herts.ac.uk/dlg/, and a list o f key 
publications at www.psy.herts.ac.uk/dlg/dist-lang-links.html.
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At this inaugural meeting, we are concerned with way-finding. Since language 
has an important collective dimension, our aim is to generate synergies and 
questions. We plan to build on group discussions animated by these Language 
and Lifers: Stephen Cowley (Hertfordshire, UK), Leo van Lier (Monterey 
Institute of International Studies, USA), Didier Bottineau (Paris West 
University Nanterre La Defense, France), Don Favareau (National University 
of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore), Gerald Ostdiek (Charles University, 
Prague, Czech Republic), Joanna R^czaszek-Leonardi (University of Warsaw, 
Poland), Susan Stuart (University of Glasgow, UK), Paul Thibault (University 
of Adger, Kristiansand, Norway), Morten Tonnessen (University of Stavanger, 
Norway), Ekaterina Velmezova (University of Lausanne, Switzerland), Dennis 
Waters (Genome Web, New York, USA).
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Not pedagogy but “biogogy”: On linking biosemiotic and 
education research
RAMSEY AFFIFI 
University of Toronto, Canada
Self-study in education research (which includes autoethnography, narrative 
inquiry, action research and other forms of practitioner inquiry) can be 
extended beyond the pedagogy of the classroom to include human relations 
with other species. De-anthropocentrizing education research depends on 
overcoming the division between humans, as subjects of learning and teaching 
relationships, and other species, as irrelevant, mechanical background pro­
cesses. To do so, education theory and research would profit from approaches 
to life developed in biosemiotic theory. Biosemiotics, the study of the 
creation, interpretation, and interaction of meaning in life’s signs, has made 
important advances in recovering the organism as subject, overcoming the 
same ontological presuppositions that materialistic, deterministic biology 
shares with anthropocentric education theory. However, the connections 
between education theory and biosemiotics have not been well elucidated. 
Some foundational concepts (such as umwelt, triadic sign processes, code­
duality) and methodologies developed in biosemiotic theory can help re­
centre the educator within a larger field of educative relations. I also argue that 
biosemiotic research may profit from first-person approaches developed in 
education research. Biosemiotic researchers are often situated within the very 
semiotic landscapes that they are studying and thereby modify the meaning- 
making activities of the very organisms they study This is particularly true 
for zoosemiotic studies but is likely true even beyond this subfield. Self- 
study methods developed in educational research can deepen reflexivity and 
responsiveness through attending to biosemiotic research itself as a significant 
interspecific educational experience.
Creativity: The negation of self-reference through 
misinterpretation
VICTORIA N. ALEXANDER 
New York, USA
In Peirce, as well as in the work of many biosemioticians, the semiotic object is 
sometimes described as a physical thing with material properties. I argue that
Main Programme 147
to the extent that we can avoid this kind of characterization, we may better 
integrate the various fields that interact with biosemiotics. I claim that the 
“semiotic object” is always ultimately the objective of self-affirmation (ofhabits, 
physical or mental) and/or self-preservation; it is never an actual physical 
thing. If “semiotic objects” are immaterial -  effects more than things -  their 
similarity to “emergent objects”, “intentional objects”, and “objectives” is more 
obvious, and we can better integrate the various fields from which these similar 
concepts derive. If signs are self-referential in the way I describe, then it can only 
be through self-mistaking (not self-negation as others have proposed), that 
learning, creativity and purposeful action are possible via signs. Furthermore, 
if we understand that semiotic objects are self-referential, we can better define 
an “interpretation” as a response to something as if it were a sign, but whose 
semiotic object does not, in fact, exist. If the response-as-interpretation 
turns out to be beneficial for the system after all, there is biopoiesis. When 
the response is not “interpretive” but self-confirming in the usual way, there 
is biosemiosis. While the conditions conducive to fruitful misinterpretation 
(e.g. accidental similarity of non-signs to signs and/or contiguity of non­
signs to self-sustaining processes) might be artificially enhanced, according 
to this theory, the outcomes would be, by nature, more or less uncontrollable 
and unpredictable. Nevertheless, biosemiotics could be instrumental in the 
manipulation and/or artificial creation of purposeful systems insofar as it can 
describe a formula for the conditions under which new objectives and novel 
purposeful behaviour may emerge, however unpredictably.
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Trans-somatic mindfulness
MYRDENE ANDERSON, KATJA PETTINEN 
Purdue University, Indiana, USA
Conventional biological models of the body echo a number of Cartesian 
dichotomies that assume developmental trajectories unfolding with a 
high degree of predictability. Engrained in that paradigm is the notion that 
evolutionary phylogenetic biological and developmental ontogenetic somatic
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processes can be captured through linear, mechanical models that measure 
or even manipulate materiality, leaning increasingly on technology. Alongside 
these reductionist inclinations, models of linguistic meaning-making bog 
down in familiar models of grammar and brainmind localization of function. 
Meanwhile, emotion and other lived experience -  as evidence of being and 
becoming within a mindfulness moment and within an umwelt -  remain 
alienated from both physical and mental frames, stranding many other pro­
cesses as well.
Here we explore a biosemiotically-informed approach toward an inte­
gration of meaning and materiality that addresses the manners in which 
the body experiences and portrays forms of intelligence, and how meaning- 
making fails to be contained within any convenient spatial or temporal units 
of analysis, from organs to organism to species and beyond. We focus on 
emerging evidence of meaning permeating and dissolving a medley of systems: 
experiential, linguistic, cultural, and biological.
The human habits of being in the world thrive on sensorial and neurological 
distinctions as ways of making sense of ourselves, our significant others, and 
our various environments, and by extension, the worlds beyond those of 
conspecifics -  inclusive of imagined phenomena. Hence, meaning-making 
embracing mindfulness is not exclusive to the domain of human language 
games but also pertains to the behavioural, biochemical, and arguably aesthetic 
signs present among other living things and within the ecology at large.
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Bio-logos: Asking for the logic of life through 
a study of artificial life art and biosemiotics
KATHRINE ELIZABETH ANKER 
Plymouth University, United Kingdom
Claus Emmeche (1994), in a study of artificial life and biology, poses the 
question: “What is the potentiality of life”? But what would be the most basic 
concepts in a contemporary definition of life?
Artificial life art explores the boundaries between biology and technology, 
and in so doing provokes current understandings of the organism as a living 
system. In this paper, I will combine a semiotic-hermeneutical approach to 
architect Phillip Beesley’s kinetic sculpture Hylozoic Soil, with a theoretical, 
biosemiotic approach, focussed upon the dynamic relation between endo- 
and exosemiosic processes, hi my reading, I view both artwork and biological 
organism as “text” (Kull 2002). Theoretically, I will look for discrepancies 
between the concepts of “mechanical process” and “information processing” 
versus “meaning making”, as concepts central in defining living systems in 
both А-Life art and biosemiotics. This further evokes questions concerning 
the role of consciousness in “wet”, organic matter.
The aim of this presentation is to introduce how contemporary technology- 
based art can deliver symbolic conceptualizations, which provoke current 
understandings of organic life and subjectivity. I will demonstrate the centrality 
of a semiotic framework, while philosophically seeking to conceptualize 
processes that are understood as basic to what it means to be living. My overall 
field is trans-disciplinary subjectivity studies, and the role of consciousness in 
the biological organism at large.
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Meaning in medicine: 
Toward a biosemiotic model of placebo effects
MARCO ANNONI 
University of Milan, Italy
People are simultaneously biological and cultural entities. Accordingly, the 
ways in which meaningful stimuli are perceived, communicated and interpreted 
in clinical settings may have a decisive impact on the efficacy of medical 
treatments and patients’ quality of life. As a growing number of researches on 
“placebo effects” demonstrate, meaning-mediated responses can be induced 
to modulate symptoms across several medical conditions and therapeutic 
contexts. However, two crucial issues are now at the forefront of any research 
aiming at assessing the role of meaning in medicine. The first is the necessity 
of rephrasing the misleading concept of “placebo effect” as to allow for the 
distinction and classification of different kinds of meaning-responses. The 
second issue, instead, impinges on the difficulty of reintroducing the concepts 
of meaning and agency within a theoretical paradigm in which explanations 
are given in terms of causal interactions between molecular substrates or 
visible neuronal correlates, and in which the production of new evidence 
relies on large-scale randomized clinical trials. In this respect, I will contend 
that a biosemiotic model based on Peirce’s theory of signs provides a superior 
alternative to other approaches currently adopted to conceptualize meaning- 
mediated responses. In particular, I will argue that Peirce’s conceptual triads 
of sign-object-interpretant and icon-index-symbol can be used not only to 
elaborate a working model to deconstruct the concept of “placebo effects” 
into its diverse basic components, but also as a source of theoretical insights 
for reconsidering the global role of meaning responses in medicine.
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Phenomenology of psychoanalytic data: 
A biosemiotic framework
ANNAARAGNO 
New York, USA
Adopting a definition of ‘biosemiotics’ as referring to a hierarchy of meaning- 
forms when applied to a psychoanalytic model of mind, this paper presents 
a broad range of bio-semiotic phenomena, processes, dynamics, defences, 
archetypal and internalized interpersonal patterns, that in psychoanalysis 
commonly fall under the heading, the “unconscious.”
Reconceptualised as interpretive data within the purview of a psycho* 
analytic discourse-semantic, this biosemiotic framework posits an epigenetic 
continuum of human meaning-organizations originating at basic organic 
levels, moving upward through biological, psycho-somatic and affective ex­
pression, proto-semiotic transmissions, represented forms, and finally to 
explicit linguistic signs and complex symbol systems.
In addition to assuming an uninterrupted epigenetic continuum crystallizing 
in hierarchic organization, this framework accentuates the multi-layered and 
increasingly condensed quality of higher, more elaborate organizations of 
meaning in human communication, drawing attention to persisting biological 
undercurrents in implied sense, intent, and motivation, all of which impact on 
repressive/defensive mechanisms.
Drawing from previous works in which my goal was to update Freud s first 
topographical theory of mind, we present the phenomenology of unconscious 
data for the purpose of introducing a diverse range of non-linguistic signifying 
forms from which psychoanalysts infer mental processes and ‘interpret’ 
meanings. An important underlying premise regarding psychoanalytic data 
and its relation to the basic biosemiotic ‘agenda’ is that, until it is grounded 
in an updated developmental theory of mind inclusive of pre- and proto-
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semiotic-forms, the term “sign” is merely an abstract linguistic ‘label’ rather 
than a mental act with antecedent developmental stages manifesting meanings 
through different forms and modes of expression. Drawn from the yields of 
the psychoanalytic semantic, our revised metatheory provides insights into 
the sensory-emotive origins of these unconscious layers of non-linguistic 
signification, thereby expanding our understanding of the formative attributes 
of the ‘semiotic function’ in human evolution.
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Internalization of functions as a model of minimal 
semiosis in autonomous systems: Towards a scientific 
biosemiotics
ARGYRIS ARNELLOS, ALVARO MORENO
University of the Basque Country, Donostia -  San Sebastian, Spain
Hoffmeyer (1998) stresses the importance o f ‘inside exterior’ and ‘outside 
interior’ as two conceptual categories that are reflected in the real world at
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the relation between inside (the system itself) and outside (the environment) 
of a system. In this way, living systems are interwoven with the environment, 
although they are asymmetrically differentiated. The respective asymmetry 
is created and maintained by the functionality o f the system through 
the establishment of internal constructive relations that organizationally 
differentiate the system from its environment, and furthermore they specify 
its autonomy and its identity. As Moreno and Barandiaran (2004) suggest, 
such an in-out dichotomy, at its most basic level, is the basis for the formation 
of several such asymmetries at higher levels of organization. From a more 
biological point of view, Rosslenbroich (2008) suggests that the increase 
of autonomy, as a central aspect that characterizes macro-evolutionary 
innovations, should be considered as emancipation from the environment, 
based on an evolutionary shift between system-environment relationship, so 
that the generation and stabilization of intrinsic functions within the system is 
enhanced. We present several cases of spatial separation from the environment 
and of the internalization of functions in the phylogeny and ontogeny of living 
systems (the passage from prokaryotes to eukaryotes, cases ofendo-symbiosis, 
endo-cytosis, etc.) as features of an increasing autonomy, and we discuss 
their semiotic nature. We then present a minimal model of internalization of 
functions in protocells (Arnellos, Moreno 2012) and we argue it can account 
for minimal semiosis in autonomous systems. Finally, we discuss the reasons 
why said model could provide the basis for a scientific biosemiotics.
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Code biology -  a new science of life
MARCELLO BARBIERI 
University of Ferrara, Italy
Systems biology and the modern synthesis are recent versions of two classical 
biological paradigms that are known as structuralism and functionalism, or 
internalism and externalism. According to functionalism (or externalism), 
living matter is a fundamentally passive entity that owes its organization to 
external forces (functions that shape organs) or to an external organizing 
agent (natural selection). Structuralism (or internalism) is the view that 
living matter is an intrinsically active entity that is capable of organizing itself 
from within, with purely internal processes that are based on mathematical 
principles and physical laws. At the molecular level, the basic mechanism of 
the modern synthesis is molecular copying, the process that leads in the short 
run to heredity and in the long run to natural selection. The basic mechanism 
of systems biology, instead, is self-assembly, the process by which many 
supramolecular structures are formed by the spontaneous aggregation of their 
components. In addition to molecular copying and self-assembly, however, 
molecular biology has uncovered also a third great mechanism at the heart 
of life. The existence of the genetic code and of many other organic codes 
in nature tells us that molecular coding is a biological reality and therefore 
we need a framework that accounts for it. This framework is code biology, 
the study of the codes of life, a new field of research that brings to light an 
entirely new dimension of the living world and gives us a completely new 
understanding of the origin and the evolution of life.
The integrated and the interactive realms 
in relation to biosemiosis
PETER W. BARLOW
University of Bristol, United Kingdom
After a presentation at the 10th Gatherings in Biosemiotics in 2010 concerning 
the presumed effects of the lunisolar tidal force upon plant behaviour, the 
question was asked: “Where is the signal?” Subsequent consideration of 
behavioural activities in various organisms (plants, crabs, iguanas, mice, 
gerbils, etc.) in relation to lunisolar tidal variation has indicated that what
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was presented at the Gatherings, as well as the question which followed, were 
rooted in a ‘Newtonian’ approach to science which posits cause and effect, 
and is allied with theory-oriented experimentation. However, it is possible to 
consider scientific investigation from another perspective, which contrasts 
with the former approach: the perspective of ‘exploratory experimentation’ 
(Ribe, Steinle 2002). Here, the emphasis is on using experiments to discover 
the conditions or influences which are necessary for the phenomenon under 
study to become manifest, and to explore the nature of the links between 
related observations. In some ways, these two strategies, the Newtonian and 
the Exploratory, are akin to the Apollonian and Dionysian ways of science 
described by Albert Szent-Györgyi (1972). The initial problem, therefore, of 
how the Moon can signal’ to life on Earth might benefit from this alternative, 
exploratory attitude. Then, not only might this guide the relevant observations 
about plant and animal behaviour towards an acceptable, and necessarily 
novel, hypothesis, but also might indicate how such behaviour casts light on 
the boundaries of biological organisation, which either permit or exclude 
biosemiosis.
Behavioural patterns are often directed towards an organism’s search 
for energy. Ibis applies not only to plants, which search for light, minerals 
and water, but also to both marine and terrestrial animals, which search for 
alimentation. In relation to the time-courses of this foraging behaviour of 
marine animals, the marine tides are widely supposed to play an important 
regulatory role, setting the times of activity and rest. Foraging activity is 
similarly regulated by natural rhythms of light and darkness. Marine tidal 
cycles stand proxy for rhythmic variations in the lunisolar tidal acceleration, 
which is evidenced in the wave of deformation that travels over Earths 
spheroidal form, resulting from the gravitational attraction between the 
Earth and the Sun and Moon. This force may be estimated in terms of minute 
variations in Earthly gravitational acceleration (m s"2 x 10~8). Because the 
lunisolar ‘gravimetric’ tide (as we may call it) cannot be annulled, it can never 
be proved beyond doubt by experimental means that any temporal pattern of 
diurnal biological activity is not due to a corresponding temporal variation in 
the geophysical gravimetric tide. Studies of biological rhythms do, however, 
attempt to annul many other candidate entraining influences, such as night/ 
day cycles. Shore-dwelling crabs, for example, can be removed from their 
native tidal environment and placed in constant, free-running conditions in 
the laboratory, e.g., in continuous low-level light and constant temperature. 
Yet under such conditions crabs continue to display activity patterns that 
appear to track the rhythm of the marine tides to which they were previously
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exposed. These transplanted laboratory crabs had, therefore, either preserved 
a detailed memory of their native marine tidal timing, or else they were 
subject (like their native marine environment) to the inescapable lunisolar 
gravimetric tide. Because, as already mentioned, it is not possible to interfere 
with or interrupt the gravimetric tide, the problem of what factor -  marine or 
gravimetric -  regulates animal activity seems insoluble. Nevertheless, two lines of 
recent evidence can be singled out which argue for a lunisolar involvement in 
behavioural rhythms.
Firstly, crabs will shed eggs in the constant environment of the laboratory. 
When these are fertilised, larval development will proceed. The free-swimming 
larvae, in turn, display a diurnal pattern of vertical migration within a water 
column. The rhythm of swimming upwards and then downwards follows that 
of the marine tide in the nearby location from which the progenitors of the 
larvae were collected (Zeng, Naylor 1996). However, because the larvae had 
never directly experienced any marine tide during their life, it is conceivable 
that they are responding solely to the local rhythm of the lunisolar gravimetric 
tide, as detailed analysis of the data indeed indicates (Barlow, in preparation).
Secondly, a completely different set of observations was made in Brazil. It 
related to the temporal pattern of spontaneous, ultra-weak emission of photons 
from germinating wheat grains (Gallep et al. 2012). This biophoton emission 
is naturally rhythmic; and this rhythm is synchronised with the co-locating 
gravimetric tide, experienced at the observation site. Then, in a subsequent 
experiment, wheat grains were translocated from their source in the Southern 
hemisphere to the Northern hemisphere. Biophoton emissions were then 
recorded during simultaneous germination tests in both the Northern and 
Southern locations. In these tests, the respective rhythms of emission were 
synchronised with the rhythms of the gravimetric tides at each location.
From each of these sets of observations it may be inferred that there is (a) 
no retention, or memory, of a rhythm -  as in the case of the wheat grains, and 
(ъ) no inheritance of a biological analogue of the marine tide, or some other 
rhythm -  as in the case of the crabs. The biological rhythms are not inherent 
to the respective organisms, but seem more likely to be imposed upon them 
in accordance with the rhythmic orbital motions of Earth and Moon around 
the Sun.
The rhythmic, biological events mentioned earlier show up at the level 
of organs (e.g. leaf movements and root growth variations in plants) and 
organisms (activity patterns in animals and biophoton emissions). Yet, they all 
may trace back to events at a common, cellular or sub-cellular level, possibly in 
the form of movements of quantal molecular aggregates into and out of cells
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via exosomes. In animals, the quantal aggregates and exosomal structures may 
also correspond to the neuronal synaptic vesicles and their contents (Beck, 
Eccles 1992) and, hence, be related to animal neuromuscular locomotory 
activities. In plants, the aggregates are units of 108 water molecules, and 
their transcellular movements translate into variations of cellular volume. 
The rhythmic movements of these quantal aggregates are hypothesised to 
be governed by processes lying within the domain of quantum physical 
theory (Dorda 2010; Barlow, Fisahn 2012), and may show analogies with the 
Quantum Hall effect. It is within this quantum domain that Sun-Moon-Earth 
orbital motions exert their effects upon biorhythms.
The fact that organisms respond to lunisolar gravitational forces suggests 
that a very primitive phenomenon is operating upon them -  a force that was 
present at the dawn of life itself. The writer and scientist, J. W. von Goethe, was 
the first to propose the notion of such a primitive factor within the scientific 
domain: he called this an Urphänomen, or Primal Phenomenon. The lunisolar 
tidal force and all that is contingent upon it may comprise such a primal 
phenomenon. The experience, by an organism, of the variable gravimetric tide 
within its own structure, and the manifestation of this, now organic, variation 
within its pattern of activity, is an expression of the organisms integration 
within what might be called a ‘systemic tetrad’, or holon, of Organism-Sun- 
Moon-Earth. Put another way, and to paraphrase a statement of Henri Bortoft 
in connection with the topic of ‘wholeness’, the universal (i.e. the holon) is 
seen within the particular (i.e. the experience), and the particular is a living 
manifestation of the universal (Bortoft 2010: 22). Thus, the answer to the 
question of where the signal of the putative lunisolar-driven biological rhythm 
is located (and where its receptor is located, also), is that it is both nowhere 
and everywhere. The rhythm is within the fabric of the holon.
Goethe remarks that “The difficulty is [...] to recognize a primitive 
phenomenon [i.e. the Urphänomen] in phenomena that are conditioned and 
concealed [in] a thousand different ways” (Eckermann 1998). Hence, taking 
into consideration not only the above-mentioned theoretical ideas but also the 
observations of organismal behaviour in relation to lunar phases and orbital 
movements manifested in the gravimetric tide and its amplitudal variation, it is 
evident that the world of biology is comprised of two interpenetrating and co­
located realms. The first realm is of primal phenomena, the second is of derived 
phenomena. The former, as noted, lies in the particularities of the organism 
within its universal holon. The latter realm is one in which organisms and their 
components interact amongst themselves and their immediate environment, or 
umwelt, which they themselves help to create. It is, moreover, a realm in which
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biosemiosis displays its power to bring into being the higher organisational 
levels from which clans, societies, nations, and so on, are formed.
The interpenetration of the two realms often renders the primal phenomena 
‘invisible’ under the cloak of the derived phenomena. This is a difficulty 
which Goethe noted. And it is a difficulty in interpreting the published time- 
courses of diurnal activity of crabs, for whereas activity patterns receive some 
entrainment from the umwelt, such as periods of light and dark, and the timing 
of the high and low marine tides, the manifestations of the primal lunisolar 
regulatory phenomenon, which interlocks with the marine tidal rhythm and the 
resultant derived biological phenomena, can only occasionally and partially - 
and tantalisingly -  be glimpsed; and, it may be said that these glimpses are 
revealed by exploratory experimentation. Under free-running conditions in 
the laboratory, however, the native umwelt is reduced and the outcome of the 
primal phenomenon more clearly manifests -  except, that is, in those cases 
where the properties of the umwelt have penetrated the organism so deeply 
that they have been assimilated into the expression pattern of certain genes 
(Whitehead et al. 2009)!
Primal phenomena are also embedded within the morphogenetic processes 
which bring about the development of organic form. Newman et al. (2006), for 
example, discuss such phenomena; these manifest as free diffusion, reaction- 
diffusion systems, oscillations, gradients, and other physico-chemical features 
relevant to the morphogenesis of multicellular organisms. Into this category 
of primal phenomena could be placed also the autoreproductive origination 
of cellular patterns. With respect to plant tissues, these patterns can be 
formalised via L-systems, as was discussed in a preliminary session to an earlier 
Gatherings in Biosemiotics (Barlow, Lück 2006). In addition, such a mode of 
autonomous biological patterning contributes to the branching structure of 
whole plant bodies. Interestingly, in this connection, the primal phenomenon 
encapsulated by the L-systems not only for cellular branching, but also the 
branching of plant parts has, as its outcome, what Goethe would recognise as 
an Urpflanze [primal plant], to use his term. Moreover, the transformations 
inherent to L-systems lead towards what Goethe gathered into his Versuche die 
Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu Erklären. One important derived phenomenon 
attendant upon morphogenesis, and which is linked here with the umwelt and 
biosemiosis, is observable in the plasticity of form, of which plants offer many 
excellent examples.
Thus, in conclusion, we are left with questions about (a) whether primal 
phenomena had a role in the origin of life; (b) whether they give rise to derived 
phenomena and, if not, then (c) whether primal phenomena can be, or have
Main Programme 159
been, coerced, or assimilated, into co-operation with derived phenomena; and 
(d) whether this latter question about assimilation is relevant to the explication 
of life. The genetic code may be one momentous example of this assimilation 
of the primal into the derivative state. Biosemiosis is a derived phenomenon, 
and is clearly integral to the development of the above-mentioned holon of the 
systemic tetrad. In this respect, biosemiosis is a vital process for furthering the 
evolution of high levels of organisation -  of societies on Earth, and beyond, 
within the Cosmos.
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Barbieri’s organic codes, genomic error-correction, 
and semantic feedbacks
GERARD BATTAIL 
Paris, France
Conserving genomes need error-correcting codes in order to make them 
resilient to casual errors, organized as nested component codes successively 
established during the geological ages. Barbieri defined organic codes as sets 
of unidirectional correspondence rules between sequences made of elements 
otherwise unrelated, as exemplified by the oldest one, the ‘genetic code! Their 
rules result from conventions as arbitrary as the semantic relations between 
words and objects in human languages.
Establishing each new organic code resulted in a major transition in life 
evolution. Error-correcting codes result from imposing constraints to a set of 
sequences. Those used in communication engineering are conveniently defined 
by mathematical equalities, but constraints of any kind can be contemplated. 
Biological sequences incur physical-chemical and linguistic constraints 
which similarly endow them with error-correcting ability, thus defining ‘soft 
codes’. Organic codes necessarily involve soft codes which moreover assume 
a nested structure, since they were successively established during the ages. 
The concepts of genomic error-correcting codes and of organic codes thus 
converge, although their respective starting points, information theory and 
molecular biology, were very different.
The concept of semantic feedback is introduced for explaining how mole­
cular mechanisms established and maintain organic codes. It accounts for the 
stability of the ‘genetic code’, its universality and conservation, and explains 
why the establishment of other organic codes endowed genomes with further 
linguistic properties and improved error-correcting ability, while enabling the 
evolution of life.
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The closed-loop coding-decoding concept as joint 
between biosemiotics, cybernetics and biophysics
KASTYTIS BEITAS, DOBILAS KIRVELIS 
Vilnius University, Lithuania
The comparative analysis of biosemiotics, cybernetics and biophysics is 
performed on the theoretical basis of the informational closed-loop coding- 
decoding control (CL-CD C) concept. Today biophysics is not only physico­
chemical biology, but according to Aristotle’s conception of physics, has 
become a fundamental bio-theory of life and living systems. Miller’s living 
systems theory alleges that space and time, matter and energy, information 
and entropy, are conceptual factors in different levels of life’s organization 
(Miller 1978). The essence of life and living systems is their organization 
on the basis of bio-informational technology. The biosemiotician Jakob von 
Uexküll’s umwelt scheme is a typical cyber-CL-CD control structure for 
linking the environment with the organism (Uexküll 1920). That coding 
procedures are the general principles of living cells’ functional organization 
is recognized by biosemioticians and biologists (Barbieri 2003). Kalevi Kull 
discusses the commonalities between biophysics and biosemiotics in the 
terms of traditional physico-chemical biology (Kull 2007).
The biophysics of the twenty-first century marks the beginning of radical 
changes. Biophysics is transforming into a fundamental life science, as the 
organized systems of bio-technologies. The last decades of research point to a 
conceptual turn in biology toward technology. “Conceptually at least, biology 
is becoming technology. And physically, technology is becoming biology” 
(Arthur 2009). Another word for this is “Wetware: a computer in every living 
cell” (Bray 2009). The techno-engineering approach to the interpretation 
of wildlife was already visible in Aristotle’s physics, as in his statement -  
“technology mimics nature.” Aristotle explained physics as living and non­
living nature. Non-living nature has been interpreted in dynamis/potente, 
energeya, and for living nature interpretation was a necessary entelecheia -  
purposeful, goal-oriented activities involving life force. Descartes forwarded 
the point of view that living organisms are inherently dual -  brain and mind, 
body and soul. Sniadecki’s approach to living matter asserts that the essence 
of life consists in the functional and organizational skills that determine the 
appropriateness of a special “ organizingforce” (Sniadecki 1804). Today we call 
it a specialized information technology (genetics, molecular signals, hormones, 
neuro-networks, pheromones, sound signals, etc.) that helps control the
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animals organs -  the technological means for managing the behaviour of living 
organisms. Later, Johannsen coined the genotype-phenotype distinction, 
which today is understood in terms of information management by means of 
CL-CD C procedures. Schrödinger studied the basic element of life, the cell, 
and concluded that “life feeds on negentropy,” and that “the known laws of 
physics are not sufficient to explain life.”
Negentropy brought the idea that the living organism in a limited space 
can reduce its own entropy to increase its functional organizational skills at 
the expense of environmental resources. It shows that life is organized as a 
functionally targeted technology system, controlled by the special structure 
of biological information-technology (genetic, hormonal, nervous), by means 
of closed, cyclic (recursive) operations in the coding-decoding circuits of CL- 
CD systems. The bio-info technologies that determine the essence of life are 
always made from material-signals (hard) and intangible (soft) technologies. 
The hard-soft concept eliminates the misunderstanding between physicists 
and cyberneticists on the concept of information, as well as between biologists 
and biochemists.
The quality reductions of entropy, which are the organizational skill- 
enhancing properties of the system, are acquired by information technology. 
The essence of the organized system is to help fight against the second law of 
thermodynamics. This bio-engineering technological approach was already 
seen by the pioneers of bioinformatics (Gamow, Yeas 1956). Biosemiotics 
recognizes life as a self-productive technology system (Sharov 1999). Such an 
integrated life science that combines physics (atoms), chemistry (molecules), 
cybernetics (information control), organizational skills and technology into a 
coherent scientific system is a fundamental science of our time, leading to the 
future convergence of Nano-Bio-Info-Cogno-Eco (NBICE) technologies. It 
is the future ofbasic science -  biophysics (Kirvelis 2010).
The concept of biosemiotics was introduced by the human sciences, because 
researchers were disappointed with the open coding-decoding of Shannon’s 
information theory, which rejects the semantics of coded signals. Meanwhile, 
the concept of closed coding-decoding (CL-CD C) joins information-signals 
and physical processes in functionally organized semantic procedures. The 
CL-CD concept organizes a unified system based on cybernetics as semiotic 
systems with semantics.
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Semiotics as an instrument for animal cognition 
research: Experimental study
DANIIL BEREZHNOY, VERA SERKOVA, KIRA NIKOLSKAYA 
Moscow State University, Russia
The main, irreducible difficulty in the research of cognitive processes in either 
men or animals is caused by the impossibility of their direct observation. 
However, I. M. Sechenov (1878), going far ahead of his time, proposed the 
linguistic method as the instrument for cognitive processe investigation, 
because it concentrates on the language -  the basic cognitive mechanism and 
system of signs representing the information.
Taking this idea as a basis and using semiotic concepts we develop the 
systemic-informational approach (Nikolskaya 2005), which states that the 
experimental environment is a bearer of signs, and the animal is a bearer of sign- 
operating rules. The animal’s goal is to recognize three types of information: 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic, and the experimenter should find out how 
the animal has done it. To create the sign system we have virtually marked 
every spot of experimental environment with a symbol and developed a 
matrix of signs representing the environment. Thus, animal behaviour is 
represented as the forming text. A full spatial “alphabet” has been considered 
as an initial matrix of the syntactic information. The symbols coding operant 
elements, defining the structure of the task, we have referred to as the semantic 
information, and the set of animal operant actions had been treated as the 
pragmatic information.
The experimental data, acquired on different animals including fishes, 
reptiles, rodents, predators, primates, testifies that the semiotic approach 
allows us to observe the dynamics of cognitive activity organization, individual 
differences in the manifestations of cognitive abilities and the properties of 
the psycho-emotional pattern and memory functioning in a normal state and 
during various functional and pathological influences.
Main Programme 165
Symbol grounding problem and 
causal theory of reference
KRYSTYNA BIELECKA 
University of Warsaw, Poland
The symbol grounding problem in Al and robotics concerns both the theoretical 
and the practical possibility of the creation of an artificial cognitive system 
that exhibits autonomous semantic abilities that assure a connection between 
symbols/concepts and their referents. As Floridi and Taddeo’s (1990) analysis 
of semantic autonomy demonstrates, the activity of the system possessing that 
autonomy must be compatible with the zero semantic commitment condition.
The most basic problem with causal theories (such as early Wittgenstein’s 
theory of meaning, Kripke’s causal theory of names or Field’s project of 
conceptual-role semantics) is that they have problems with reference, and 
they either stipulate some form of direct connection (causal or not) between 
the symbol and the referent, or simply leave the reference undetermined. The 
same difficulties appear in projects that were supposed to show how to solve 
the grounding problem, as suggested by Harnad (1990), Taddeo and Floridi 
(2007) and Steels (2007).
I will focus on the inevitable difficulties that every causal theory of refe­
rence faces, using some examples from robotics and A.I. as the detailed 
development of solutions to the philosophical issue of reference in terms 
of causal connections. I argue against a quite popular claim that the symbol 
grounding problem has been solved thanks to a sensorimotor approach to 
meaning (Varshavskaya (2002) inspired by Brooks (1990) or Billard and 
Dautenhahn (1999)), to show some crucial difficulties for the causal theory of 
reference concerning higher-order levels of representation, learning abilities, 
social coordination and their evolutionary development. I suggest that only 
by going beyond the simplistic causal story may we have a plausible solution 
to the grounding problem.
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Biosemiotics: Enhancing on the concept 
of chemical systems
AMELIA C. BOJO
Central Mindanao University, Musuan, Philippines
Biosemiotics -  the science of signs and symbols and how living organisms 
interpret them -  is a fascinating study especially within the context of system- 
environment interactions. Erwin Schrödinger may have unwittingly started 
the discourse that triggered the birth of this trans-disciplinary science when 
he asked What is Life? in 1944. Several attempts have been done to answer 
Schrödinger since then and different frameworks and theories have been made 
(Favareau 2006). From the series of studies and theories, Battail (2010) came 
up with the proposal that information should be taken as the third component 
of chemical systems, particularly those called living systems.
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The introduction of information as a third component of a chemical system, 
particularly in a living chemical system, neatly wraps up a good elementary 
answer to Schrödinger s basic question of “How can the events in space and time 
which take place within the spatial boundary of a living system be accounted for 
by physics and chemistry?” Then the question emerged, whether introducing 
information as a third component of a chemical system “gives the signal” 
that chemistry is an everyday occurrence and will thus make chemistry more 
understandable and more appreciated by freshman chemistry students. This 
paper reviews biosemiotics and reports on how a “chemical system” version of 
the human body helped revise students’ view of chemistry, the “terror science”.
Although the objective of the study was to find a strategy to help students 
appreciate chemistry more, the study posited a new thought: was the new 
concept highly appreciated because students recognized that information 
is an inherent component of a living chemical system, or was it because it 
was completely new that all were enthusiastic about its novelty? Qualitative 
indicators showed that appreciation for chemistry skyrocketed with this 
approach. However, while it would be easy to conclude that the objective of 
the study was met, it has to be admitted that the jury is still out on biosemiotics 
and would likely stay out for a lot longer.
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Making sense out of one’s own actions: 
The case of human language
DIDIER BOTTINEAU
Paris West University Nanterre La Defense, France
Human language is commonly considered as (i) a formalism that supplies 
subjects with lexical distributions and grammatical patterns providing “mental
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representations” aimed at schematizing the material world of empirical 
experience, and (ii) a socially-grounded system of practices that provide 
subjects with procedures aimed at encoding and decoding representations 
in intersubjective interaction on the basis of a common set of standard 
routines. This definition falls short from accounting for crucial elements in 
the phenomenological construction of languaging as it is experienced by 
subjects in everyday practice: (i) languaging is not about forms, but about 
the dynamic production of perceivable effects through motoric actions of 
the body; to speak is to behave in an intersubjectively interpretable way. Even 
written texts fall under this definition once reading is taken into account as 
an uncircumventable phenomenological mediation between the subject and 
the object; (ii) languaging is not only for intersubjective communication, 
it is also for inner thinking (endophasia): a mental simulation of the motor 
/  perceptual loop that is instrumental in the conduct and control of the 
production of meaning. Languaging is best defined as a behavioural system 
enabling the conduct of semantic processes through embodied action via 
motoric-perceptual couplings: to speak is to behave corporally (somatically 
or imaginarily) in such a way as to produce, either for oneself or for others, the 
perceivable or imaginable events and accidents required for the production 
of meaning in a social form at, along the lines of procedural gestures provided 
as models by social routines grounded in intersubjective interaction. 
Languaging is not required for the exercise of “intelligence” and “thinking” 
in general: just perceiving a scene and intervening in it is enough to produce 
meaning by attributing affordances and values and paving the way for personal 
inscription in the world through action and well-being. In this respect, the 
specificity of languaging is that it uses words, which are by definition segments 
of quotes abstracted from other speakers' previous speeches (including one’s 
own), truncated quotes whose dialogic depth and interactive reproduction 
will be reminiscent of chains of knowledge acquired first and foremost in 
the context of previous interaction with others (and very secondarily in the 
context of pragmatic interaction with the objects themselves, which need not 
exist -  hence the possibility of abstraction). Languaging also uses “grammar”, 
a set of vocal operators (morphology), sequential patterns (syntax) and 
fluctuations in tone, tune and rhythm (prosody) enabling the formation of 
complex combinatory patterns and conceptual constructions that do not 
reflect the perceivable “world” (if this means anything) but, rather, reproduce 
traditional models of elaboration developed in the history of the collectivity 
practising them. Languaging is thus an “amplifier of intelligence” -  it increases 
the potentialities of biosemiotic processing in a specific ethological domain
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of behaviour characteristic of the human species, and each “language” is a 
relatively closed system -  a system of consistent practices characterizing 
socially formatted biosemiotic vocal procedures in a given human community. 
The goal of this paper is to present those principles, sketch the connections 
with biosemiotic tenets, and illustrate the phenomena through examples from 
a wide range of languages and verbal practices.
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Reflection of Jakob von Uexküll’s thoughts from 
the point of view of Czech theoretical biologists and 
philosophers from Charles University in Prague
ONDREJ BRADÄC
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
The goal of this article is to briefly introduce Jakob von Uexkülls concept of 
umwelt, described in his books Streifzuge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und 
Menschen, and Bedeutungslehre and to confront this theory with its 2 1th century 
reflection from the point of view of theoretical biologists and philosophers 
from Charles University in Prague, Department of History and Philosophy of
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Natural Sciences, based on Kleisner and Klikovä’s anthology Umwelt (2006). 
Another goal of this article is to try to show which parts of Uexkülls thought 
system can be considered outdated in the contemporary context, and which 
parts of it can still be inspiring for contemporary biosemiotics and biology 
in general. In this article I concentrate on parts of Uexkülls paper which are 
subjects of a possible critical discussion, which is the problem of spontaneity 
of living beings, the problem of implicit necessity of a transcendental agent 
behind the score of nature or the question of evolutionary dynamics in 
the world described by Uexkülls concept. Through the critical discussion, 
Uexkülls theory is brought into a contemporary context and the possible 
ways it could influence contemporary biological and biosemiotic thoughts are 
revealed.
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Neural and behavioral semiotics of fear
METTE MIRIAM RAKEL BÖLL 
Aarhus University, Denmark
Fear is a component of a vast amount of behaviours, reported and investigated 
throughout the animal kingdom. Fear is also a common research object 
in neuroscience, as it has proven recognizable across species boundaries in 
both brains and behaviour (e.g. LeDoux 1998; Kandel et al. 2000). This talk 
will highlight the overlaps between the neuronal and behavioural aspects of 
fear. It will investigate the concept of Hebbian plasticity with the well-known 
quote “neurons that fire together wire together” in a biosemiotic framework. 
In addition, the newly generated idea of emotional styles (Davidson, Begley 
2012) as well as the somewhat older idea of mirror neuron systems (Iaco- 
boni 2008) will be considered and discussed in a biosemiotic context of 
interpretation, following an evolutionary trait from fish (Chandroo et al. 
2004) to human beings. Linkage will be made to such fields as social and 
affective neuroscience (Davidson, Begley 2012; Iacoboni 2008), human 
health (Kandel et al. 2000; LeDoux 1998), ethology and evolutionary biology, 
as well as biosemiotics.
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Biosemiotics as systems theory: 
An investigation into biosemiotics 
as the grounding for a new form 
of cultural analysis
SARA CANNIZZARO
London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom
In 1984, M. Anderson et al. stated that semiotics is fundamentally concerned 
with systems, however “semiotics has seldom dealt with dynamical systems 
as a whole, those nonlinear, irreversible realities where energy explicitly fuses 
with information, such as experience, ontogeny and phylogeny” (1984: 25). 
Hence this paper sets out to explore the relation of biosemiotics to systems 
theory and cybernetics. The investigation of the ‘disciplinary’ and historical 
overlap between theories of modelling in biosemiotics and in systems theory 
is carried on following the example set by Deely’s Archaeology o f Concepts 
(Deely 1981). Initially, it is argued that systems theory and biosemiotics 
share a perspective based on a systems thinking which is grounded in 
transdisciplinarity and in a dynamical and functional approach to systems. In
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this respect it is argued that such a common methodological perspective is an 
instance of historical continuity. Subsequently, it is argued that cybernetics 
and biosemiotics’ systems thinking fundamentally differ in their take on 
‘information’. In fact, biosemiotics broadly conceives information in terms of 
Peirce’s notion of abduction, whereas cybernetics conceives information in 
terms of logical constraints. Such a methodological difference is argued to be 
an uneven development (Althusser 1965). My conclusion will underline how 
cultural analysis after a biosemiotics will need to take into account the benefits 
that both biosemiotics and cybernetics bring to the understanding of cultural 
systems. In particular, it is hoped that biosemiotics-as-systems theory will 
mitigate the unscientific character (which amounts to logo-centrism, text- 
centrism, excessive emphasis on representation and narrowcasting the scope 
of analysis to unmasking ideology) that seems to characterise contemporary 
disciplines in the humanities (e.g. media studies) which make an ill use of 
semiotics.
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Taste as an indicator of plants’ healing powers
LUCIE CERMÄKOVÄ
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
Plants have been used by man as remedies since time immemorial. Although 
many healing properties were known by tradition, people were often trying 
to search for some signs how to recognize the virtues of particular plants. On 
that account, certain theoretical concepts, which help to decode the secrets 
of the power of plants, were established. Probably one of the more popular 
ones is the doctrine of signatures -  the therapeutic effects were identified
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by similarity between a human organ and the plant or some part of it, or by 
some other analogy. Many studies have dealt with this topic (Foucault 1966; 
Copenhaver 1990), some from the semiotic point of view as well (van den 
Broek 1987).
But there is still another theory, no less interesting, according to which 
the healing powers of plants can be recognized by taste. Taste informs us 
about the elemental composition of each plant (whether fire, water, earth or 
air prevails). It is based on the assumption that taste is the basic sense for all 
creatures, signalling whether something is good for our nutrition or not. There 
is a spectrum of tastes starting with sweet -  which is the most suitable taste 
for our body and serves as nutrition -  and ending with bitter, which is the 
best taste for medicaments. We will explain this theory in more detail on the 
example of renaissance herbals; then we will discuss its ancient sources and, 
on the other hand, compare it with the current situation, where medicine uses 
many taste-masking strategies to deceive our senses.
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Iconicity and mimicry: The classical legacy and Peirce, 
and its biosemiotic aftermath
HAN-LIANG CHANG 
Fudan University, Shanghai, China
In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses 
‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The 
synonymity of the two words has rarely been questioned. Curiously, a locus 
classicus of the pair can be found in Plato’s late dialogue the Sophist, where the 
mysterious ‘stranger’ makes the famous distinction between eikon (likeness) 
and phantasm a (semblance) (236a,b). For all his broad knowledge in ancient
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philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this parallel; nor has any Peircean scholar 
identified it. There seems to be little problem with eikon as likeness, but 
phantasm a may give rise to a puzzle. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon 
is to phantasma, eikastikhn (the making of likeness [235d]) is to phantastikhn 
(semblance making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because 
of the act of icon-making, which is none other than indexicality, and the idea 
coincides with Peirce s discussion of indexization of iconicity. The Peircean 
example of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and 
sculpturing in the Sophist clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. 
The paper will reread Peircean iconicity by closely analysing this relatively 
obscure Platonic text. It will extend the discussion to the biosemiotic advances 
of iconicity since the seminal essays by Rene Thom and Paul Bouissac in the 
early 1980s.
Results of the development of biosemiotics
SERGEY CHEBANOV
Baltic State Technical University, St. Petersburg, Russia
The history of the formation of biosemiotics can be divided into three stages.
1. Prehistory of biosemiotics: a) before the non-anthropomorphic period 
(until the 18th century); b) the non-anthropomorphic period (from 
the end of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century); c) the 
period after the decoding of the genetic code (in the middle of the 
20th century).
2. The initial stage of biosemiotics: a) origin (l960s-1970s); b) self­
comprehension and maturing ( 1980s); c) explosive growth (1990s); 
d) academization (2000s).
3. The initial period of academic history (2010s).
The results of this development are:
-  Expansion ofsemiosphere borders (displacement of the semiotic threshold 
and the inclusion of all biological life into the semiosphere) and semiotic 
borders.
-  The formation of semiotically realized biology and the folding of its 
relations with biology in the perspective of the humanities.
-  The appearance of biosemiotics as a kernel of semiotically realized bio­
logy and an initial institutionalizing of biosemiotics. Appearance of
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corresponding literature (including periodicals), training courses, profes­
sional organizations and communities.
-  Biosemiotics finds a place among the other variants of semiotically realized 
biology -  biohermeneutics, biophilology, biolinguistics, biopragmalin- 
guistics.
-  Reconsideration of the status of natural sciences and a revision of the parity 
of borders between nature and culture, and areas of knowledge studying 
them.
- The contribution of biosemiotics to the development of new outlooks 
in philosophy and religion (including the formation of new directions in 
philosophy and divinity).
-  The influence of biosemiotics on applied areas of human activity (medi­
cine, agriculture, forestry, fish culture, beekeeping, applied ecology, etc.).
As a result, it is possible to say that biosemiotics has begun to play an im­
portant role in the deduction of the unity of modern culture by providing 
connections between nature and culture, knowledge in the humanities and 
the exact sciences, as well as their different divisions.
Codes and their interpretation in endobiosemiotics
JOHN COLLIER
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
Marcello Barbieri (2001) has argued that endosemiotics is different from exo­
semiotics in biology, contrary to Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008), who has argued 
that the two have no clear distinction (endo and exo run into each other), 
and work under the same principles. The basis of Barbieri’s position is that 
he thinks that the existence of organic codes is sufficient to ground semiosis. 
Naively, one of the characteristics of codes (think Morse code, or computer 
code) is that there must be an encoding and a decoding, with at least some 
sort of functional relation between the two. I have argued previously that 
functionality in biology derives from autonomy which underlies viability. 
This serves as the ultimate interpretant (in Pierce’s sense) for biological 
endosigns. In examining Barbieri’s view, I notice that he claims that the codes 
connect “two worlds”. I think that in doing so he has surreptitiously brought in 
something very much like encoding and decoding, at least implicitly, and that 
the “worlds” function as interpretants in his approach. I will expand on this 
and try to make it more precise with some principles from information theory
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and channels that I have discussed before at these meetings (see Collier 2008,
2010 for grounding).
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Interactivity: Origins and consequences
STEPHEN COWLEY
Univeristy of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, United Kingdom
Biosemiotics allows processes like protein synthesis to be gradually supple­
mented by ones resembling reading -  as in the adaptivity of bacteria (Markoš, 
Svorcova 2009). Mutual influences later permit enkinaesthesia or a “situated 
co-afFective feeling of the presence of the other(s), [both] agential [ ...]  and 
non-agential and, where appropriate, the anticipated arc of the other’s action 
or movement, including, again where appropriate, the other’s intentionality” 
(Stuart 2011: l) .  For Stuart, humans, horses and beetles live with their world 
and, in doing so together, ants and bees come to exploit eusocial intelligence. 
With learning, organic memory favours the rise of anticipatory dynamics: 
organisms exploit interactivity or “sense-saturated coordination that is ne­
cessary to much action and coaction” (Cowley 2012). Along with increased 
brain size, learning and new flexibility, animals come to grasp situations - 
wolves learn from shared experience (Tonnessen 2011). Interactivity permits 
affect-based cognition and, in humans, link experience with others to the 
experience of others. Together, members of Homo sapiens gain from eusocial 
intelligence. By hypothesis, organic coding supplements abductive going on’
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with enkinaesthesic sense. Interactivity allows us to coordinate in a (partly) 
shared world where acting is constrained by a normative environment-using, 
which Donald (1991; 2007) calls mimesis. Human practices give individuals 
skills that link their experience with the learning of others. Interactivity made 
humans hypersocial more than a million years before language: later, of 
course, language exerted cascading effects on sense-saturated coordination, 
enkinaesthesia and, perhaps, how brains use organic coding to manage 
coordination with the world.
References
Cowley, Stephen J. 2012. Cognitive dynamics: language as values realizing activity. 
In: Kravchenko, Alexander (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics and Linguistic Interactions. New­
castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 15-46.
Donald, Merlin 1991. The Origins of the Modern Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
Donald, Merlin 2007. The slow process: a hypothetical cognitive adaptation for 
distributed cognitive networks .Journal of Physiology -  Paris, 101: 214-222.
Markos, Anton; Svorcovä, Jana 2009. Recorded versus organic memory: Interaction 
of two worlds as demonstrated by chromatin dynamics. Biosemiotics 2(2): 131-150.
Stuart, Susan 2011. Enkinaesthesia: The essential sensuous background for co­
agency. In: Radman, Zdravko (ed.), Knowing Without Thinking: Mind, Action, Cog­
nition and the Phenomenon of the Background. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tonnessen, Morten 2009. On contrapuntuality. Semiotic niche vs. ontological niche: 
the case of the Scandinavian wolf population. Paper presented at the 9th Gathering in 
Biosemiotics, Prague.
Periphrasis and paraphrasis in cellular regulatory 
pathways
FATIMA CVRCKOVÄ
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
hi language studies, the term “periphrasis” may mean two different things. 
For a linguist, periphrasis is a grammatical device, i.e. using several words for 
something expressed by a single word in another language (usually through 
inflection). The English phrase “I will come” always means the same as 
Czech “prijdu”. However, periphrasis is also a synonym of circumlocution -  a
178 Main Programme
figure of speech where meaning is expressed by alternative, roundabout or 
ambiguous means, i.e. a form of paraphrasis. Some euphemisms, or ingenious 
constructions produced by non-native speakers, are a good example.
Cellular signalling and regulatory pathways investigated by molecular 
biology could be metaphorically described as “the language of life”, and 
molecular biology itself might thus be understood as a linguistic discipline of 
a kind. Similar to comparative linguistics, phylogenetic analyses reconstruct 
ancestral pathways and their evolutionary histories. Surprisingly, also in the 
world of cellular signalling, phenomena reminiscent of periphrasis, or at least 
paraphrasis, are found. This can be illustrated e.g. on examples of various 
aspects of regulation of eukaryotic cell polarity, in particular the structure 
and dynamics of the actin cytoskeleton and its connection to small GTPase 
signalling.
I suggest that such cases are analogous not only to periphrasis in the 
grammatical sense, but also to genuine circumlocution or paraphrasis, whose 
understanding (not only by humans, but also by the cells themselves) is 
necessarily context-, history- and experience-dependent. Observed con­
sequences of experimental introduction of genes into unnatural biological 
contexts (i.e. heterologous or ectopic gene expression) may provide support 
for this interpretation.
Overcoming the tragedy of the commune in the Hawk- 
Dove game through conventional coding
JOACHIM DE BEULE
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Two more or less diametrical approaches to understanding life and evolution 
have existed since the field of theoretical biology was established (Kull 
2000). The “phylogenetic” view proposes that evolution essentially reduces 
to differential reproduction and selection (Dawkins 1976). The “ontogenetic” 
view reserves a place for development which, although influenced by the 
genome, also depends on context and on processes of “self-organization”, 
“coding” and “signification” (Kauffman 1993; Kull et al. 2009; Barbieri 1985). 
In order to make progress, what is needed is a more general theory that can 
accommodate both views. Such a theory should not dismiss the results and 
methods from either “camp”, but rather relate them and show how they can 
fit together.
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One claim from biosemiotics that goes directly to the heart of the 
issue is that the mechanism of natural selection alone cannot explain all of 
evolution, but rather should be complemented by a mechanism for natural 
conventionalization (Barbieri 2008; De Beule 2012). The first mechanism 
accounts for the gradual transformation of existing species through differential 
reproduction and the second for the origin and fixation of absolute novelties at 
higher levels of organization in so called “major” or “metasystem” transitions 
(Maynard-Smith, Eörs 1995; Turchin 1977). In this paper, I show how this 
claim from the ontogenetic “camp” can be studied within the framework of 
evolutionary game theory -  a prototype theory of the phylogenetic “camp”.
Concretely, I focus on the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith, Price 
1973) and show how the “tragedy of the commune” (Doebeli et a l  2004) can 
be overcome by so called “coders”, that is, by agents or players that have the 
capacity to code. This capacity is defined as the capacity to learn and exploit 
new, arbitrary connections between signals and meanings (percepts and 
actions), and it allows a population of coders to establish new conventional 
codes and increase their selective advantage as a species. Crucially, it is the 
interplay between evolution by natural selection and evolution by natural 
conventionalization that determines the outcome of evolution in total. Without 
differential reproduction, that is, even without population turnover, evolution 
stops and no conventionalization takes place. On the other hand, without 
conventionalization, no coordination takes place and no major or metalevel 
transitions can occur.
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Information in biological individuation
YAGMUR DENIZHAN 
Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey
Claude Shannons definition of information as “the amount of uncertainty 
eliminated by a message” has not only constituted the basis of the contempo­
rary communication and computation technologies but has also shaped 
the dominant scientific and philosophical perspectives of the modern age. 
However, its technological success and consequent popularity are accom­
panied by an increasing criticism evoked by its overtly reductionist nature.
At a closer look, we believe that such a conception of information is re­
ductionist in a two-fold manner. First and quite obviously, it reduces the 
concept to the amount of uncertainty, i.e. a quantitative measure which ignores 
meaning and signification altogether, as has been pointed out repeatedly by 
many thinkers ever since Shannon formulated his definition. Yet a second 
point is latent in the fact that it reduces the aforementioned uncertainty 
to a probabilistic measure, a move that can easily escape the attention 
of a 21st century reader whose understanding has been shaped by this very 
reduction itself.
As a matter of fact, the inherent reductionism of this definition creates 
an incompatibility between the concepts of “information” and “system” just 
the opposite of which is actually needed for a philosophically sound theory
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capable of accounting for biological organisation that is the ultimate example 
of a “system”. The aim of this contribution is to search for an alternative onto­
genetic framework and a semiotic conception of information within the theory 
of individuation proposed by the Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989).
Sign concept adequacy in DNA and 
protein synthesis grammars
DAN FALTYNEK
Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic
In this paper I compare the specific DNA or protein synthesis grammars, and 
biosemiotic sign concepts that imply some type of grammar -  I focus on the 
work of Edward Trifonov, Sungchul Ji, Luigi Luca Cavalii-Sforza, Marcello 
Barbieri, Jesper Hoffmeyer, David B. Searls, etc. I show how these concepts are 
different in the expression level modelling. I proceed from the schematic of R. 
Jakobsons model, with analogues between linguistic levels and parts of DNA 
and proteins (see, for example, Katz 2008), and I show how the other authors 
transform this notion. Similarly, I proceed on the plane of meaning - 1 outline 
how the concept of meaning moves from a string (which functions as a part of 
sign, the relationship of DNA-RNA, DNA and amino acids, etc.) or reaction 
controlled by gene expression to the behavioural response of the organism. In 
conclusion, I selectively formulate the necessary properties of a process that 
is understood as a semiosis -  such as arbitrariness (primary semiotic concept 
of the DNA code), or linearity. From these fundamental properties it is clear 
how it is possible to set down the second articulation plane of DNA/protein 
synthesis situated in the triplet level, of which the combination of the bases is 
a distinctive feature. From this trivial point, it is always necessary to proceed 
with construction grammar of DNA/protein synthesis -  no grammar of DNA 
or protein synthesis, however, works with this assumption.
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Acoustic patterns of the Red-billed Leiothrix 
(Leiothrix lutea), an invasive species 
in the Mediterranean scrublands
ALMO FARINA 
University of Urbino, Italy
In the Mediterranean basin the high number of exotic birds is probably largely 
favoured by the human regime of disturbance, but the “behavioural flexibility” 
associated with brain size and foraging innovation seems to be the major 
determinant for their successful settlement. Red-billed Leiothrix (Leiothrix 
lutea), a species native of Southeast Asia, southern China and the Himalayan 
regions of India is actually found in different parts of Mediterranean Europe 
with locally restricted but stable populations.
The reason of its success is not only due to the environmental conditions 
(favourable climate and vegetation), but a relevant portion of this success 
may be attributed to its acoustic loudness that could represent an efficient 
trait to reduce interspecific competition. The acoustic pattern of this species 
throughout the year has been compared in a Mediterranean scrubland with 
the acoustic performance of the native birds using the Acoustic Complexity 
Index (ACI) coupled to an aural species-specific identification. The results 
demonstrate that about half of the acoustic information produced by the 
entire bird assemblage belongs to the Red-billed Leiothrix, a species that 
is acoustically active all year around, and also in July and August when 
native song-birds are silent. Most likely the acoustic novelty of this species 
has a differentiated impact on the native bird assemblage, although further 
experimental evidence is prudentially requested.
Including absence
DONALD FAVAREAU
National University of Singapore, Singapore
The centrality of the relation ‘not’ to the action of biosemiosis was perhaps 
most explicitly first articulated in Gregory Batesons 1955 paper examining 
primate communication, “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” (Bateson 1972:138— 
148), which is cited early in Jesper Hoffmeyer s Signs of Meaning in the Universe 
(1996) as presenting a fundamental conceptual challenge to modern biology:
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i.e. how are we to account for the fact that the only way that any living system 
can possibly act intelligently in the world is to rely upon a system wherein 
certain things can only be effectively acted upon by using them as if they were 
precisely what they are not. Sign vehicles, by definition, are not themselves the 
things that they signify -  and, likewise, that which is signified by a sign vehicle 
cannot be coextensive with it in its action as a sign.
Yet while this understanding of the sign relation goes all the way back to 
antiquity (and is implicit in the proto-biosemiotics of Uexküll and Peirce as 
well) bothjohn Deely’s 2007 Intentionality and Semiotics and Terrence Deacon’s
2011 Incomplete Nature have recently advanced forceful new arguments about 
the ineliminable and generative nature of “what is not” upon “what is”... and 
why “what is known” must, perforce, partake of both these kinds of being. 
As Deacon and Deely can be thought to be presiding, Janus-like, over a new 
pathway for the investigation of the roles of signs in life -  yet are disciplinarily 
positioned such that neither is looking at what the other one is seeing -  this 
talk will attempt a synthesis of Deelyean and Deaconian ideas about the 
semiotic fundament of “absence” for the analyses of biosemiotics.
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Semiosis and phase transitions in biology: 
The place of biosemiotics within a genuinely evolutionary 
conception of nature
ELISEO FERNÄNDEZ
Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology Kansas City USA
Ever since Darwin and Wallace the idea of evolution has been the leading 
unifying factor in biological theorizing, acting in cooperation w7ith other key 
conceptual strands imported from thermodynamics, genetics and molecular 
biology. Physics, whose explanatory resources underpin those of the special 
sciences, has in the main remained impervious to evolutionary thought since 
its seventeenth century rise up to quite recently. The thoroughly ahistorical 
conception of nature promoted by traditional physics conspired, together 
with some philosophical preconceptions, against any conceptual unification 
with biology other than strict reductionism.
This article aims at showing that new developments in both physics and 
biology offer prospects for a reversal of this situation through a non-reductive 
unification of physical and biological theories within a truly evolutionary 
natural philosophy, including cosmology. In contrast to the present situation, 
there are reasons to expect that such upcoming synthesis will turn out 
auspicious to the incorporation of biosemiotic ideas as central explanatory 
resources.
To spell out these reasons I offer first a brief summary account of some 
remarkable developments in cosmology, particle physics, condensed matter 
physics, and biology, all of them related to the notions of symmetry breaking, 
phase transitions and scale invariance. I then indicate how these trends merge 
with the rise of novel forms of causation (e.g. circular, downward, reciprocal) 
in systems biology and self-organization theories. Finally I speculate on how 
the characteristic form of causation in biosemiotic transactions (semiosis) 
interlocks with those other types of causal relations in living systems.
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Modelling artificial cognition in biosemiotic terms
MARIA ISABEL ALDINHAS FERREIRA, MIGUEL CALDAS 
University of Lisbon, and Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal
Cognition is the capability of every natural or artificial system to evolve in a 
specific environment, exhibiting what is commonly designated as intelligent 
behaviour, i.e. adequate responsiveness.
This adequacy of response comprises the capacity to individuate and 
identify typical environmental features and to react accordingly. But successful 
responsiveness also involves the systems capacity of intervening on that 
same environment, creating the most favourable contexts or the capacity of 
producing new responses when the parameters that define the typical context 
change. In other words, intelligence could be defined as the ability to act 
appropriately in an uncertain environment.
In natural systems, intelligence grows over the lifetime of the individual 
through maturation and learning. Acknowledging this fact is fundamental to a 
full understanding of the dynamics of the binomium living entity/environment 
and it is crucial when aiming at the creation of autonomous artificial entities. 
A deeper understanding of truly situated autonomous systems can be gained 
by realizing that the concepts of semiosis and umwelt are at the core of the 
general process of cognition.
Equating these essential biosemiotic concepts with fundamental principles 
in Autonomous Systems Research, we attempt to show their close inter­
dependency and contribute to the definition of a common theoretical frame­
work capable of providing the grounding to a global approach that encompasses 
and explains both biological and machine intelligent instantiations.
Distributed cognition and the problem of impaired social 
and biological coordination: A reflection 
on the comatose patient-physician communication
LUC IAN A GARBAYO 
University of Texas at El Paso, USA
This paper enquires into how cognition, while at once non-local and physical, 
can be socially coordinated as physicians carry out the medical evaluation of
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comatose patients. Accordingly I first present and discuss the literature on 
the problem of comatose patient communication from the biosemiotic and 
enactivist perspectives. In so doing, I focus on ( l )  the problem of patient- 
physician co-action and (2) the problem of understanding communicative 
uncertainty in biosocially restricted settings from the ecological point of view. 
In our analysis, we take Andy Clark’s principle of ecological assembly (2008) 
to offer a relevant theoretical basis for modelling the brain ecologically, 
as it presents brains as opportunistic controllers seeking cognitive and 
physical routines as a type of “ecological control”, through the generalized 
recruitment of problem-solving resources. Such a principle allows us to 
model the ecological defective controlling efforts of the comatose brain, with 
limited and unsatisfactory outcomes. Finally, I consider ways to redesign the 
communicative environment in order to generate scaffolding strategies that 
heighten communicative signalling and that facilitate ecological control for 
comatose patients in ways that can inform sound medical decision-making.
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First logical steps to a theory of biosemiotic evolution
SEBASTIAN GAUB
Kaiserslautern University of Technology, Germany
In paragraph 65 of the Critique o f Judgem ent, Immanuel Kant postulated 
a non-mechanistic type of causality. Developed by Charles S. Peirce, the 
logical triad provides a solution to that postulated type of logic. Using the 
geometric triangle, one can argue plausibly that enzymatic reactions have to 
be formulated as a logical triad. The analysis of this logical structure shows 
that it overcomes problems of biophysical notations and allows for a holistic 
view of the enzymatic reaction.
Additionally, the logical triad can also be used to illustrate the semiotic 
character of biological systems, such as long-term potentiation or immu­
nological memory. Specificity and storage capability of these systems can 
consequently be derived as a property of the basal semiosis. However, 
the characteristics of a single logical triad are not sufficient to describe the
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dynamics of such systems. In accordance with Peirce the biological signs must 
be embedded in a more complex context of meaning.
Such an expanded semiotic system can be applied to describe the basic 
relationships between genome, transcriptome and proteome. As a first con­
sequence, one has to predict the direct mediation between genome and 
proteome. In accordance with recent findings in epigenetics and molecular 
genomics, the semiotic model shows logical deficits of previous interpretations 
of cellular dynamics. To solve these problems, biosemiotics can predict the 
existence of non-genetic factors of evolution and the existence of epigenetic 
learning processes. Therefore, evolution can be interpreted as the development 
of semiotically organized systems.
The egg as a semiotic gateway to reproduction: 
Digital and analogical communication 
in the oocyte-egg-zygote transition
FRANCO GIORGI, LOUIS GOLDBERG, LUIS EMILIO BRUNI 
Aalborg University, Ballerup, Denmark
Eggs -  not “just” genomes -  provide the means by which individuals of sub­
sequent generations of complex, multicellular organisms are genetically and 
historically linked in time. Sexual reproduction begins with the development 
in the mother’s body of a single cell, the oocyte. From this single maternal cell, 
a fully grown individual will eventually emerge as a qualitative equivalent of 
parental organisms.
The so-called “self-description” of the fertilized egg does not lie exclusively 
in the zygote’s genome. This self-description is gradually unfolded through the 
interplay between a digitalized genomic memory and the analogical memory 
stored in the historical structural organization of the ooplasm -  of which the 
topological distribution of mRNAs is of fundamental importance.
When approaching the question of sexual reproduction in these terms 
there are two major concerns that need to be addressed. First, how the self­
description gets to be structurally organized in the oocyte, and second, how 
this self-description is eventually communicated and interpreted throughout 
the oocyte-egg-zygote transition.
As we will show, in this crucial biological process the analogical mode 
of communication is of primary importance. We examine the maternally
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controlled generation of patterns in the oocyte-egg transition -  and their 
meaningfulness during zygotic genome expression -  in terms of code duality 
and digital-analogical consensus, i.e. the dialectic process characterized by 
the unfolding of hierarchical instances of coding and de-coding based on the 
interplay of digital and analogical modes of communication.
Sense as biological category
ELENA GOROKHOVSKAYA
S. I. Vavilov Institute for the History of Science and
Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
In my view, the conceptual apparatus of biosemiotics must include a special 
category of meaning as sense, which has to be one of the key categories in the 
foundations of biology. My understanding of sense is a version of semantic 
realism, where sense is treated as a real entity that exists independently of the 
sign and its user. Hereinafter this category is referred to as “smysl” (transliteration 
of meaning as sense in Russian). The smysls precede biosemiosis. They generate 
biosemiotic processes and manage them.
The smysls under consideration are not set by signs; they are only semantic 
(integral) by their nature. That is why they do not correspond to the ideas 
of sense that are presented in the main semiotic conceptions, such as Freges 
concept of the sense (S in n ) of a sign which is different from its referent 
( B ed eu tung) (Frege 1892). Although the smysl is a particular type of reality, it 
is not the object which is related to the sign as in Ch. Peirce’s conception.
At the present stage of my study, I avoid providing a direct definition of 
the smysl. Instead I prefer to set it operationally in terms of its function in a 
hierarchical system, where the smysls occupy the highest level, and below are 
the proper levels of biosemiotic processes and entities. The smysls are entities 
with which an agent (ranging from a cell up to an ecosystem) interacts. The 
agent and its functioning has two sides: integral semantic but not semiotic, 
and structural biosemiotic. The interaction of the agent with the smysl is a non- 
semiotic process that occurs without the sign as its mediator. This interaction 
begets biosemiotic processes and relations. Its results can relate to what J. von 
Uexküll figuratively called “the creative melody” or “the germ of meaning” 
(B edeutungskeim ) (Uexküll 1940). The smysl is the source of this germ. Such 
an interaction articulates the results of its non-semiotic activity, implementing 
the transition to biosemiotic processes: to molecular biological processes in
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the cell, for example. Along with the fundamental level of interaction, animals 
and human beings have a secondary level of thinking which is a consequence 
of the fundamental one. In this level the mental images-signs occur.
Although the smysls are non-semiotic, I think it is possible to denote them 
by biological concepts (e.g. “heredity”, “development”, “communication” 
“creation of antibodies”, etc.), just as J. von Uexküll by necessity labelled 
components of animal umwelt by means of human umwelt s language.
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Explanatory reductionism
LUKÄŠ HADWIGER ZÄMECNIK 
Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic
This project aims to demonstrate the difficulty of conceptualizing the relation­
ship of explanatory reductionism between various scientific disciplines. The 
problem of the physical causal explanation of phenomena in supervenient 
disciplines (e.g. biology, psychology) is viewed in the context of the philosophy 
of mind. There is an on-going discussion among many philosophers of 
mind, often focussed on the pre-eminence of physicalism, a conception that 
critically emphasises the physical explanation of the traditional problem of 
the relationship between body and mind.
This paper has three parts:
Part I. Nonreductive physicalism and Jaegwon Kim’s critique of this con­
ception.
Section 1. Summarises the basic theses upheld by some authors (Fodor, 
Putnam et al.) in the effort to sustain nonreductive physicalism -  a con­
ception that acknowledges the monistic claims of physicalism yet also postu­
lates the nonreductive nature of mental states.
Section 2. Introduces Kim’s critique of this approach which displays an 
interesting parallel between emergentism and nonreductive physicalism.
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Analysis of Pepper-Kim’s dilemma reveals the fundamental contradiction 
between upward determination and downward causation.
Part II. Kim’s conception of slightly defective physicalism.
Section 1. Sketches Burge’s arguments based on anti-individualism, 
demonstrating the tenuousness of physicalism.
Section 2. Introduces Kim’s conception of slightly defective physicalism 
which claims that, excepting the internal properties of subjective phenomenal 
mental states, all mental states are physically reducible.
Part III. The author’s defence of physicalism and a general universal con­
ception of physical causal explanation.
Section 1. Demonstrates that the prerequisite for the functional reduction 
of subjective phenomenal states is fulfilled.
Section 2. Upholds that the dilemma of epiphenomenalism and reductio­
nism is generally valid for the relationship between scientific disciplines (e.g. 
physics and biology; biology and psychology).
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The semiotics of human nature
JESPER HOFFMEYER 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
The number of stupidities spread by scientists on human nature is infinite. But 
as Mary Midgley has once remarked: “If we were to veto every science that 
has some lunatic exponents, we could quickly empty the libraries” (Midgley 
1995: 5). When approaching the question ofhuman nature from a biosemiotic 
view the first thing to be asked is whether the concept of human nature is 
meaningful at all. Again it might be wise to follow Midgley (1995: 76): “What 
is natural, in fact, is never just a condition or activity -  inquiry, say, or space 
around one, or sexual activity, or playing with children -  but a certain level, 
of that activity, proportionate to the rest of one’s life”. Biosemiotics seems 
excellently equipped to manage such a diffuse concept of human nature, 
since its basic unit, the sign, cannot be contained inside either a biological or 
a social frame. Semiosis painlessly bridges genomic, somatic, developmental 
and social dimensions ofhuman life.
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Modelling the cell as a formal system that writes 
its own production rules
JAN-HENDRIK SERVAAS HOFMEYR 
University of Stellenbosch, South Africa
This contribution describes the outlines of a formal model of the living cell 
that incorporates three features that are generally accepted as necessary for 
life: a functional organisation that ensures self-fabrication, a molecular form
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of self-representation that can be copied, and an organic coding system that 
decodes the self-representation. Existing models of the cell, such as Rosen’s 
metabolism-repair system with its associated concept of closure to efficient 
causation, the autopoietic model with operational closure of Maturana and 
Varela, Von Neumann’s kinematic self-reproducing automata, and Pattee’s 
semantic closure address only one or at most two of these features.
A formal system in mathematics consists of a set of axioms from which a 
set of production rules produce theorems (propositions, inferences). Such a 
formal system could model cellular metabolism if axioms are mapped onto 
nutrients, theorems onto metabolites, and production rules onto enzymes 
(the efficient causes of the cell). Closure to efficient causation then requires 
the formal system to have the ability to write its own production rules, which 
in turn requires an internal representation of these rules and a mechanism 
for decoding and copying it. The implementation that I shall present has an 
internal logic that requires of the formal system to have features that map onto 
phenomena such as protein folding and unassisted self-assembly, which I have 
previously argued are what makes life as we know it possible.
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A qualitative-semiotic conception 
of spatial configuration
TIM IRELAND
University College London and DeMontford University, United Kingdom
The concept of space is vague. It is a real live thing in our ontology, but whilst 
‘space’ is a property of the world, it cannot be rationalised in the same way 
that an object can. Physical space is not in physical space, it is not an object 
(Latour 2012). Alternatively, it is claimed that space is "a concrete thing 
with shape and structure” (Nerlich 1994: 10). Space is thus conceived as a 
container: a topological perception in which wholes are determined through 
connection and the relations between points, distinguishing a whole as 
separate from what surrounds it. It is perhaps the most common approach to 
thinking about and organising space, but space has mereological properties 
too. A mereotopological perspective therefore enables us to think and reason 
qualitatively about spatial configuration (Cohn, Gooday, Bennett and Gotts 
1997). From an architectural perspective it enables a formal ontological 
conception of the way in which a configuration may be effected through 
agency and function.
Graham Nerlich states that ‘what realists see as central to a relationist 
view of space’ is the question: "what is required fo r  a spatial relation to hold? 
(Nerlich 1994: 18). On the premise that no relation is static, but unfolding 
and changeable, the premise of this study is that a sign is required; understood 
as a qualitative relation between an entity and an object of attraction. The 
ensuing action effects change, which feeds back, effecting subsequent 
actions. A generative process of adaptation and configuration, effected by the 
structural coupling between an entity and its environment. Looking at bio­
logical systems through a semiotic lens (Hoffmeyer 1996, 2008; Favareau 
2010), the spatial salience of an entity-in-its-environment is translated into 
a methodology for spatial configuration. The notion of space as something 
created through action and being is translated into a property which may 
be utilised creatively. Drawing on artificial life as a way of modelling natural 
processes, the making of patterns is replicated into a pattern-maker. In this way 
the low-dimensionality of space is utilised to approach architectural problems 
as complex dynamical systems to generate a semiotic body (Hoffmeyer 1994). 
Rather than flattening problems into something quantifiable, the constraints 
which make space productive can be manipulated and steered.
A model of spatial configuration is presented, based upon a general theory 
of niche dynamics (Smith, Varzi 2002). An entity occupying a region of space
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is defined by a boundary that distinguishes it from its environment. Perceived 
as a regulating device, through which information is conveyed between internal 
and external conditions (Hoffmeyer 2008; Smith, Varzi 2002; Ashby 1957). 
The boundary defines a structural composition. This differential condition is 
conceived as a niche, a region of space which is effected through differences. 
Agency between niches creates neighbourhoods and amalgamations effected 
through functional intercourse. The model presented consists of a collection 
of niches (causally relevant spatial forms) which self-organise to aggregate 
in a cell-like manner; an approach to architectural spatial formation which 
integrates the perception of user inhabitation (Barker 1968; Hall 1966) and 
the built environment (Hillier, Hanson 1984; Bollnow 20 1 1) with underlying 
processes of biological conformation (Camazine et al. 2001; Hemelrijk2005).
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Felids, their coat patterns, camouflage and signs
FILIP JAROŠ
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
The aim of the paper is to discuss if and to what extent findings of leading 
(Darwinian) biological approaches, such as ethology and behavioural eco­
logy, could be transferred to the concepts of biosemiotics and vice versa. 
Thoughts will be illustrated on the empirical material from the ecology and 
morphology of felids. The work is driven by an ambition to develop a more 
complex biological theory of camouflage, enriched by semiotic insights into 
the topic (e.g. Maran 2011). Classical theoretical accounts of the theory 
of crypsis (Endler 1978) are based on the evaluation of the properties of a 
predator, prey, and environment. Each object of this triangle is classified by 
measurable qualities that have the undesirable effect of omitting the highly 
specific perceptual world of individual participants (umwelt). There is a need 
to assess Dawkins’ vision of extended phenotype by biosemiotic interest in the 
active role of individual organisms. Finally, we will meet a challenge of felids 
displaying “signs without a receiver” and discuss the strengths and pitfalls of 
Portmann’s aesthetic morphology (Portmann I960).
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Arbitrariness of signs and the cell force 
as the complementary aspects of cell language
SUNGCHULJI
Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA
Cells communicate with one another using a molecular language which is iso­
morphic with the human language (Ji 1997). Communication is synonymous 
with information transmission in space and time, and Shannon’s channel capacity 
equation indicates that no communication is possible without dissipating free 
energy. Thus information and energy are the two indispensable ingredients for 
communication both within and between cells. Ih e analysis of the whole-cell 
RNA metabolic data measured with DNA microarrays from budding yeast 
undergoing glucose-galactose shift (Garcia-Martinez et al. 2004) has revealed 
two major findings: (i) the genotype-phenotype coupling is quasi-deterministic 
(reminiscent of the principle of the arbitrariness o f signs in linguistics), and (ii) 
the whole-cell RNA metabolic kinetic data fit a 4-parameter mathematical 
equation (called blackbody radiation-like equation, BRE) which is of the same 
form as the blackbody radiation formula discovered by Max Planck in 1900. It 
is suggested here that the first finding is related to the informational aspect and 
the second finding to the energetic aspect of the cell language.
It was quite surprising to find that BRE also fit data from (a) single-molecule 
enzymic activity and (b) protein folding. An analysis of the various sets of 
the BRE parameters in a parameter space revealed that blackbody radiation, 
single-molecule enzyme catalysis, and protein folding processes follow a 
common trajectory, while the whole-cell RNA metabolism deviates from it. 
One interpretation of this finding is that, although the molecular interactions 
underlying blackbody radiation, single-molecule enzyme activity and protein 
folding are mediated by the electromagnetic force, those in whole-cell RNA 
metabolism implicate, in addition, another force intrinsic to the cell -  the 
cell force. Thus, the DNA microarray technique invented in the mid-1990s 
has produced the whole-cell metabolic data that appear to provide the first 
quantitative evidence for the information-energy dual requirement for the
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cell language -  arbitrariness o f signs which maximizes the rate of information 
transmission ( j i  1997), and the cell fo rce  which organizes cell metabolism 
guided by the genetic information stored in DNA (Ji 2012).
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Seeing each other: An international comparison 
of the eye colour effect on perception of trustworthiness, 
dominance and attractiveness
KAREL KLEISNER
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
Eyes are usually considered as an organ of visual perception -  sight. In our 
study, we approach the human eyes as semantic organs to which different 
meanings can be attributed. The photos of 120 Czech people were presented to 
Estonian and Czech raters, who were asked to judge them for trustworthiness, 
attractiveness and dominance in a seven point scale. We did not report 
any effects of eye colour on attractiveness and dominance attribution in 
either Czech or Estonian samples. Nevertheless, we found a significant effect 
of eye colour on judgment of trustworthiness by Czech raters. Brown eyed 
people were rated as more trustworthy than their blue eyed peers. Interestingly, 
when the same photos were rated by Estonians, the opposite effect was present. 
Moreover, we found some imprinting-like effects, i.e. the preference of a 
particular eye colour was dependent on the eye colour of parents or mating 
partner. Based on our results, we briefly summarize the knowledge about 
the effect of eye colour on the attribution of various psychological factors, 
temperament, and behaviour. The evolutionary consequences of variation in 
the iris colour of Europeans are further discussed.
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Modelling of semiosis: Juri Lotman’s legacy
KALEVI KULL 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Juri Lotman (1922-1993) established the Tartu (and Tartu-Moscow) school 
of semiotics in the 1960s. In addition to his pioneering work in semiotics of 
culture, he developed the theory of general semiotics. We attempt to extract 
some principles from Juri Lotman’s formulations that characterize the core 
aspects of semiosis (see also Lotman 1990; Favareau 2010; Kull 1999). These 
include: ( l )  the principle of code plurality (that one code is insufficient 
for semiosis, at least two codes are necessary for it; that semiotic dualism 
is the minimal form of organisation of a working semiotic system); (2) the 
principle of incompatibility, or nontranslatability (that meaning-making 
requires an incompatibility of codes; the incompatibility is the source of 
indeterminacy, non-predictability, and semiotic freedom); (3) the principle 
of autocommunication, or translation (that autocommunication is the most 
general form of communication, it must be present for sign interpretation; 
autocommunication underlies the ability to qualitatively restructure and 
translate; the primacy of autocommunication is also assumed by Jakob von 
Uexküll); (4) the principle of semiotic inheritance (that every sign comes from 
another sign; this is a version of Redi’s rule); (5 ) the principle of semiosphere 
(or the principle of the relationality of semiotic systems -  that semiotic space 
may be regarded as a unified mechanism; semiosis cannot exist outside of the 
semiosphere); (6) the principle of non-gradual evolution (in the development 
of a semiosic system, explosive or disrupted and continuous or orthogenetic 
processes alternate and co-occur); (7) the principle of modelling (semiotic 
systems are themselves modelling systems).
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The body in the mark: The distribution of cognition 
in early inscribing
LESLEY LANCASTER
Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom
There is a prevailing stance in much educational thinking that childrens early 
cognition of inscriptional systems is primordially a solitary, mental process 
(Brown et al. 1989), with learning involving the accumulation of knowledge 
over time. However, although there is only a small body of research that 
looks at the processes involved in the earliest understandings of inscriptional 
systems, this suggests that such individualist accounts cannot be sustained 
by the evidence. Kress calls for a more generous understanding of cognition 
(Kress 1997: xviii), and one that can account for how the very youngest 
children are able to engage in complex forms of sign making, in which they act 
independently in diverse, representational environments.
This paper will discuss the findings of one project (Lancaster, Roberts 
2006) that investigated systems used by children under three to represent 
features of their experiential world by means of graphic marks. It found they 
were always intentional in their mark-making, producing meaningful signs 
long before they could understand conventional notations, and this was 
integrally linked to interactive sequences involving adult and child participants, 
effecting a distribution of intellectual work between participants, actions, 
objects, environments and events. Linguistic and bodily communication, the 
recapitulation of shared histories, and joint manipulation of tools, objects, 
and physical environments were often incorporated into the meaning and the 
material structure of childrens signs.
200 M ain Programme
The focus in this presentation will be on sections of data that show how 
difficulties presented by the representation of action and movement in a 
spatial, graphic medium are resolved through gestural and bodily enactment.
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The semiotic challenges of the guide dog and 
blind person team
RIIN MAGNUS 
University of Tartu, Estonia
The interspecific and multimodal exchange of signs that grounds the coope­
ration of the guide dog and blind person provides rich and valuable material 
for semiotic research. It is thus not by chance that one of the first applications 
of biosemiotic theories was in guide dog training (Uexküll, Sarris 1931; Sarris 
1935). Ih e  current study aims to demonstrate the semiotic side of the post­
training interactions between the guide-dog and guide-dog user.
Based on participatory observation and interviews with guide dog owners 
in Estonia, Germany and a few other countries, I will distinguish between three 
main types of challenges that the guide dog and blind person teams face when 
orienting in the city. Perceptual challenges are faced if the perceptual capacities 
of the team do not meet the affordances of the infrastructural and architectural 
planning of the city. Symbolic challenges come from cultural traditions,, social 
attitudes and legal regulations concerning animals, the status of dogs among 
animals, distinctions between different functions and roles animals may play in 
human life. The social consideration of the variety of disabilities belongs here 
as well. Communicative challenges are met if the meaning of what is perceived is 
to be passed on to the other member of the team and interpreted adequately by 
the other. The real time work of the team demonstrates how the three types of 
challenges come to influence one another -  e.g., the merely symbolic regulations
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may at a certain point be turned into material obstructions, the dog may start 
to ignore perceptual signs if its host does not respond to the dogs attempts to 
communicate those. Proceeding from this, I would like to claim that an attentive 
and flexible combination of different types of semiosis can be considered as one 
of the keys to successful cooperation between the guide dog and its blind host.
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Evolition: A reassessment of Rothschild’s biosemiotics
KATYA M AND OKI
Universidad Autönoma Metropolitana, Mexico D.F., Mexico
Evolution by random variation and selective retention enables progressive 
differentiation that challenges the second law of thermodynamics in what 
Schrödinger defined as “negentropic processes”. We search for a single 
consistent and complete paradigm, so whenever trapped in contradictions or 
anomalies such as this one, it seems tempting to recruit the idea of God as 
the great solver of all riddles. Newton made this move regarding the origin 
of planetary motion, which nevertheless did not compromise the accuracy of 
classical mechanics’ three laws of motion and universal gravitation.
Among those who departed from science and appealed to theological 
principles for explaining problematic aspects of evolution we can mention 
Alfred Russell Wallace, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Ludwig Klages, Gregory 
Bateson, Stuart Kauffman, Jakob von Uexküll, and Humberto Maturana. In 
this paper we will consider the case of Friedrich S. Rothschild, a neurologist 
and psychiatrist of scientific and humanistic scholarship who co-founded the 
discipline of biosemiotics. Rothschild not only appealed to but developed a 
theological perspective of evolution as inner adaptation within transcendental 
subjectivity to an omnipotent and omniscient God.
The problem with this idea is that it does not solve any riddle at all but 
rather cancels the possibility of even formulating it. Moreover, the mystery of 
subjectivity itself is overwhelming enough to further attempt accounting for
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a transcendental one. More modestly we may, on the contrary, try to reassess 
the evolutionary process but from an inverse, secular approach by considering 
instead the infinitely minute and free agency of each creature at any scale in its 
determination to five and reproduce. As a deliberate act of will and purpose at 
each crossroad of evolution, we may denote it as “evolition”.
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Are ecological codes archetypal structures?
TIMOMARAN 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Developing an ecological perspective is both a big challenge and a necessity 
for biosemiotics. In the present paper I examine the concept of ecological 
code (Kull 2010) by asking wThat its properties and functioning could be. My 
initial suggestion is that codes on the ecosystem level behave very differently 
than codes regulating human communication or any other intraspecific 
communication. I suggest three initial characteristics of ecological codes:
1. Ecological codes are distributed and open. Ecological conventions 
involve different species that have different perceptual organs, umwelten, 
and different ways of attachment to the environment. Therefore, no 
single individual or species has fu ll perception o f  an ecological code. Instead, 
ecological code forms as the sum of memories and experiences of 
corresponding perceptions.
2. Ecological code is built upon and incorporates the consistencies, 
constraints and habits existing in a particular ecological community. 
Ecological code rests on indexical relations (cf. indices in Maynard 
Smith, Harper 1995: 306) and also uses habitual semiosis, behaviour 
and action of animals (cf. semethic interactions in Hoffmeyer 2008:
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189). Ecological codes are com m unal and disperse, with regard to both 
living agents and environment.
3. Ecological codes use different memory types (following Jablonka, 
Lamb 2005), that is, ecological codes have both cognitive and non-cognitive 
(or conscious and  unconscious)  aspects. A convention can simultaneously 
depend on different memory types in different organisms that need to 
come into contact for the convention to become effective.
To sum up the three proposed characteristics, ecological codes resemble 
archetypal imagery or patterns -  dispositions in animals to establish certain 
types of meaning relations and to link sign processes with actions in particular 
ways. Abstract mimicry, deimatic displays and semeic body structures 
(Kleisner, Markoš 2005: 218) will be discussed as practical examples of 
ecological codes.
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Hymenomorophism
DANIEL MAYER
National University, San Diego, USA
Surfaces within surfaces, membranes within membranes, layers within layers: 
this is how living beings classify, calculate, parse the world. This suggests 
that sign processes (semiosis) = distinctional calculi. The deep isomorphism
204 M ain Programme
between all instances of layer-produced organization, from societies to cells, 
further suggests that a nascent language of emergence might be named 
hym enom orphism : the membrane-foundations of knowing and the known; 
inquiry into form as emergent through nestings of distinctional processes, 
surfaces, membranes, skins.
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An introduction to the biosemiotic relevance 
of contemporary category theory
LEE MONDSHEIN
Bridgewater State University, Massachusetts, USA
Substantial effort and eloquent calls have been made to promote coherence 
while maintaining diversity within biosemiotic discussions. O f relevance 
to this effort is the history of category theory, a mathematical domain and 
framework that has served as an interdisciplinary Rosetta Stone for 60 years, 
illuminating and inter-relating seemingly disparate issues and discourses in 
logic, geometry, algebra, and theoretical computer science.
This paper discusses past and contemporary concepts and methods 
in category theory, highlighting their relevance to biosemiotic issues of 
self-reference and evolvability. Examples are drawn from both biological 
signalling and computational systems. Mathematical characterizations of 
spatio-temporal patterns of communication and interpretation are explored, 
based on biosemiotic concepts rather than physio-chemical reductionism, in
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a manner that aims to be both substantive and accessible to non-specialists. In 
a rigorous yet visually clear manner, category theory focuses our thinking on 
transformations and relationships among constituent elements, rather than on 
their internal structure or “identity”, revealing patterns shared by apparently 
unrelated phenomena.
Beyond its integrative capacities, the mathematical language of category 
theory may prove particularly valuable in promoting the progress of the bio­
semiotic programme within the larger scientific community.
Communication in zoos and communicative zoo
NELLY MÄEKIVI 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Any semiotic study that has zoological gardens as research objects needs to 
include animal and symbolic levels of communication in order to analyse intra- 
and interspecies communication, as well as interactions with the environment. 
Different aspects of the zoo are interdependent in shaping the zoo environment for 
people and other species. Considering the zoo as a communication environment 
means analysing how environment as medium frames and influences different 
intra- and interspecies communication situations. On the other hand, zoos 
are also communicative, i.e. they are designed to impart messages of nature 
conservation. The zoological garden is thus seen as a place where communication 
takes place but also as a means to communicate messages. Communication 
models applicable to the zoo environment should be able to incorporate this dual 
function of the environment that considers biological ecosemiotics and cultural 
ecosemiotics. At the same time, features that are common to zoos (e.g. restricted 
area, exhibit design principles, reconciliation of people’s wants and animals’ 
needs, relations between natural and artificial, etc.) should be considered as the 
basis for discovering and describing the differences between zoological gardens 
(e.g. species variety, actual exhibit design, means for communicating messages, 
etc.). Ibis presentation tries to combine biological and cultural aspects of the 
zoo, to develop a communication model that would enable the description of 
zoos as places of communication and communicative places.
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Scaling life: Developmental semiotics 
in infancy and beyond
GERALD OSTDIEK
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
This essay argues that the crucible of biosemiotics is found in stored’ 
relations, while the friction of conflicting yet interdependent scales and 
functions supplies the ‘heat’ necessary for the bonding process of semiosis 
to succeed. As Peirce argued and others have since developed, it is heterarchy 
that matters. And semiosis is in the smelting of potential and consequence 
into novel origination and ontologically unique functions and structures that 
defy reduction by crossing multitudes of intertwined and intertwining scales. 
This is found in molecular, developmental, and evolutionary biology as well 
as infant semiosis, human psychology and culture, the function of languaging 
that is the most original feature of our particularly human way of being, and 
the subsequent range of the distribution of agency within both individual 
people and populations of humans.
Ivan Havel’s spatial, temporal, and cognitive scaling offers a means by which 
we re-frame the biosemiotic heterarchy to forge a necessary link between 
S. J. Gould’s heterochrony as well as his use of Adolf Portmanns postnatal 
development, Burton W hite’s developmental psychology, and Colwyn 
Trevarthen’s infant semiosis. All this is inhered within the (now conventional) 
argument that a focus on biological development need not be Lamarckian, 
for development serves as selective phenomena on scales that range from
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molecular to ecological (i.e., from endosemiotic to exosemiotic) -  and back 
again. We conclude by returning to our scale of things, and the Philosophy for 
Children movement, to uncover how it is that grown up’ semiotics depends 
upon a matured persistence of the mannerisms of infant semiosis.
Plant as an actor in reading the landscape
KAROLINA PAUKNEROVA
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
Landscape is studied in various disciplines. Within biosemiotics, landscape 
could be understood as a living system that consists of many elements that 
are organized into a sign system or into a text (cf. definition of biosemiotics in 
Kull 1999: 386). Therefrom a biosemiotic study of landscape could be put as 
reading the text, i.e. reading the landscape.
The concept of landscape as a text has been widely studied and criticized 
within social sciences in the last three decades (e.g. Duncan, Duncan 1988). 
However, it was exclusively used for human reading, in other words for an 
anthrop о centric notion of landscape.
In the poster I will first present the concept of landscape as a text, and after 
that, plants as actors that structure and organize the world that surrounds 
them and this way also act as active readers of the landscape. Two examples of 
spontaneous development of urban green (or sauvagerie urban , see Levesque 
2000; for a general discussion of the concept of wilderness see Oelschlager 
1991) will be discussed: ( l )  the abandoned garden colony in Prague-Jarov 
(the change of social discourse on greenery injarovis discussed in Pauknerovä, 
Gibas, Cizek 2010) and (2) a transient area of field-wood in Prague-Letnany.
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Morris, Sebeok and beyond: From biosemiotics 
to semioethics
SUSAN PETRILLI, AUGUSTO PONZIO 
University of Bari, Italy
Before taking an interest in Jakob von Uexküll and his studies in biology, 
Thomas A. Sebeokhad already found important reflections on the relationship 
between semiotics and biology in Charles Morris (his teacher). In fact, 
biology is central in Morris’s research. This is the case not only in his topical 
book Signs, L anguage and Behavior (1946), but also in his preceding works, 
where biology is not only a theme internal to his research and writing, but also 
appears in the title of some of his texts. But Morris also makes an important 
contribution to the study of values. In this paper we intend to work on the sign- 
value relationship in Morris through the role assigned in semiotics to biology 
not only by Morris himself, but also by Sebeok. In our paper we intend to 
develop a line of research that connects Uexküll, Morris, and Sebeok and leads 
into what we have denominated semioethics.
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Why biosemiotics cannot solve 
the symbol-matter problem
JOHN PICKERING
Warwick University, Coventry, United Kingdom
Human beings have freedom of choice and evolution produces genuine 
novelty. How can this be so if the material world, and thus the human body, is 
really, merely’ insensate mater in inexorable motion? Pattee and Kull (2009) 
suggest that in order to resolve this conundrum, which is also the mind- 
body problem, it is necessary to understand how symbols can control matter.
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Pattee also believes that it is here that biosemiotics will make its enduring 
contribution (ibid .: 329).
This paper will claim that even though Pattee is correct, a deeper under­
standing of the symbol-matter problem will not resolve the mind-body 
problem or the conundrum of freedom and novelty.
This claim will be supported by a comparison with a heroic failure to solve 
the mind-body problem. Humphrey (2000) offered a detailed account of how 
self-awareness may have evolved. He proposed that as nervous systems became 
more complex, sensory-motor circuitry became internalised and detached 
from the sensory world. Clear as this proposal was, it failed to address the 
central issue of qualia. That is, why awareness, of self or of anything, has the 
subjective quality that we know from direct experience. A re-statement of the 
mind-body problem as the symbol-matter problem, however helpful, will 
likewise fail.
Pattee identifies the mind-body problem as just one of four levels of the 
symbol-matter problem (Patte, Kull 2009: 320). This paper will propose that 
it is more fundamental than the other levels. Crucially, it will also propose that 
even if biosemiotics can help to clarify the problem it will remain insoluble 
without a radical change in our understanding of matter itself.
The paper will offer evidence that this change is occurring, using work 
by Whitehead, de Quincey and Goodwin. This change removes the barrier 
between the organic and inorganic domains and marks a fundamental shift in 
Western metaphysics from the mechanistic towards the organic.
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Dicisigns in mimicry
JOÄO QUEIROZ, FREDERIK STJERNFELT, CHARBEL NINO EL-HANI 
Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil; University of Aarhus, Denmark; 
Federal University of Bahia, Brazil
Peirce proposed several typologies of signs, with different degrees of refinement 
and several relationships to one another. Here we are especially interested in 
how Peirce’s extended theory of signs can contribute to the construction of 
models that serve as tools for the investigation of biological mimicry. As a 
corollary to our analysis of firefly signaling (see El-Hani, Queiroz, Stjernfelt 
2010), we analyse the capacity of producing dicent symbols (propositions) as 
a general requisite for a semiotic system to act as a mimic. As it is well known, 
the semiotic processes involved in biological mimicry most often do not 
result from learning processes taking place in the individual semiotic system, 
but from the fine-tuning of inherited capacities by natural selection among 
variants over hundreds to thousands or millions of generations. Still, the 
concrete sign exchange takes place within the lifetime of a single individual, 
and those signals, indicating and describing at the same time, can be conceived 
of as dicent symbols or dicisigns. This calls for an investigation of the Peircean 
notion of the dicisign, which is a generalization of the notion of proposition. 
Peirce’s formulation liberates our treatment of propositions from the confines 
of human language and points to their appearance also in pictures, gestures, 
etc., and, moreover, generalizes propositions from being a human privilege so 
as to also embrace simpler dicisigns found in non-human animals.
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On coding and meaning
JOANNA R4CZASZEK-LEONARDI 
University of Warsaw, Poland
The analogy between DNA and human natural language has been noticed by 
many (see e.g. Jakobson 1971). However, the ability to draw such an analogy 
often rested on the propensity to see both biological and cultural information
212 M ain Programme
systems mainly as “coding systems” in which symbolic structures are seen as 
“standing for” or “mapping” to their meaning. This, in turn, was based on the 
tendency to reify meaning as amenable to static and discrete description (e.g., 
in the case of natural language, a set of semantic features or a set of referents). 
Recently, however, it is increasingly recognized that the most important 
relation in living and linguistic systems is not between two static structures but 
rather between a structure and the dynamical events it controls. The concept of 
“coding” seems insufficient to describe such a relation, and the analogy between 
the informational systems based solely on this concept becomes a difficult one.
I am thus proposing a revival of the careful distinction between the notion 
of “coding” and “meaning”, leaving the first to describe the relation between 
discrete structures, while the second for the description of the relation that 
symbolic structures have with respect to the dynamics of a system. It seems 
that the latter relation is more important as a property of the universal 
language, which could be the basis for the above analogy (Pattee 1985). 
However, an important question is whether both the meaning and the coding 
relation is needed for a system to function as a language. Examples of coding 
and meaning are pointed out in natural language and the audience is invited 
to a) notice a similar distinction in the case of living organisms, and b) ponder 
the possibility or impossibility of reducing one of the relations to the other.
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Inability: A suggestion for a stance concerning 
discourses on animals
SILVER RATTASEPP 
University of Tartu, Estonia
It may be argued -  once necessary demonstration is provided -  that tradi­
tional discourses in the human sciences, and especially in philosophy, are 
characterised by their lack of attention to nonhuman forms of life. A survey
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of the literature on theoretical arguments that introduce a particular species 
of animals, or, more commonly, “animals” as such, gives ample demonstration 
to the fact that this introduction of animals serves purposes which are almost 
entirely disconnected from any actual understanding of the particular ways 
of life of that animal species. A reference to “animals” as such is used to lend 
credence to the importance of the ideas being discussed, to demonstrate 
their uniqueness and relevance by way of a reference to the lack of them in 
nonhuman animals (be it reason, language, consciousness or a nearly endless 
list of such markers of human uniqueness). Moreover, far from being strictly 
limited to this “psychological” (and thus, in most cases, theoretically irrelevant) 
function of introducing animals, animals-as-lacking-something-human also 
figure as a demarcation of “proper” humanity, as a mechanism for segregating, 
delimitating and thereby of defining mankind as such.
Put briefly: theoretical discourse not specifically targeted at understanding 
life’s diversity, but which nevertheless introduces animals into its arguments, is 
not in fact interested in understanding the specificity of diverse animal species 
in any meaningful sense. There are no animals in philosophico-theoretical 
discourse.
With the above in mind, the presentation suggests a particular stance or 
position that should be taken with respect to “animals”, that is, life’s diversity -  
namely, “inability”, of “not being able to”, a sort of conscious step back from 
casual judgments on animals, especially if such judgments are, first, about 
“animals” in their totality, and second, if animals are to be introduced by way 
of their lacking something thought to be “essentially” human. There is no need 
to either prop up arguments by reference to a lack in animals, nor is there a 
need for a constant vigilance with respect to the supposed “true” borders of 
humanity proper.
A conscious stance of not being able to judge and assess animals in a 
casual manner will lead to more diverse and more sophisticated theoretical 
constructions, since they are rid of the need to support themselves by a casual 
dismissal of nonhuman animals and by constant exhortations of human 
exceptionalism. The deliberate stance of “inability” is simultaneously a step 
back in its refusal to discuss “animals” as such and a step closer to the unique 
specificity of life’s myriad forms.
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VINICIUS ROMANINI 
University of Säo Paulo, Brazil
The mathematical theory of information is a useful tool in technology and the 
study of processes based on discrete changes of states, but does not help us 
to understand biological phenomena, such as life, evolution, growth, habit- 
taking and development, all of them intrinsically dependent on some sort of 
telic and continuous dynamics in the background. Biosemiotics has adopted 
Peirce’s concepts of sign and semiosis to fill this gap, but has not yet accepted 
Peirce’s own concept of information. Peirce’s theory of information is, however, 
a fundamental and necessary ingredient for understanding semiosis as a living 
process in which a community of interpretants share the form of the dynamic 
object. Peirce’s information is at once bioinformation and the ground of all 
kinds of biosemiosis. As a result of our own research, we will further show 
that there might be four types of bioinformation (perceptive, inquisitive, 
deliberative and scientific). The study of this typology of information might 
allow for a biosemiotic classification of all living species according to their 
ability to develop by taking habits, which is the same as internalizing bio­
information. 1
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Biosemiotic information
See also Minute Semeiotic at www.minutesemeiotic.org.
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Uexküll’s contribution to an interdisciplinary concept 
of vision and knowing
TORSTEN RÜTING 
University of Hamburg, Germany
Semioticians claim to deliver a fundamental and interdisciplinary conceptua­
lisation ofhuman knowing. Since media increasingly rely on non-verbal visual 
sign systems, theories of seeing should combine semiotics and biology of vision. 
Such a synthetic approach was offered by the biologist Jakob von Uexküll 
(1864-1944). I will show that his description of seeing is also fundamental 
for the understanding of his theory of signs. Uexkülls explanations give insight 
into the physiological process of sign formation and reveal the cybernetic 
nature of this process. Uexkülls theory of vision thus also helps to understand 
his famous function-cycle (Funktionskreis) as an illustration of sign formation 
on a basic level. Uexküll also shows how various sensory modalities and bodily 
functions are integrated, which explains similarities in the perception and 
production of signs. His theory thus proved relevant to scientists and artists 
and may foster interdisciplinary ways of knowing for the future.
The origin of mind: Transition from 
protosemiosis to eusemiosis
ALEXEI SHAROV
National Institute on Aging, Baltimore, USA
One of the challenges in biosemiotics is to uncover threshold zones between 
levels of semiotic organization in evolving organisms (Kull 2009). The origin 
of mind, which is a tool for classifying and modelling objects, marks an 
evolutionary transition from protosemiotic agents that use signs to directly 
control their actions, to eusemiotic agents that can associate signs with ideal 
objects. In contrast to real objects, which are components of the outside world, 
ideal objects exist within minds and serve as tools for classifying real objects. 
Ideal objects are functional subunits within complex material systems (e.g. 
“brain-objects” in Swan, Goldberg 2010); but their functions are more stable 
than material implementations. The hallmark of mind is a holistic perception 
of objects, which is not reducible to individual features or signals. Thus the 
topology of attractors in the phase space of mind is more important than 
specific signalling pathways. Each attractor represents an ideal object, and
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trajectories that converge to an attractor correspond to possible ways of 
identifying objects. The initial state of mind in each trajectory is set by a combi­
nation of sensorial inputs. Mind can support a higher level of intentionality in 
agents because goals are represented by ideal objects. Although simple ideal 
objects can emerge via genetic selection, individual learning is a substantially 
more efficient mechanism than selection for the development of new ideal 
objects and improving already existing ones. Epigenetic mechanisms seem 
to play a crucial role for the origin and function of mind. Chromatin states 
are repaired after perturbations and thus create a large number of attractors, 
which serve as rewritable memory signs. A primitive form of mind may exist 
in a single cell, where the nucleus plays the role of the brain. Thus multicellular 
brains in animals are communities of cellular “minds” of individual neurons. 
The ability of agents to classify objects may have originated from their 
capacity to distinguish states of their own body in order to prioritize various 
functions. Ideal objects are primitive models that allow agents to anticipate 
unperceived features of real objects. Within primary modelling systems, ideal 
objects are not connected with each other, but instead are tailored directly for 
specific functions. In the secondary modelling system (Sebeok, Danesi 2000), 
ideal objects become interconnected via arbitrarily established links (e.g. in 
associative and dynamic models). Language, which is the tertiary modelling 
system, supports efficient communication of models between individuals. 
Models are not universal and require testing if applied in unusual situations. 
Testing of models can be described by commuting diagrams (Cariani 2011), 
which I modify to include object tracking or manipulation. A model (F )  is 
correct if M (G (0 ) )  = F ( M ( 0 ))  for each object О within a given set, where 
M (O )  is an ideal object that results from measurement or classification of 
object O, and G(O) is a result of object tracking or manipulation.
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Pointing, reaching, grasping, and tapping as self- 
signifying gestures: End-effectors, from pebble tools 
to smart devices
PAUL MATTHEW ST. PIERRE 
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada
This paper proposes a biosemiotic theory of hand gestures through human 
evolution, from the Oldowan or Mode One stone tool industry of H om o habilis 
(2.6-1.7 million years ago), through the Acheulean or Mode Two stone tool 
industry of H om o ered u s  (starting 1.7 million years ago). Throughout their 
evolution, human organisms have made and operated handheld tools, using 
coherent hand gestures of pointing, reaching, and grasping, incorporating 
power grips, precision grips, and tapping gestures, tools that fit in the palm 
of the hand like a pebble. All these gestures (those of the hand alone and of 
the hand grasping and employing tools with irregular edges, from choppers, 
scrapers, and pounders to keyboards and touchpads, and robotic end-effectors) 
are self-signifying biosemiotically, ( l )  because they have irregular edges, 
designed to effect work, that replicate the irregular edges of the asymmetrical 
human hand, and (2) because they convey information primarily about the 
operation of the hand or end-effector and the work it performs with handheld 
tools, ranging, for example, from killing, bleeding, and defeathering a bird 
of old to tapping out a tweet on Twitter today. My argument contends that 
messaging gestures on handheld devices convey information primarily about 
manipulative handwork, in which respect I demonstrate that, biosemiotically, 
handheld devices in the digital age have evolved from the stone tool industries 
to transmit messages about work, the survival of organisms and species, and 
the link between the hand as tool and the tool as end-effector.
Like seeks like? Dog-owner resemblance as a case 
of semiotic co-option
MARCO STELLA
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
Reports on a striking resemblance between an owner and his dog are more 
than common. The last decade or so has brought new scientific studies, that, 
only with a few exceptions, have confirmed this old folk knowledge. In several 
independent studies, observers were statistically significantly able to match
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dog’s and owner’s photographs. However, evidence of the precise source of 
this resemblance is missing. Other studies show, for example, resemblances in 
psychological character traits, but this evidence is weak and such information 
cannot be read directly from photographs. Using Geometric Morphometries 
(GM M ), we will precisely measure the similarity between the dog’s and 
owner’s most visible semantic organ (i.e. the face) without the necessity of 
using observers-raters. We can then conclude whether the correctly evaluated 
similarity can be attributed (at least partly) to the physical resemblance of face 
structures and the shape of the face as such (the use of GMM will exclude 
certain simpler traits such as hair colour or general hairiness, which could also 
be another source of similarity). If a match will be found, this resemblance 
could be considered as a case of semiotic co-option.
Dual inheritance theory and the problem 
of the origins of language
ANTON SUKHOVERKHOV
Kuban State Agrarian University, Krasnodar, Russia
My presentation considers the general theory of memory and dual inheritance 
theory. The theoretical and methodological foundations for this study are 
semiotic, ecological and process approaches. It is stated that there are general 
principles of the function and reproduction of biological and social systems, 
namely, these systems determine and are determined by the re-constructive 
processes of accumulation, maintenance and transmission of inherited infor­
mation. In this presentation the general principles of the theory of memory 
and semiotics are applied to explain the origin and evolution of language and 
communication. It is argued that language origin, maintenance and trans­
mission in biological and social systems presuppose both biological and 
cultural inheritance and constant correlation of language-related activities 
with natural or index signs.
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The language of life
JANA ŠVORCOVÄ, ANTON MARKOŠ 
Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
Our paper offers an additional dimension to the rigid view that living beings 
are only driven and programmed by a hierarchy of hardwired codes. We trace 
life at different levels of organization to the cohabitation of individuals within 
and between historically established lineages. Ways of such cohabitation 
depend on the experience of particular guilds or aggregates; they cannot be 
easily foretold from any basic level of description, they are distributed across 
all levels, and across all members of the community. Such phenomena of 
interactivity constitute a lived world which, we argue, represents a genuine 
analogy with our domain of human cultures and languages (Markoš 2002; 
Markoš et al. 2009; Markoš, Švorcovä 2009; Markoš, Faltynek 2011).
Examples, on which we would like to demonstrate the historically based 
concept of meaning, are:
(1) That protein folding is not completely provided by the code but is 
rather dependent on the historical (evolution, ontogeny) or ad hoc 
(e.g. temperature, mating season, etc.) contingencies, or on the expe­
rience of the given cell/organism.
(2) That chemical diacritics, such as epigenetic modifications like DNA 
methylation or histone code, can be written and rewritten and how 
they influence the behaviour within the cell.
(3) That the decisive factor of ontogeny, i.e. of patterning multicellular 
bodies, is not the mere digital representation of genes but, rather, 
how the gene is understood in the overall “cultural” context of the 
species/culture (Švorcovä 2012).
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On the notion of induced semiosis, with emphasis on 
anthropogenic semiosis
MORTEN T0N N ESSEN  
University of Stavanger, Norway
In this presentation Sharov s (2010) notion of induced semiosis, which repre­
sents a valuable contribution to biosemiotic vocabulary, will be analysed and 
further developments of the term suggested. According to Sharov, agents, 
which are either living organisms or their products, “are defined as systems 
with goal-directed programmed behaviour” (ibid, 1052), and semiosis “can 
be inherited or induced by higher-level agents” (ibid, 1050). In Sharovs 
conception, induced semiosis concerns sign exchange which is induced 
(initiated) by some higher-level agent for some purpose. The various forms 
of anthropogenic induced semiosis can, in the perspective of human ecology 
(i.e. ecosemiotics), be considered as constituting a further effectory layer in 
humankinds control system qua global species. Non-human agents involved 
in such sign exchange are generally only vicariously goal-directed -  it is our 
goals they are set to pursue.
But what about the myriad of cases in which biosemiotic sign exchange 
is triggered by our global civilization but not intended  by any human agent? 
Is not such semiosis induced (and anthropogenic) as well? We thus have to 
distinguish between induced semiosis qua com m unicative system triggered by 
some intending agent and induced semiosis as triggered by the activity o f some 
comm unicative system but not intended by its controlling agents. This latter kind, 
enveloping a variety of unintended consequences, is arguably an equally 
informative measure of our ecological impact.
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Senses of significance and meaning in the models 
of biosemiotic sign
TOMMIVEHKAVAARA 
University of Tampere, Finland
If biosemiotics is to make any real difference to standard non-semiotic biology, 
it has to introduce an irreducible concept of biological meaning or significance. 
Quite often, such an idea of meaning is left implicit or vague, although the 
choice of the prototype idea has its effects on the corresponding concept of 
biosemiotic sign or of semiotic character. A tricky situation appears if the 
motivation for biosemiotics includes one kind of intuition or intention about 
biological significance, but the chosen basic semiotic concepts contain implicitly 
incompatible or inapplicable kinds of concepts of meaning or significance.
I suspect that this is often the case when Peirce’s concept of sign or its 
derivatives are employed at the level of biosemiotic theory For Peirce, a sign 
was a logical concept and he kept logic more abstract as a science than any 
special science, including biosemiotics (^ ‘psychical bioscience’). However, 
it does not follow that the concept of psychological or biological sign would 
necessarily obey a similar structure and have corresponding components. 
Peirce’s concept of meaning contains the idea of increasing self-awareness, to 
which semiotic normativity and thus sign action, semiosis is tightly connected. 
Moreover, it also includes the idea of the external testability of the content. 
Neither of them seems to be well applicable in biosemiotics, except perhaps 
in zoosemiotics of large mammals. Instead, both of them can be seen as valuable 
at the meta-level, in m aking of the biosemiotic science (its concepts, etc.), not 
at the level of biosemiotic theory, although there have been several attempts 
(mine included) to do so.
I would like to suggest that Peirce’s triadic concept of sign as the communion 
of sign, its object, and its interpretant does not have much use at the level of 
biosemiotic theory; instead, we need more general concepts of sign, and not 
necessarily a single concept. For instance, a concept of non-representational 
but still triadic sign might be handy. In many purpose-oriented actions of 
humans and other ‘higher’ mammals, for instance, two different concepts of 
sign can be seen at work: the representational truth-normative (and Peircean) 
one, and the other more general, non-representational and action-normative 
one that has no equivalent to the Peircean object of sign.
222 M ain Programme
On the semiotics of “interjections”
EKATERINA VELMEZOVA 
University of Lausanne, Switzerland
There exists a group of words in languages that is often defined (or simply 
referred to) as “interjections” and which are very different from other linguistic 
elements on several grounds:2
a) phonetically: they sometimes contain sounds which are atypical of 
their corresponding languages;
b) morphologically: they are often devoid of any morphological struc­
ture;
c) syntactically: either they form phrases in themselves or they are 
syntactically independent of other parts of sentences (which explains 
their initial designation when this group of words was distinguished 
for the first time in the history of language sciences, cf. inter-jection, in 
modern English);
d) stylistically: the majority of these words are more commonly found 
in informal spoken utterances than in literary languages, etc.
On the basis of these criteria (the list of which is far from exhaustive), 
very heterogeneous words are often grouped under the common label of 
“interjection” such as exclamations and onomatopoeia, words specific to 
child speech and language, particular words used to address domestic animals, 
words of etiquette, the so-called “verbal interjections”, etc. The majority of 
these words are often considered to be at the periphery of the “intellectual 
language”, closer to the “emotional” one (the question why “interjections” are 
sometimes viewed as elements of human language that have more in common 
with “animal signs” than other linguistic units needs particular attention). 
In our paper, which oversteps the limits of a purely linguistic approach, we 
will dwell on the semiotics of these words, offering some semiotic criteria and 
grounds for their distinction. More precisely, the following questions will be 
the main focus of our study:
l )  What kind of signs are “interjections”? Should one consider them to 
be exceptions to the general rule of language signs’ arbitrariness, as
2 Some linguists deny “interjections” the status of “words” and even that of “language elements”: 
in their theories, this problem is linked to the question of the concept of language itself.
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F. de Saussure did? Can “interjections” be considered as symbols or 
indexes?
2) Why does Ch. Peirce’s semiotics seem much more appropriate for the 
study of “interjections” than the Saussurean approach?
3) Is it possible to distinguish one general semiotic function of words 
referred to as “interjections”?
In the history of language sciences, some attempts have already been under­
taken to provide answers to these questions; they go back to various epochs 
and to the descriptions of the grammars of specific languages. The fact that 
no due attention seems to have been paid to these answers yet also deserves 
particular consideration.
Umwelt and Lebenswelt: Between subjective 
significance and intersubjective understanding 
in human semiotics
ZDZISLAWW4SIK 
Wroclaw, Poland
The subject matter of this lecture will be constituted of a discussion of the 
semiotic properties of human beings who are engaged in communicative 
interactions as meaning creators and meaning utilizers. Confronting the 
biological view o f  Umwelt w ith  the anthropological specifications oiLebensw elt 
and Eigenwelt des M enschen, the concept of semiotic self, initially referring to 
an organism which emits to and subsumes signals from its environment as 
significant, will be counterpoised to the concept of communicating self as 
an observable person who sends and receives the meaning bearers and as 
an inferred subject who interprets and understands them appropriately. In 
consequence, solipsism, usually opposed to collectivism, will be discussed 
under the label of cognitive semiotics in terms of collective solipsism. Against 
the background of the European heritage of transcendental, existential and 
mundane phenomenology, the theories of personal constructs and social 
construction of reality, with special reference to radical constructivism, will 
be taken into consideration in order to show that man is a social being whose 
contacts with external environments are mediated by verbal and nonverbal 
means of signification and communication, and that it is language which
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“objectivates” the shared experiences of communicating individuals, making 
them available to all members who belong to a given speech community, 
becomingin such a way both the source and the tool of collective understanding 
and knowledge. To sum up, language and culture-centred conceptions of sign 
and meaning will be juxtaposed here with the human-nature-and-culture- 
centred conceptions of subjective significance, on the one hand, and the 
intersubjective understanding on the other, which happen to take place in the 
collective ecosemiotic systems of communicating selves.
Generalizing von Neumann’s theory 
of self-reproducing automata for biosemiotics
DENNIS P. WATERS 
New York, USA
John von Neumann’s Theory o f  Self-Reproducing Autom ata  has emerged as a 
plausible model for thinking about biosemiotic processes (De Beule 2011; 
Waters 2011; Barbieri 2009). However, in the form presented by von Neu­
mann (1966) and elaborated by Howard Pattee (2008; 2009), it is focused 
on the use of symbol strings to guide the physical construction of functional 
devices.
While this abstraction maps remarkably well to the construction of enzymes 
by nucleic acid templates in the cell, its mapping to higher-level biosemiotic 
processes, such as human language, presents a challenge. Human language 
does not physically construct humans; rather, it constrains and configures 
humans previously constructed by other means.
Can von Neumann’s theory be adapted to incorporate configuration as 
well as construction? This paper outlines some of the challenges and proposes 
a more generalized version of von Neumann’s model as a preliminary step.
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There is no outside: A biological corollary 
for poetic space
ANDREAS WEBER 
Berlin, Germany
In contemporary biology life is usually understood as a meaning process 
happening on matter. In this understanding there exist two separated spheres, 
the material and the symbolical one. The degree to which the notion of 
meaning is stressed distinguishes the semiotic approach in biology (primacy 
of meaning) from “mainstream” biology (secondness of meaning, e.g. code/ 
interpretation in some areas of the organism, DNA).
In this paper I want to propose a different understanding of the lived 
dimension. I want to define the living as a poetic space, which encompasses 
both material processes and meaning relations, joining them to a lived ex­
perience, which is “felt” or subjective from the inside and “sensuous” or “ex­
pressive” from the outside. The poetic space is not inside as “spirit” but inside as 
body, which can be best understood as metamorphic material which is always 
meaningful. This can be related to the idea of “core self” (Panksepp 1997).
I want to argue that the phenomenon of the living starts in this “hybrid” 
region of being neither inside nor outside. The lived space is rather a continuous 
communication of felt meaning which at the same time is materially embodied 
and “ideally” symbolic. The poetic space of the living hence has to be conceived 
of as really one space. This idea breaks with any notion of primacy of either 
matter or symbolic relationships and hence in a radical way is nondualistic 
(there is no outside to this poetic space, the poetic space encompasses both 
organic and anorganic matter).
At the same time it becomes clear that the imaginary scene of this poetic 
space can be subject to transformation from both sides: through material 
manipulation but also through imaginative creation. The poetic space is the
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only transformable space that there is. The poetic space of the living is open to 
new interpretations, new framing of utterances of self-expression and can be 
really transformed in that way.
In this respect the poetic space of the living is also the place of freedom, 
where in a certain range of existential flexibility no pre-established values 
of good or bad exist. It is clear that material impacts can be of existential 
importance, but also signs can be of healing or mortal influence. Both levels, 
however, are never separable and always joint: because the poetic space is the 
only space where living occurs, any material impact has “felt” consequences 
and vice versa (Weber 2001, etc.).
From this point one could argue that any sense-making processes should 
take place in this lived poetic space. There are, thus, direct implications for our 
daily dealings with our being alive, the life on this planet and our relationship 
to the living, which at the moment are treated as rather technical or structural 
matters. Learning from the idea of poetic space, it should follow that any 
process of imagining and transforming reality has its greatest potential to be 
alive if it is a poetic -  or artistic -  process.
A practice of using the poetic space of the living as transformational and 
enlivening process can be found in the work of the performance artist Shelley 
Sacks, who creates poetic or “felt” spaces to generate a process of transforming 
reality as artistic process. I propose to generalize her idea to a “biology of 
the artistic process” which can be used to return to a fruitful and creative 
relationship towards life not only in scientific understanding but also in more 
general (and urgent) areas of our livelihoods.
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Augustine and the ape: A biosemiotic investigation 
into the nature of life
DAVIDE WEIBLE 
University of Tartu, Estonia
Everyday ordinary language deeply relies on the exploitation of visual meta­
phors that, by referring to the phenomenon of light, the faculty of sight and the 
organ of the eye, draw a striking parallel between, on one side, the functioning 
of the mind in its meaning generation and understanding processes and, on 
the other side, visual perception. “I see what you mean”, “the eye of the mind” 
and “an illuminating idea” are a few examples of this rhetorical mechanism.
Nevertheless, this analogy between thinking and perceiving could not be 
intuitively understood without another implicit assumption, namely a kind of 
likeness between the external space of visual perception and the internal space 
of visual cognition. If understanding is somehow akin to seeing, then there 
must be an inner space of mind where this occurs.
Before a controversial and questionable reason connected to our neuro­
logical and psychological nature, there is doubtless a historical ground on 
which it is more likely to agree: if we speak and think today in terms of an 
inner mental space where visual-like phenomena happen, this is due to the 
philosophical-religious synthesis operated in the meditation of St. Augustine 
between, on one side, Plato’s identification between knowledge and vision 
and, on the other side, Plotinus’ inward turn towards the space of mind. In 
respect to Augustine’s philosophy of mind, peculiar significance is then given 
to the functions of memory and productive imagination, through which 
human intentionality is able to creatively produce new meanings in the inner 
mental dimension of consciousness.
Nonetheless, ethological experiments carried out on primates dealing 
with problem-solving situations seem to suggest that something very 
similar is happening in the proto-mind of our closest ancestors: when facing 
circumstances that require an original and innovative rearrangement of 
elements at their disposal, they behave as if  something akin to a mental inner 
representation of the scene before their eyes were created and its structure 
were somehow abstractly manipulated to find a suitable solution, a solution to 
be proved by the concrete behaviour subsequent to this reflexive moment.
According to the historical-natural theory of knowledge which goes by the 
name of Evolutionary Epistemology, the vision-based thinking described by 
Augustine and hypothesized to be proper to some primates is nothing but an 
advanced evolutionary step of a far more primitive process by means of which
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the primary connection between life and movement is vicariously supported 
by the creation of a complex apparatus of perceptive and proprioceptive 
systems, of which vision is one of the most prominent. What is basically 
missing in such a perspective are both some corrective conceptual tools 
within evolutionary biology itself, in order to avoid strictly adaptationist 
interpretations of how the creation of biological novelties actually occurs, 
and a biosemiotic approach able to properly account for this “long-distance 
relationship” between living beings and their surrounding environments, a 
relationship whose mediating and mediated character cannot be explained 
otherwise than by its semiotic nature.
References
Augustine of Hippo 1968. De Trinitate. Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina, vol. 50. 
Turnholt: Brepols.
Gould, Stephen J. 2002. Jhe Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press.
Lorenz, Konrad 1973. Die Rückseite des Spiegels: Versuch einer Naturgeschichte 
menschlichen Erkennens. München: Piper.
Merleau-Ponty’s ontological bridge between 
biosemiotics and culture
LOUISE WESTLING 
University of Oregon, USA
Scholars such as Jesper Hoffmeyer (2008) and Wendy Wheeler (2006) have 
acknowledged the relevance of Merleau-Ponty s philosophy for biosemiotics. 
This paper will demonstrate how his chiasmic ontology, with its understanding 
of the world itself as the only Logos and animality as its incorporated meaning, 
explains the emergence of human communication and cultural behaviour 
within the semiosphere in synergy with other organisms. “Their landscapes 
interweave, their actions and their passions fit together exactly” he says in The 
Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 144). His Nature lectures at the 
College de France explored research in embryology, ethology, and evolutionary 
biology to demonstrate the complementarity between philosophy and science, 
and the philosopher’s ability to “see behind the scientist” broader meanings
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and consequences of experimental findings. Discussing Jakob von Uexküll and 
Niko Tinbergen, for example, he explains how their work demonstrates the 
beginnings of culture in other animals, such as the crab: “The architecture of 
symbols that the animal brings from its side thus defines within Nature a species 
of preculture” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 176). Merleau-Ponty s linguistic theories-  
developed in dialogue with cognitive psychology and studies of infant language 
acquisition -  help him to explore how literature and the other arts function as 
human modes of redoubling and inscribing the wild Being we share with the 
rest of life. His philosophy thus provides a foundation for new interdisciplinary 
approaches in environmental humanities that are poised for collaboration with 
biosemiotics.
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Genetic information, mechanical interpreters and 
thermodynamics: The physico-informatic basis 
of biosemiosis
PETER R. WILLS
Hie LJniversity of Auckland, New Zealand
The sequence of nucleotide bases occurring in an organism’s DNA is often 
regarded as a codescript for its construction. However, information in a DNA 
sequence can only be regarded as a codescript relative to a biochemical machine 
which the information constrains in such a way as to direct the process of 
construction (Wills 2009). In reality, any biochemical machine for which a DNA 
codescript is efficacious is itself produced through the mechanical interpretation 
of an identical or very similar codescript. In these terms the origin of life can 
be described as a bootstrap process involving the simultaneous accumulation
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of genetic information and the generation of a machine that interprets it as 
instructions for its own construction. This problem will be discussed within the 
theoretical frameworks of thermodynamics, informatics and self-reproducing 
automata, paying special attention to the physico-chemical origin of genetic 
coding and the conditions, both thermodynamic and informatic, that a system 
must fulfil in order for it to sustain semiosis. The conclusion reached is that 
biological systems are necessarily semiotic and vice-versa.
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Affect, attention, and organic selection
MARA CAY WOODS 
Claypool, Indiana, USA
In the life of an animal, the functional cycles of its past resonate into those 
of the future. Results of past perception-action sequences influence which 
potential perceptual cues of the world enter into the umwelt. One mechanism 
by which potential perceptual cues are marked and weighed for their salience 
to the organism’s needs is through the influence of affect on attention.
Affective impulses stem from an endosemiosic chain that represents the 
organism’s needs (which the functional cycles of the animal are constructed to 
meet), drives, motivations, appetites, and other dispositions in the body and 
life history of the animal. The semiosic processes that underlie the dispositions 
resonate outward, as it were, towards the object in the umwelt, and yet 
resonate inward, affecting the innenweit without the presence of perceptual or 
operational cues to anchor them. Additionally, this resonance, when anchored 
to perceptual or operational cue-carriers, is experienced not only as properties 
of the external object alone but also the attraction or repulsion of the self in 
connection to that object. Thus, as a complement to the concept of functional 
tone, the concept of affective resonance is introduced.
The role of affective resonance in biasing the choices the animal makes in 
its lifetime suggests a larger role for it in phylogenetic change. Sensitivity to 
affective resonance is here suggested as a type of phenotypic plasticity and is 
hypothesized to be a site of organic selection.
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Code semiosis, interpretative semiosis and 
translation modelling
SHUOYU CHARLOTTE WU
National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, Taiwan
The burgeoning literature on translation as interpretative semiosis is in­
triguing. Translation as interpretative semiosis implies the construction 
of an inter-dependent relation between texts in translational process. The 
interpretative semiosis of translation manifests itself through constructing 
unlimited textual and intertextual relationships between the translated and 
translatant texts. Viewing translation as interpretative semiosis means seeing 
translation from the angle of text modelling, since the interpretative relation 
arises not from individual signs in both texts, but from both of them being 
treated as unitary texts. In this case, the interpretative semiosis of translation 
is not limited to the genesis of one particular text, but mirrors the different 
textual modelling processes that Juri M. Lotman suggests. However, both the 
Peircean and Lotmanian viewpoints suggest ‘translation as understanding or 
comprehension in communication, which is broader than the Jakobsonian 
trichotomy of interlingual, intralingual and intersemiotic translation (hence­
forth: Translation). The difference between the two is that in Translation, in 
addition to building an intersemiosic relation, the agent is also implicated, as 
translators undergird the whole process related to code selection/realization. 
Hence, I propose to include Marcello Barbieri’s notion of code semiosis for 
demonstrating the nature of Translation modelling. Code semiosis may shed 
light on Translation modelling when we accommodate coding rules, sign, 
meaning and translator into Jakobsons communication model. In this project, 
my adaptation of code semiosis and Jakobsons model will be used to explain 
how Translation modelling functions as meta-text modelling achieved by the 
complimentary relation between code and interpretative semiosis.
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Tactile scores: How tactile perception leads 
to convergence semiosis
A. AMBRA ZAGHETrO 
University of Milano Bicocca, Italy
The word score’ indicates a handwritten or printed form of musical notation, 
and the medium of scores is typically paper. On the one hand, the notion of 
‘score’ is based on the categorization of the scores musical symbols (visual 
input) and, on the other hand, it is related to the production of a vocal/instru­
mental performance (auditory output/input). The musical performance 
is something perceived through the auditory channel, which is apparently 
incompatible with hearing impairments. However, deaf people too are 
able to perceive the musical input by using hearing aids or through tactile 
perception. ‘Tactile score’ is a term for indicating dynamical sequences of relief 
signs organized from the left to the right side of a limited paper space. The 
performance of a ‘tactile score’ does not implicate the use of instruments and 
it can be realized by people with or without perception impairments. Using 
‘tactile scores’ (tactile plates) I explore the relief signs categorization process 
in hearing and deaf subjects. Data show that tactile sensation enriches the 
visual input and leads to the creation of convergent communication in both 
groups (the performance result). I discover the semiosic process in hearing 
and deaf subjects by analysing the relations between different sign systems 
and observing the ‘tactile scores’ performances.
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W ith biosemiotics, “a new and profoundly revolutionary 
world of thought seemed to be coming into being right 
before my very eyes/’ writes Donald Favareau. Here we 
commemorate the 12th annual Gatherings in Biosemiotics, 
and the first and thus far the only regular series of worldwide 
conferences in semiotic biology.
This volume includes a self-descriptive complete history of 
the G a th erings  2 0 0 1 -2 0 1 2  as told by their organizers, Jesper 
Hoffmeyer, Donald Favareau, Claus Emmeche, Kalevi Kull, 
Anton Markos, Almo Farina, Barend van Heusden, Argyris 
Arnellos, Joäo Carlos Major, Victoria Alexander, and others.
It also includes material on the contemporary approaches 
to biosemiotics by Kalevi Kull, Terrence Deacon, Stuart 
Kauffman, Howard Pattee and Myrdene Anderson. In 
addition to the full list of abstracts, the work collected in 
G a therin gs in B iosem iotics presents the current spectrum of 
thought on semiotic biology in one congregate volume.
